WikiLeaks 19

Paul J heeft een nieuwe reactie op uw bericht "De Nuance van de NRC 189" achtergelaten:

Dat de haviken jegens Iran profiteren is een gevolg van het feit dat hun journalistieke bongenoten bij de New York Times etc. selectief citeren uit de Wikileaks-documenten. Deze journalisten zetten simpelweg hun campagne pro-bombardementen voort, nu op basis van documenten geschreven door officials die op hun beurt ook behept zijn met eenzelfde bias. Voor de journalisten is het doodsimpel dat te citeren wat in hun kraam past. Gareth Porter geeft een sprekend voorbeeld in dit stuk: http://original.antiwar.com/porter/2010/11/30/russians-refuted-us-claim/

Porter is zelfs van mening dat Wikileaks dit 'cherry picking' door de commerciële media had kunnen verwachten en dat ze er beter aan hadden gedaan de alternatieve media de scoop te geven.

De reden dat Wikileaks de keuze heeft gemaakt voor de Guardian, Spiegel etc. heeft ongetwijfeld te maken met het gevaar dat de onthullingen anders geen enkele impact zouden hebben gemaakt vanwege doodzwijgen in de mainstream media. Alexander Cockburn noemt het voorbeeld van vergelijkbare interne correspondentie buitgemaakt door de Iraanse bezetters van de Amerikaanse ambassade in 1979. Link naar Cockburns uitstekende stuk: http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/72286,news-comment,news-politics,alexander-cockburn-julian-assange-wanted-by-the-empire-dead-or-alive-wikileaks

Russians Refuted US Claim of Iranian Missile Threat to Europe

by Gareth Porter, December 01, 2010

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A diplomatic cable from last February released by WikiLeaks provides a detailed account of how Russian specialists on the Iranian ballistic missile program refuted the U.S. suggestion that Iran has missiles that could target European capitals or intends to develop such a capability.

In fact, the Russians challenged the very existence of the mystery missile the U.S. claims Iran acquired from North Korea.

But readers of the two leading U.S. newspapers never learned those key facts about the document.

The New York Times and Washington Post reported only that the United States believed Iran had acquired such missiles – supposedly called the BM-25 – from North Korea. Neither newspaper reported the detailed Russian refutation of the U.S. view on the issue or the lack of hard evidence for the BM-25 from the U.S. side.

The Times, which had obtained the diplomatic cables not from WikiLeaks but from the Guardian, according to a Washington Post story Monday, did not publish the text of the cable.

The Times story said the newspaper had made the decision not to publish “at the request of the Obama administration.” That meant that its readers could not compare the highly distorted account of the document in the Times story against the original document without searching the WikiLeaks Web site.

As a result, a key WikiLeaks document which should have resulted in stories calling into question the thrust of the Obama administration’s ballistic missile defense policy in Europe based on an alleged Iranian missile threat has produced a spate of stories supporting the existing Iranian threat narrative.

The full text of the U.S. State Department report on the meeting of the Joint Threat Assessment in Washington Dec. 22, 2009, which is available on the WikiLeaks Web site, shows that there was a dramatic confrontation over the issue of the mysterious BM-25 missile.

The BM-25 has been described as a surface-to-surface missile based on a now-obsolete Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, the R-27 or SS-N-6. The purported missile is said to be capable of reaching ranges of 1,500 to 2,500 miles – putting much of Europe within its range.

The head of the U.S. delegation to the meeting, Vann H. Van Diepen, acting assistant secretary for international security and nonproliferation, said the United States “believes” Iran had acquired 19 of those missiles from North Korea, according to the leaked document.

But an official of the Russian Defense Ministry dismissed published reports of such a missile, which he said were “without reference to any reliable sources.”

He observed that there had never been a test of such a missile in either North Korea or Iran, and that the Russian government was “unaware that the missile had ever been seen.” The Russians asked the U.S. side for any evidence of the existence of such a missile.

U.S. officials did not claim to have photographic or other hard evidence of the missile but said the North Koreans had paraded the missile through the streets of Pyongyang. The Russians responded that they had reviewed a video of that parade and had found that it was an entirely different missile.

