Ik kreeg onlangs deze verwijzing:
'paul said...
De behandeling van de "familiejuwelen" van de CIA in de media doet me denken aan de woorden van Harold Pinter over de smerige oorlogen door de VS in zijn Nobelprijs-rede van vorig jaar: "It never happened. Nothing ever happened. Even while it was happening it wasn’t happening. It didn’t matter. It was of no interest."Roger Morris geeft een fascinerend beeld van de CIA-cultuur in zijn driedelige artikel over Robert Gates (opvolger Rumsfeld). Die cultuur is er een van ijzervreterige domheid en wreedheid . En inderdaad, zoals jij zegt Stan, de gewelddadige complotten zijn geen betreurenswaardige excessen maar vormen een institutioneel onderdeel van Amerikaanse rol in de wereld.Inleiding en links naar Morris' artikelen: http://www.bogobogo.nl/artikel/514/1710279.html'
De behandeling van de "familiejuwelen" van de CIA in de media doet me denken aan de woorden van Harold Pinter over de smerige oorlogen door de VS in zijn Nobelprijs-rede van vorig jaar: "It never happened. Nothing ever happened. Even while it was happening it wasn’t happening. It didn’t matter. It was of no interest."Roger Morris geeft een fascinerend beeld van de CIA-cultuur in zijn driedelige artikel over Robert Gates (opvolger Rumsfeld). Die cultuur is er een van ijzervreterige domheid en wreedheid . En inderdaad, zoals jij zegt Stan, de gewelddadige complotten zijn geen betreurenswaardige excessen maar vormen een institutioneel onderdeel van Amerikaanse rol in de wereld.Inleiding en links naar Morris' artikelen: http://www.bogobogo.nl/artikel/514/1710279.html'
Ik heb die toespraak van Pinter weer eens gelezen. Hij zei bij de aanvaarding van de Nobelprijs onder andere dit: '
'As every single person here knows, the justification for the invasion of Iraq was that Saddam Hussein possessed a highly dangerous body of weapons of mass destruction, some of which could be fired in 45 minutes, bringing about appalling devastation. We were assured that was true. It was not true. We were told that Iraq had a relationship with Al Quaeda and shared responsibility for the atrocity in New York of September 11th 2001. We were assured that this was true. It was not true. We were told that Iraq threatened the security of the world. We were assured it was true. It was not true.
The truth is something entirely different. The truth is to do with how the United States understands its role in the world and how it chooses to embody it.
But before I come back to the present I would like to look at the recent past, by which I mean United States foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. I believe it is obligatory upon us to subject this period to at least some kind of even limited scrutiny, which is all that time will allow here.
Everyone knows what happened in the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe during the post-war period: the systematic brutality, the widespread atrocities, the ruthless suppression of independent thought. All this has been fully documented and verified.
But my contention here is that the US crimes in the same period have only been superficially recorded, let alone documented, let alone acknowledged, let alone recognised as crimes at all. I believe this must be addressed and that the truth has considerable bearing on where the world stands now. Although constrained, to a certain extent, by the existence of the Soviet Union, the United States' actions throughout the world made it clear that it had concluded it had carte blanche to do what it liked.
Direct invasion of a sovereign state has never in fact been America's favoured method. In the main, it has preferred what it has described as 'low intensity conflict'. Low intensity conflict means that thousands of people die but slower than if you dropped a bomb on them in one fell swoop. It means that you infect the heart of the country, that you establish a malignant growth and watch the gangrene bloom. When the populace has been subdued - or beaten to death - the same thing - and your own friends, the military and the great corporations, sit comfortably in power, you go before the camera and say that democracy has prevailed. This was a commonplace in US foreign policy in the years to which I refer.
The tragedy of Nicaragua was a highly significant case. I choose to offer it here as a potent example of America's view of its role in the world, both then and now.
I was present at a meeting at the US embassy in London in the late 1980s.
