donderdag 6 augustus 2026

The Ceuta Crisis

AUGUST 6, 2026

The Ceuta Crisis

Photograph Source: Mario Sánchez Bueno from Ceuta, España – CC BY-SA 2.0

The political reaction to the Ceuta migration crisis showed just how quickly border events become vehicles for much broader themes. At a time when some Europeans have grown weary of Donald Trump, Elon Musk and JD Vance dismissing or belittling Europe, it was easy to interpret the episode as another attempt to portray European governments as weak and divided on migration.

That made the response from parts of Europe particularly striking. Italy, Denmark and Greece were surprisingly quick to criticise Spain during what increasingly appeared to be a migration crisis with a far more complex backstory than headlines initially suggested. Italy’s intervention was especially disingenuous given that Italy has borne the greatest burden of Mediterranean migration for years, receiving far larger numbers of arrivals. Political divisions deepened sufficiently for the European Union to gather together an emergency meeting of interior ministers, while Commission President Ursula von der Leyen publicly defended Spain and stressed European solidarity.

Within forty-eight hours, most of the estimated 60,000 migrants had reportedly returned to Morocco, many voluntarily and others escorted by Spanish authorities. The “invasion”, as the European right described it, proved considerably less dramatic than early political rhetoric suggested. Nevertheless, dozens died during the episode, making it a profound human tragedy. Spain has since reinforced the border with an additional floating sea barrier.

The circumstances remain contested. Some officials, analysts and media reports began suggesting Moroccan authorities had relaxed border enforcement or quietly encouraged movement towards Ceuta, something Rabat has rejected. Several migrants interviewed by international media claimed police directed them towards the frontier.

The impression left across much of Europe was that the crisis had rapidly become politicised. Whatever its immediate causes, political actors had quickly crowbarred the story into pre-existing narratives. Reform UK’s Zia Yusuf travelled to Ceuta, claiming excitedly that he had already spoken to Moroccan migrants hoping ultimately to reach Britain—a remark that reflected how rapidly the episode had been woven into others’ migration debates.

Numerous explanations emerged. Some reflected genuine diplomatic tensions between Spain and Morocco. Others circulated primarily through social media, alleging Israeli retaliation over Spain’s support for Palestine, American pressure following disagreements with Madrid, or Moroccan anger over Spain’s expanding relationship with Algeria. Some suggested these interests had converged.

Each contained enough plausibility to attract attention. Yet the importance of distinguishing genuine conspiracies from conspiracy theories remained. States can play the darkest of games, but suspicion alone does not evidence make.

A fully satisfied Trump argued that Europe was finally experiencing the consequences of migration policies he had long criticised. Across Europe’s far right, politicians blamed Pedro Sánchez’s allegedly permissive immigration policies. Sánchez instead argued that organised trafficking networks had lured migrants with false promises that they would be allowed to remain in Spanish territory. Throughout the crisis he was careful to avoid publicly accusing Morocco despite the obvious diplomatic strain.

The geography of the crisis seemed widely misunderstood. Ceuta has remained under Portuguese and subsequently Spanish sovereignty since 1415, remaining with Spain after Portugal regained independence in the seventeenth century. Although part of both Spain and the European Union, Ceuta occupies a unique legal position. Entry into the enclave does not provide unrestricted access to mainland Spain, and those who entered had neither crossed the Strait of Gibraltar nor acquired any realistic prospect of reaching continental Europe.

One intriguing intervention came from Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. During March 2026 he published a series of striking opinion pieces urging Secretary of State Marco Rubio and President Trump to reconsider longstanding American policy towards Ceuta and Melilla. Rubin argued that Washington should recognise the enclaves as occupied territory and later suggested Morocco could replicate elements of the 1975 Green March strategy, while questioning whether NATO’s Article 6 protections would necessarily apply. Although Rubin was writing in a personal capacity rather than articulating official policy, Moroccan media portrayed his articles as evidence that figures close to Rubio were advocating a significant shift in Washington’s position.

Around the same time, Congressman Thomas Massie highlighted language contained not in legislation itself but in the accompanying House Appropriations Committee report describing Ceuta and Melilla as territories “under the illegal claim” of Morocco. Massie argued this reflected congressional support for reconsidering American policy, although others noted that committee report language neither alters US foreign policy nor binds the executive branch. Even so, the episode showed that questions surrounding the Spanish enclaves had begun surfacing in parts of Washington where they had rarely surfaced before.

The images also jarred with Morocco’s efforts to project itself as a confident, modernising country. Previous research I conducted on Morocco highlighted the restlessness of many younger Moroccans, particularly those associated with the ‘Gen Z 212’ movement, while also illustrating how cautiously even well-informed observers discussed King Mohammed VI.