The Russian official said there was no evidence for claims that 19 of these missiles had been shipped to Iran in 2005, and that it would have been impossible to conceal such a transfer. The Russians also said it was difficult to believe Iran would have purchased a missile system that had never even been tested.

U.S. delegation chief Van Diepen cited one piece of circumstantial evidence that Iran had done work on the “steering (vernier) engines” of the BM-25. Internet photos of the weld lines and tank volumes on the second stage of Iran’s space launch vehicle, the Safir, he said, show that the ratio of oxidizer to propellant is not consistent with the propellants used in the past by the Shahab-3.

That suggests that the Safir was using the same system that had been used in the R-27, according to Van Diepen.

The Russians asserted, however, that the propellant used in the Safir was not the one used in the R-27.

Even more important evidence from the Safir launch that Iran does not have any BM-25 missiles was noted in an authoritative study of the Iranian missile program published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) last May.

The study found that Iran had not used the main engine associated with the purported BM-25 to help boost its Safir space-launch vehicle.

If Iran had indeed possessed the more powerful engine associated with the original Russian R-27, the study observes, the Safir would have been able to launch a much larger satellite into orbit. But in fact the Safir was “clearly underpowered” and barely able to put its 27 kg satellite into low earth orbit, according to the IISS study.

The same study also points out that the original R-27 was designed to operate in a submarine launch tube, and a road-mobile variant would require major structural modifications. Yet another reason for doubt reported by IISS is that the propellant combination in the R-27 would not work in a land-mobile missile, because “the oxidizer must be maintained within a narrow temperature range.”

Van Diepen suggested two other Iranian options: use of the Shahab-3 technology with “clustered or stacked engines” or the development of a solid-propellant MRBM with a more powerful engine.

The Russians expressed strong doubts about both options, however, saying they were skeptical of Iranian claims to have a missile with a 1,200-mile range. They pointed out that the longest range on a missile tested thus far is 1,000 miles, and that it was achieved only by significantly reducing throw weight.

Van Diepen cited “modeling” studies that showed Iran could achieve a greater range, and that adding an additional 200 miles “is not a great technological stretch.” But the Russian delegation insisted that the additional length of the flight could cause various parts of the missile to burn through and the missile could fall apart.

The head of the Russian delegation, Vladimir Nazarov, deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council, said Russia believes any assessment of the Iranian missile program must be based not only on modeling but on “consideration of the real technical barriers faced by Iran.”

One of several such barriers cited by the Russians was the lack of the “structural materials” needed for longer-range missiles that could threaten the United States or Russia, such as “high quality aluminum.”

The Russians maintained that even assuming favorable conditions, Iran would be able to begin a program to develop ballistic missiles that could reach Central Europe or Moscow only after 2015 at the earliest.

The Russians denied, however, that Iran has such an intention, arguing that its ballistic missile program continues to be directed toward “regional concerns” – meaning deterring an attack on Iran by Israel.

The U.S. delegation never addressed the issue of Iranian intentions – a position consistent with the dominant role of weapons specialists in the U.S. intelligence community’s assessments of Iran and their overwhelming focus on capabilities and disinterest in intentions.

Michael Elleman, the senior author of the IISS study of the Iranian missile program, told IPS the report of the U.S.-Russian exchange highlights the differences in the two countries’ approaches to the subject. “The Russians talked about the most likely set of outcomes,” said Elleman, “whereas the U.S. side focused on what might happen.”

(Inter Press Service)

Read more by Gareth Porter

• An Overeager Petraeus Ignored Danger Signs on Taliban Imposter – November 24th, 2010
• Behind Drone Issue in Yemen, a Struggle to Control Covert Ops – November 10th, 2010
• Dissecting the Perpetual War Machine – November 8th, 2010
• Torture Orders Were Part of US Sectarian War Strategy – November 1st, 2010
• Leaked Report, New Iraqi Alignment Reveal US War Failure – October 25th, 2010

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