The United States Congress was about to decide whether to give more money to the Contras in their campaign against the state of Nicaragua. I was a member of a delegation speaking on behalf of Nicaragua but the most important member of this delegation was a Father John Metcalf. The leader of the US body was Raymond Seitz (then number two to the ambassador, later ambassador himself). Father Metcalf said: 'Sir, I am in charge of a parish in the north of Nicaragua. My parishioners built a school, a health centre, a cultural centre. We have lived in peace. A few months ago a Contra force attacked the parish. They destroyed everything: the school, the health centre, the cultural centre. They raped nurses and teachers, slaughtered doctors, in the most brutal manner. They behaved like savages. Please demand that the US government withdraw its support from this shocking terrorist activity.'
Raymond Seitz had a very good reputation as a rational, responsible and highly sophisticated man. He was greatly respected in diplomatic circles. He listened, paused and then spoke with some gravity. 'Father,' he said, 'let me tell you something. In war, innocent people always suffer.' There was a frozen silence. We stared at him. He did not flinch.
Innocent people, indeed, always suffer...'
The truth is something entirely different. The truth is to do with how the United States understands its role in the world and how it chooses to embody it.
But before I come back to the present I would like to look at the recent past, by which I mean United States foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. I believe it is obligatory upon us to subject this period to at least some kind of even limited scrutiny, which is all that time will allow here.
Everyone knows what happened in the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe during the post-war period: the systematic brutality, the widespread atrocities, the ruthless suppression of independent thought. All this has been fully documented and verified.
But my contention here is that the US crimes in the same period have only been superficially recorded, let alone documented, let alone acknowledged, let alone recognised as crimes at all. I believe this must be addressed and that the truth has considerable bearing on where the world stands now. Although constrained, to a certain extent, by the existence of the Soviet Union, the United States' actions throughout the world made it clear that it had concluded it had carte blanche to do what it liked.
Direct invasion of a sovereign state has never in fact been America's favoured method. In the main, it has preferred what it has described as 'low intensity conflict'. Low intensity conflict means that thousands of people die but slower than if you dropped a bomb on them in one fell swoop. It means that you infect the heart of the country, that you establish a malignant growth and watch the gangrene bloom. When the populace has been subdued - or beaten to death - the same thing - and your own friends, the military and the great corporations, sit comfortably in power, you go before the camera and say that democracy has prevailed. This was a commonplace in US foreign policy in the years to which I refer.
The tragedy of Nicaragua was a highly significant case. I choose to offer it here as a potent example of America's view of its role in the world, both then and now.
I was present at a meeting at the US embassy in London in the late 1980s.
The United States Congress was about to decide whether to give more money to the Contras in their campaign against the state of Nicaragua. I was a member of a delegation speaking on behalf of Nicaragua but the most important member of this delegation was a Father John Metcalf. The leader of the US body was Raymond Seitz (then number two to the ambassador, later ambassador himself). Father Metcalf said: 'Sir, I am in charge of a parish in the north of Nicaragua. My parishioners built a school, a health centre, a cultural centre. We have lived in peace. A few months ago a Contra force attacked the parish. They destroyed everything: the school, the health centre, the cultural centre. They raped nurses and teachers, slaughtered doctors, in the most brutal manner. They behaved like savages. Please demand that the US government withdraw its support from this shocking terrorist activity.'
Raymond Seitz had a very good reputation as a rational, responsible and highly sophisticated man. He was greatly respected in diplomatic circles. He listened, paused and then spoke with some gravity. 'Father,' he said, 'let me tell you something. In war, innocent people always suffer.' There was a frozen silence. We stared at him. He did not flinch.
Innocent people, indeed, always suffer...'
Lees verder: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2005/pinter-lecture-e.html
En ook Paul's verwijzing hiernaar is interessant:
En ook Paul's verwijzing hiernaar is interessant:
Roger Morris: De Robert Gates erfenis (delen 1, 2 en 3)
Door Donkerdoorn
Door Donkerdoorn
Sommige artikelen zijn zo goed, die verdienen gewoon meer aandacht. Dat geldt zeker voor het drieluik van Roger Morris over het leven, en met name de professionele loopbaan, van de nieuwe Amerikaanse minister van Defensie Robert Gates. Zoiets lijkt op het eerste oog een saai en gortdroog relaas te worden, maar Morris “gebruikt” Gates om een veel groter en beduidend spannender verhaal te vertellen.