Online, considerably broader interpretations continued to proliferate. Some social-media users alleged increasingly coordinated pressure involving the United States, Israel, Morocco and elements of Europe’s far right designed to destabilise Spain’s Socialist government, while others connected the episode to domestic legal challenges facing Sánchez’s family. These claims gained traction online but remained unsupported with evidence.

Other commentators focused instead on Spain’s deteriorating relations with Israel and Washington, pointing again to Madrid’s recognition of the State of Palestine, its heavy criticism of Israeli military operations, restrictions on arms shipments through Spanish ports and reported disagreements over the use of American military facilities.

Others placed the Strait of Gibraltar at the heart of the story. Around ten per cent of global maritime trade passes through this strategic choke point. Some commentators argued, in an age of new choke points, that strengthening Moroccan strategic capabilities could ultimately shift the regional balance of influence around the Strait of Gibraltar.

In January 2026, Israel and Morocco signed a joint military action plan. According to defence industry reporting, Israel has become Morocco’s largest defence supplier, while Morocco is significantly expanding its domestic drone industry with Israeli assistance. Reports suggest that a joint maritime surveillance centre is being developed on Morocco’s northern coast.

Morocco is also emerging as an important player in discussions surrounding Israel’s post-war plans for Gaza. Reports have suggested that it could host training for a proposed multinational force of around 20,000 personnel, although both the force and Morocco’s role remain speculative.

The Ceuta crisis illustrated just how migration has become inseparable from wider geopolitical competition. Border incidents are no longer interpreted simply as humanitarian or security events. They are rapidly absorbed into competing narratives about national identity and strategic influence. As with the US-Mexico border, Ceuta became a stage on which domestic politics and information warfare crisscrossed.

Whether the crisis resulted primarily from Moroccan policy, organised smuggling networks, diplomatic tensions or a darker combination of factors remains under debate. What is beyond doubt is that the migration itself became only one part of the story. Far more revealing was the speed with which governments, commentators and online activists transformed a local border emergency into a proxy battle over Europe’s future, transatlantic relations and the emerging balance of power in the western Mediterranean.

Peter Bach lives in London.

https://www.counterpunch.org/2026/08/06/the-ceuta-crisis/

Trump’s 100% Neocon MIC-MAGA Plan for the U.S. to Conquer the World

ERIC ZUESSE

AUG 06, 2026

5 August 2026, by Eric Zuesse. (All of my recent articles can be seen here.)

Being a conservative, U.S. President Trump believes in Might-Makes-Right, and respects power above all else, and so his “Make America Great Again” is aiming for the U.S. empire to continue growing to control ultimately the entire world, and this is why he reallocates hundreds of billions of federal dollars per year that had been spent on education, healthcare, Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security, infrastructure, and consumer protection, to be going in his Administration to the military and to Homeland Security instead. And he knows that the Congress, in both of its Parties, is at least as neocon and pro-military and anti-public as he is, even though congressional Democrats pretend not to be (in order to fool their liberal voters). So, Trump has a plan for America, and he is carrying it out.

Whereas Biden said “I am running the world,” Trump said “I run the country and the world.” They both agreed that the U.S. President runs the world. That statement was aspirational for both of them. But ‘merely’ the aspiration proves how deadly dangerous this Government (in BOTH of its Parties) really IS. The difference between its Parties is superficial — both of them are neoconservative on foreign policies, and neoliberal on domestic policies. And both of those policies mean increasing privatization of governmental assets, so that investors will be able to profit from what had previously been governmental assets and services. Here are recent examples of this bipartisan neoliberal-neoconservative Government, which start from January 2026, and extend till now:

——

https://thealtworld.com/andrew_korybko/the-us-new-national-defense-strategy-calls-for-a-world-war-like-military-build-up

https://web.archive.org/web/20260730221642/https://thealtworld.com/andrew_korybko/the-us-new-national-defense-strategy-calls-for-a-world-war-like-military-build-up

“The US’ New National Defense Strategy Calls For A World War-Like Military Build-Up”

24 January 2026, Andrew Korybko

Trump 2.0 just released its National Defense Strategy (NDS) two months after its National Security Strategy (NSS), and as could be expected, they each preach the need to prioritize the Western Hemisphere. The “Trump Doctrine” that’s discernable within both, which was analyzed here, aims to restore the US’ predominant position (unipolarity) over the Americas and then the rest of the world. …

The Department of War’s (DOW) primary tasks in the Western Hemisphere are defending the US’ borders, countering (Islamic and narco-) terrorists, building the “Golden Dome”, and ensuring military and commercial access to key terrain like Greenland, the Gulf of America, and the Panama Canal. The last-mentioned task is the essence of the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine”. The DOW’s explicit goal … is described as “restor[ing] American military dominance in the Western Hemisphere”.

