| GAZA BOARD OF INQUIRY AND NEXT STEPS | |
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2009 May 7, 15:00 (Thursday)
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09USUNNEWYORK468_a
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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9633
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TEXT ONLINE
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1. (C) Summary: Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon transmitted to
the Security Council on May 5 his letter and summary of the
Board of Inquiry's conclusions and recommendations into nine
incidents involving the UN in Gaza between December 2008 and
January 2009. The Security Council will discuss in informal
consultations on May 7 the modalities of how to handle the
Secretary-General's letter and summary. Council members will
likely press for a discussion and possibly a Council product.
We cannot be assured of blocking procedurally a Council
discussion but can block any product (either by withholding
consensus on a PRST or Press statement, or vetoing a
resolution). The President of the General Assembly may also
decide to call an emergency special session of the General
Assembly at the request of a state or group of states. We
cannot block such a session nor a product (which we expect is
likely) from such a session. End summary.
2. (C) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon transmitted to the
Security Council on May 5 his letter and summary of the Board
of Inquiry's conclusions and recommendations into incidents
involving eight UN sites and one UN convoy in Gaza between
December 27, 2008 and January 19, 2009. In his cover letter,
Ban underscored that Boards of Inquiry do not consider
questions of legality nor make legal findings; that Israel
continues to work with the UN Secretariat to address the
Board's recommendations; and that he will seek no further
inquiry into matters the Board addressed which are outside
its Terms of Reference, specifically its recommendation
numbers 10 and 11 (see para 3).
3. (SBU) The summary of the report concludes that seven of
the nine incidents covered by the report were caused by
military actions of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and that
the IDF breached the inviolability and immunity of UN
premises, that such inviolability and immunity cannot be
overridden by demands of military expediency, and that the
IDF did not take sufficient precautions to fulfill its
responsibilities to protect UN property and personnel and
civilians taking shelter therein. The Board found the
Israeli government responsible for the deaths, injuries, and
physical damage that occurred in those seven cases and
estimated the cost to repair damages at something over USD 11
million. The Board concluded that the damage at one site, a
WFP warehouse, was caused by rocket fire by a Palestinian
faction, most likely Hamas, which was intended for Israel but
which fell short. Repair costs of the warehouse total USD
29,000. The Board was unable to reach any conclusions for an
incident at an UNRWA school.
4. The Board concluded that no military action was carried
out from within/within UN premises in any of the incidents,
but it also noted that it was not within its capacity to
reach conclusions on possible military activity near UN
premises or possible military use of nearby buildings. The
Board stated that no warnings were given to the UN before
attacks on targets close to UN sites, and that it believes
this could and should have been done. It found no
deficiencies in UN efforts to communicate and coordinate with
the IDF, and ascribes any IDF lack of awareness about UN
locations or movement of UN employees to failures of
communication within the IDF itself. The Board also reported
that the IDF had confirmed to UNRWA at a meeting (no date
given) that the IDF had not found munitions in UNRWA schools,
that it recognized that UNRWA had procedures in place to
protect its schools from abuse, and that it undertook to
ensure that IDF troops were informed of this.
5. (SBU) The summary lists the Board's eleven
recommendations of actions that the UN should take to avoid
recurrence of such incidents. The recommendations are:
-- 1) Seek formal acknowledgment and apology from the GoI for
alleging that Palestinians fired from within the Jabalia
school and the UNRWA Field Office.
-- 2) Seek accountability and reparations from the
responsible party for damage, death, and injury.
-- 3) Promote provision of assistance to non-UN civilians
killed or injured within UN premises, including medical
treatment and psycho-social support.
-- 4) Request the GoI to strengthen internal mechanisms to
ensure that UN personnel and premises are not put at risk in
any future military operations in Gaza.
-- 5) Request the GoI to commit to giving the UN sufficient
advance warning of any future military operations near UN
premises so the UN can ensure the safety of its personnel or
other civilians on the premises.
-- 6) Request a commitment from the GoI that whenever the GoI
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believes UN premises are being misused for military purposes,
the GoI will promptly convey this information to the UN.
-- 7) Commend UNRWA staff for their courageous action in
preventing fuel combustion at the UNRWA Field Office.
-- 8) Pursue the GoI's promise to provide the UN with the
results of its internal inquiry into incidents affecting UN
property, and ask the GoI for a commitment that it will carry
out prompt investigations in any future incidents and make
the results available to the SYG and any Board of Inquiry he
may establish.
-- 9) Consider establishing standby arrangements to quickly
deploy UN investigators.
-- 10) Ensure the timely investigation of other incidents
involving UN premises and personnel that were not included
within the Board's ToR.
-- 11) Recommend that the nine UN incidents be further
investigated and that non-UN-related incidents involving
civilians also be investigated as part of an impartial
inquiry into "allegations of violations of international
humanitarian law in Gaza and southern Israel by the IDF and
by Hamas and other Palestinian militants."
Possible next steps
in the Council
-------------------
6. (C) The Russian Presidency will raise the
Secretary-General's letter and summary under "other matters"
during consultations on May 7 in order to discuss the
modalities of how the Council should deal with the Board of
Inquiry report. The Russian Deputy Perm Rep told Ambassador
Wolff on May 5 that his delegation intends to keep any
discussion of this matter within closed consultations and not
have it move to a formal meeting of the Council; however,
neither they nor we can completely control that outcome
unless we have 6 other Council members prepared to oppose any
form of session. It is not certain at this point whether we
have the blocking votes. (see below). Since the Russians
effectively control the Council's calendar as President, they
will, however, likely ensure there is no formal Council
meeting on this scheduled prior to their May 11 ministerial
meeting on the Middle East. USUN believes some Council
members will raise the Board's report in their national
statements on May 11.
7. (C) If some members are not satisfied with discussing
this in consultations, they may push for a formal Council
session. Under Rule 2 of the Council's Provisional Rules of
Procedure, any Council member can request a meeting of the
Security Council, but the meeting's agenda must be agreed
upon by the Council members. If there is no consensus on the
agenda among Council members, the decision would be subject
to a procedural vote. If it comes to a vote, we very much
doubt that we have the seven votes to prevent a formal
meeting on this. In terms of timing, the next opportunity
for a formal meeting of the Council would be May 12 or 13,
before the Council mission to Africa departs on May 14. That
Council mission returns on May 21, after which a formal
meeting could also be scheduled.
8. (C) Some delegations, such as Libya, may seek a press
statement, Presidential Statement, or even resolution on the
Board of Inquiry conclusions. Council press statements and
Presidential Statements are based on consensus, so U.S.
agreement would be required. If the U.S. were the sole
delegation to block a statement, that information would
quickly be known publicly.
Possible next steps
in the General Assembly
-----------------------
9. (C) The President of the General Assembly (PGA) at the
request of a majority of Members or the request of a member
state with the concurrence of a majority of Members could
call for a meeting of the tenth Emergency Special Session of
the General Assembly on "Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied
East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory" and use it to discuss the Board of Inquiry report.
USUN assesses that a majority of Members would likely
support such a meeting. Article 12 of the UN Charter is
widely understood as providing that the General Assembly may
discuss any issue, even when the Council is seized with that
same issue, providing the General Assembly does not make any
recommendation with regard to that issue to the Council
unless the Council so requests. The General Assembly could
approve a resolution on the Board of Inquiry report, as long
as it does not make a specific "recommendation". A General
Assembly resolution would likely include the Board of
Inquiry's eleven
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recommendations.
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