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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1433, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HEUSGEN ON AFGHANISTAN,

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Reference ID	Date	Classification	Origin
09BERLIN1433	2009-11-12 17:05	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Berlin

VZCZCXRO6312 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHRL #1433/01 3161743 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 121743Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5750 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001433    SIPDIS    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019  TAGS: PREL MARR NATO MNUC PARM KNNP GM IR RU AF SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HEUSGEN ON AFGHANISTAN,  MIDDLE EAST, IRAN, DETAINEES, RUSSIA, NUKES AND BALKANS    Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Chancellery National Security Advisor  Christoph Heusgen told EUR A/S Phil Gordon and Ambassador  Murphy in a November 10 meeting in Berlin that Germany  strongly preferred that the proposed international conference  on Afghanistan be held outside the country to make it easier  to press Karzai to commit to the necessary reforms.  On the  Middle East, Heusgen thought Netanyahu had to do much more on  settlements if there was to be any hope of re-starting  negotiations.  On Iran, Heusgen hoped for some conclusion by  early next month on whether the diplomatic track was going to  bear fruit so that this issue could be discussed at the  December 10 EU Summit.  Heusgen said Germany was ready to  discuss taking Guantanamo detainees, but stressed the  importance of dealing directly with the Ministry of Interior  and keeping the negotiations confidential.  While arguing for  being rhetorically supportive of the Medvedev European  Security proposal, Heusgen shared U.S. skepticism about a new  treaty and an OSCE Summit hosted by Kazakhstan.  Heusgen  distanced the Chancellery from the proposal to remove all  remaining tactical nuclear weapons from Germany, stressing  the need to get reciprocal cuts from the Russians.  Also  discussed was CFE, the Macedonian name issue and Bosnia.  END  SUMMARY.    AFGHANISTAN    ¶2. (C) Heusgen confirmed that Germany would only announce  additional resources for Afghanistan after the proposed  international conference, which Chancellor Merkel and UK PM  Brown are now proposing for January 28 in London.  He said  the conference is key because this is where the Germans  expect the Afghan government to make specific commitments to  improve governance and to gradually begin assuming  responsibility from the international community.  President  Karzai had to be put under international pressure to perform  according to prescribed benchmarks.  Toward that end, the  Chancellery felt strongly that the conference should be held  outside of Afghanistan and not on Karzai's "home turf."  Heusgen complained that the German and U.S. embassies in  Kabul are on "a different track" and pushing for a conference  in Kabul.  It was important to "make up our minds" quickly on  the way ahead.  If the conference slipped to February or  later, and the UK were no longer able to host it in view of  the upcoming parliamentary elections there, then Germany  would be willing to.    ¶3. (C) Heusgen at first expressed concern that the U.S. would  undermine international leverage on Karzai by rolling out its  new strategy and resource commitments before he made any  reciprocal commitments to reform.  Gordon assured him that  the formal U.S. roll-out would only come after the November  19 inauguration, where Karzai is expected to "say the right  things" in his inaugural address.  Gordon also highlighted  the need to coordinate on the U.S. roll-out to avoid the  perception that the U.S. was "Americanizing" the  international effort in Afghanistan.  It should be announced  as a common strategy and not as a U.S. strategy to which the  Allies then respond.  Heusgen agreed in principle, but  indicated that Germany would stick to its approach of holding  back on any announcement of new commitments until after the  international conference.    MIDDLE EAST    ¶4. (C)  Referring to the Secretary's recent public statements  on settlements, Heusgen said that Germany "perceives this  differently" and thought Netanyahu needed "to do more" in  order bring the Palestinians to the negotiating table.  With  Palestinians in East Jerusalem getting notices from Israeli  authorities that their houses will be destroyed, it would be  "suicide" for President Abbas to move under the current  circumstances.  Heusgen said he could not fathom why  Netanyahu did not understand this.  He suggested pressuring  Netanyahu by linking favorable UNSC treatment of the  Goldstone Report to Israel committing to a complete stop in  settlement activity.  Gordon said that making a direct  linkage between the two would almost certainly be  counterproductive, but agreed that it was worth pointing out  to the Israelis that their policy on settlements was making  it difficult for their friends to hold the line in the UNSC.  