By way of comparison, its explicit goal in the Indo-Pacific … is “peace through strength”, which the DOW plans to pursue through “strong denial defense” in the First Island Chain. This will be carried out together with the US’ regional allies, which can be described as the AUKUS+ network, although that terminology isn’t used in the NDS. The authors expect that this will create a favorable “balance of power” for achieving a “decent peace” that allows for mutually beneficial coexistence with China.

The third [goal] embraces the “Lead From Behind” (LFB) concept that was described here in 2015 by incentivizing partners to do more to advance their shared regional interests with the US. The NDS earlier described Russia as a “persistent but manageable threat” in the sense that “European NATO dwarfs Russia in economic scale, population, and, thus, latent military power.” The aforesaid just have to be fully unleashed through US incentives and strategic guidance in order to more effectively contain Russia.

The last [goal] underpins the preceding ones. Without “Supercharg[ing] the U.S. Defense Industrial Base”, the US cannot “restore American military dominance in the Western Hemisphere”, practice a “strong denial defense” in the First Island Chain, or LFB to contain shared adversaries like China (described as “the most powerful state relative to us since the 19th century”), Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This part ends with a call for military-industrial production comparable to the two World Wars and Cold War.

Therein lies the top takeaway from the NDS, namely that the US will resume World War-like levels of military-industrial production in furtherance of Trump 2.0’s grand strategic goal of restoring the US’ predominant position (unipolarity) over the world. Although the US will try to avoid Great Power conflict with China and Russia, this will be very difficult to do given its attempt to establish strategic superiority over themthrough this new undeclared arms race, which risks a war breaking out by miscalculation.

——

https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/exclusive-hasc-chair-seeking-450b-for-defense-in-reconciliation/

https://web.archive.org/web/20260308212010/https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/exclusive-hasc-chair-seeking-450b-for-defense-in-reconciliation/

“EXCLUSIVE: HASC chair seeking $450B for defense in reconciliation”

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers told Breaking Defense the next NDAA will focus on expanding the defense industrial base.

By Valerie Insinna on February 04, 2026 5:26 pm

WASHINGTON — The fiscal 2027 budget season has barely started, but the head of the House Armed Services Committee is setting two major goals for the year: securing $450 billion for defense in an upcoming reconciliation bill, and using the next defense policy bill to expand the defense industrial base.

In an exclusive interview with Breaking Defense, HASC Chairman Mike Rogers said that he is working with his Senate counterpart, Sen. Roger Wicker, to lock that funding in.

“We’ve informed our leadership of that,” he said Wednesday. “We’re not talking about something frivolous here. We’re talking about national defense.”

That $450 billion would be three times the $150 billion secured for defense in last year’s reconciliation effort — which itself represented the first time defense money was secured through the reconciliation procedure. However, Rogers argued that the funding would be necessary to achieve the target, laid down by President Donald Trump, of a $1.5 trillion defense budget for FY27.

Rogers explained his math thusly: If the White House requests a budget equivalent to last year’s, at about $1.03 trillion, and rolls over the $20 billion left over from last year’s reconciliation bill, that leaves a gap of about $450 billion to hit $1.5 trillion.

And while appropriators have final say on defense spending during the normal budget process, authorizers, such as Rogers, have control in reconciliation.

How the “Doomsday Plane” contract highlights the rise of mid-tier primes

Midsized companies can offer flexibility and agility while keeping intellectual property in the hands of the government.

By Breaking Defense

However, getting $450 billion in defense spending into a reconciliation bill and passed into law could be an uphill battle.

While Republicans are able to pass a reconciliation bill without help from Democrat votes, they will face tight margins and a narrow timeframe for doing so, as Democrats are projected to take back the House in the upcoming midterm elections. And securing Republican support for additional defense funding in reconciliation is not a given.

…

Meanwhile, HASC has already begun early work on the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act, which will prioritize the expansion of the defense industrial base, Rogers said.

“We tilled the soil last year by trying to improve acquisition processes to make it more commercial, so that it’s easier for industry to work with the government,” he said. “That was on purpose, because we do have to expand the defense industrial base. It’s gotten very small, and it’s atrophied, and it needs a lot of attention.”

Following the end of the Cold War, the defense industry narrowed to just six prime contractors, after the infamous Last Supper meeting in 1993 where Pentagon leaders told defense executives to consolidate or risk going out of business.

Over the past decade, the industrial base has grown, as venture capital-backed defense tech startups like Anduril and Palantir entered the scene. But Rogers said he would like to see a larger number of commercial companies start making products for the Defense Department.

“That’s our question to these folks, and we’ve already started bringing them in and asking them, ‘What can we do to incentivize you to get into the defense production?’” he said. “Taking the traditionals and non-traditionals, what can we do to incentivize you to grow? [For] the primes, what can we do to incentivize you to expand?

Meanwhile, HASC has already begun early work on the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act, which will prioritize the expansion of the defense industrial base, Rogers said.

——

“The Coming U.S. War Economy”

Dated February 4, 2026, Richard D. Wolff