Oud lid van de National Security Counsil (NSC) Morris schetst in de artikelenreeks een korte geschiedenis van de CIA, vanaf de jaren vijftig tot nu, met alle geheime operaties en interventies. De provinciale en bureaucratische Gates, die uiteindelijk onder de oude Bush zal opklimmen tot directeur van het vermaarde inlichtingenbureau, blijkt direct- of indirect bij veel operaties betrokken te zijn. Maar Morris gaat verder. Hij ziet in Gates een metafoor, of spiegel, van het Amerikaanse internationale beleid door de jaren heen.
Deel 1: The tortured world of US intelligence
“I may be dangerous,” he said, “but I am not wicked. No, I am not wicked.”—Henry James, The American
We volgen de provinciale Gates in zijn jonge jaren en in zijn eerste stappen als medewerker voor de inlichtingendienst. Het zijn de jaren van de koude oorlog, Cuba-crisis en problemen in het Midden Oosten. Zij zullen de jonge Gates vormen.
Deel 2: Great games and famous victories
Over de jaren Nixon en Ford. Het verzet tegen Nixon’s en Kissinger’s détente met de sovjets en China, het opblazen van het SALT-II akkoord, interventie in Zuid Amerika en operaties in het Midden Oosten, en de groteske voorstelling van dreiging vanuit “evil empire” Rusland. De langlopende agenda van mensen als Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz en Richard Perl vanaf de jaren zeventig tot nu.
Deel 3: The world that Bob made
Over de jaren Carter en Reagan. Met het succesvol saboteren van Nixon’s détente politiek door de mensen die later bekend zullen worden als de neocons, breken gouden tijden aan voor de CIA. De gijzelingscrisis met Iran, de oktoberverrassing, Afghanistan, Libanon en natuurlijk het Iran-Contra schandaal. '
Oud lid van de National Security Counsil (NSC) Morris schetst in de artikelenreeks een korte geschiedenis van de CIA, vanaf de jaren vijftig tot nu, met alle geheime operaties en interventies. De provinciale en bureaucratische Gates, die uiteindelijk onder de oude Bush zal opklimmen tot directeur van het vermaarde inlichtingenbureau, blijkt direct- of indirect bij veel operaties betrokken te zijn. Maar Morris gaat verder. Hij ziet in Gates een metafoor, of spiegel, van het Amerikaanse internationale beleid door de jaren heen.
Deel 1: The tortured world of US intelligence
“I may be dangerous,” he said, “but I am not wicked. No, I am not wicked.”—Henry James, The American
We volgen de provinciale Gates in zijn jonge jaren en in zijn eerste stappen als medewerker voor de inlichtingendienst. Het zijn de jaren van de koude oorlog, Cuba-crisis en problemen in het Midden Oosten. Zij zullen de jonge Gates vormen.
Deel 2: Great games and famous victories
Over de jaren Nixon en Ford. Het verzet tegen Nixon’s en Kissinger’s détente met de sovjets en China, het opblazen van het SALT-II akkoord, interventie in Zuid Amerika en operaties in het Midden Oosten, en de groteske voorstelling van dreiging vanuit “evil empire” Rusland. De langlopende agenda van mensen als Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz en Richard Perl vanaf de jaren zeventig tot nu.
Deel 3: The world that Bob made
Over de jaren Carter en Reagan. Met het succesvol saboteren van Nixon’s détente politiek door de mensen die later bekend zullen worden als de neocons, breken gouden tijden aan voor de CIA. De gijzelingscrisis met Iran, de oktoberverrassing, Afghanistan, Libanon en natuurlijk het Iran-Contra schandaal. '
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