Heusgen said this certainly would be an issue when Netanyahu  and "half of his cabinet" visit Berlin on November 30 for  bilateral government consultations.    IRAN    ¶5. (C) Heusgen praised the U.S. for its patience with Iran,    BERLIN 00001433  002 OF 003      but noted that at some point, it would be necessary to move  to the second track in order to maintain credibility.  Heusgen said that he and his British counterpart agreed that  ideally, there would be some conclusion on this by early next  month so that the way ahead could be discussed by EU leaders  at their summit on December 10.  Gordon agreed that there had  to be a time limit, noting that President Obama had given the  Iranians "by the end of the year" to respond favorably.  He  also noted that the U.S. could support a Turkish role in the  proposed exchange of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel if  that would make it easier for Iran to accept the deal.  Gordon indicated, however, that Turkish PM Erdogan needed to  be careful about losing credibility in Washington if he  continued to make comments about Ahmadinejad being his  "friend."    GUANTANAMO DETAINEES    ¶6. (C) Heusgen noted that now that the Bundestag election was  past, Germany was ready to help on detainees, as it had  promised earlier.  He advised the USG to work directly with  new Interior Minister de Maiziere, rather than going first to  MFA and the Chancellery, which had irritated de Maiziere's  predecessor and made him less willing to cooperate.  In this  regard, he thought that it would be helpful if DHS Secretary  Napolitano made direct contact with de Maiziere.  Heusgen  also suggested that the discussions be kept confidential  until MOI had come to a decision on which detainees to accept  and in which state they would be settled.  Premature public  disclosure could doom the whole initiative.  Heusgen said  that Uighurs would be "too difficult," but that Germany could  probably accept "2-3 others."  (Comment: The reluctance about  Uighurs is due to the expected negative reaction of the  Chinese government.  End Comment.)    EUROPEAN SECURITY PROPOSAL AND POSSIBLE OSCE SUMMIT    ¶7. (C) Heusgen said that while the West should try to react  positively to whatever the Russians propose in advancing the  Medvedev European security proposal, nothing should be  accepted that would undermine current European security  institutions, including the OSCE.  He shared Gordon's  misgivings about a proposed treaty.  He was also skeptical  about the idea of an OSCE Summit in Astana, agreeing that  Kazakhstan's human rghts record and the lack of substantive  agenda items made it unattractive.  Heusgen suggested that an  OSCE Summit be offered to the Russians on the condition they  solve the frozen conflict in Transnistria, which he said  Moscow could accomplish "in about a month."    TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS    ¶8. (C) In response to Gordon's question about how the  government planned to take forward the commitment in the  coalition agreement to seek the removal of all remaining  nuclear weapons from Germany, Heusgen distanced the  Chancellery from the proposal, claiming that this had been  forced upon them by FM Westerwelle.  Heusgen said that from  his perspective, it made no sense to unilaterally withdraw  "the 20" tactical nuclear weapons still in Germany while  Russia maintains "thousands" of them.  It would only be worth  it if both sides drew down.  Gordon noted that it was  important to think through all the potential consequences of  the German proposal before going forward.  For example, a  withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany and perhaps from  Belgium and the Netherlands could make it very difficult  politically for Turkey to maintain its own stockpile, even  though it was still convinced of the need to do so.    CFE    ¶9. (C) Gordon asked for Heusgen's views on a German CFE paper  that had been delivered to the State Department just a few  days earlier.  Heusgen said he did not know anything about  it, claiming that he did not follow this issue closely or  "believe in it."  He noted that MFA "loved this disarmament  business," which was okay, but it had to be balanced or the  "Russians will sit there and laugh."    MACEDONIAN NAME ISSUE    ¶10. (C) Gordon briefed Heusgen on the current state of the  negotiations, noting that the two key issues were the  geographic modifier and international usage.  Heusgen noted  that the Chancellor knew PM Macedonian Gruevski through their  common membership in the European People's Party and would be  willing to engage him on this issue if that would be helpful.    BOSNIA    BERLIN 00001433  003 OF 003        ¶11. (C) Heusgen revealed that Serb President Tadic was coming  to Berlin the week of November 16 for consultations.  He  noted that while Tadic always claimed to be tough on  Republika Srpska PM Dodic, he needed to be tougher.  While  expressing pessimism about whether it would ever be possible  to turn Bosnia into a "working state," Heusgen agreed it was  important to keep trying.  MURPHY