Ukraine: "A War Crime Most Egregious"

 

A War Crime Most Egregious A war crime was committed on 2 November 2026 when Russia bombed Komyshuvakha. But the perpetrators aren’t whom the popular narrative being bandied about social media would lead one to believe. SCOTT RITTER NOV 7   READ IN APP   Ukrainian rescue workers sift through the ruins of the Komyshuvakha underground school bombed by Russia on 2 November 2026 On 2 November 2026, Russian forces struck targets in the town of Komyshuvakha, situated near the front line, with multiple guided aerial bombs, including heavy FAB-3000-class munitions. One of the targets struck was a so-called “underground school” (more accurately called an anti-radiation protective shelter that had been adapted for educational purposes.) By the morning of 4 November, rescuers had recovered 31 bodies. Another 59 people were listed as missing, and officials estimated that as many as 38 might still be trapped beneath the wreckage. As of this writing the search was still in progress. The Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia regional prosecutor’s office has opened a case under Article 438(2) of Ukraine’s Criminal Code, which deals with violations of the laws and customs of war resulting in deaths. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Ukraine’s domestic security and investigative service, is conducting the pre-trial investigation.  The International Red Cross maintains an International Humanitarian Law data base that serves as the foundational document when it comes to the Law of War. Part of this data base are a series of rules which address what is known as “the Principle of Distinction.” Rule One in this regard states clearly that “the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.” Rule Seven notes that “the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.” The 1977 Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions holds that “the presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favor or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.” Thus, the Additional Protocol I rule applies to the use of any civilians to shield military operations. Note that the prohibition addresses only the use of civilians and not civilian objects. Russia has adopted the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I prohibitions in its Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law, noting “It is prohibited by resorting to perfidy to use the movement of medical units and transports, civilians and prisoners of war or use their presence to shield the movement (maneuver) of military units or protect any areas (military objectives) when conducting combat operations.” Ukraine has emphasized their narrative that, at the time of the Russian attack on 2 November, the Komyshuvakha “school” was being used as a distribution center for the disbursement of humanitarian aid (food) parcels. According to Ukrainian authorities, this disbursement was a regularly scheduled event, and that public announcements to this effect had been made in such a manner that all parties, including Russia, were aware of this fact. Rule Eight of the IHL “Principle of Distinction” defines a military object as being “limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” Rule Nine defines civilian objects as “all objects that are not military objectives.” Rule Ten further notes that “Civilian objects are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they are military objectives.” Rule Sixteen also declares that “each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives.” A critical question arises in regard to Komyshuvakha, therefore, regards the function that the “underground school” was serving at the time of the attack. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions helps formulates an answer to this question by providing that “in case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.” But even here the matter is not crystal clear. The United States holds that the Additional Protocol I wording “is not customary and is contrary to the traditional law of war because it shifts the burden of determining the precise use of an object from the defender to the attacker, i.e., from the party controlling that object to the party lacking such control. This imbalance would ignore the realities of war in demanding a degree of certainty of the attacker that seldom exists in combat. It would also encourage the defender to ignore its obligations to separate civilians and civilian objects from military objectives.” At least 13 facilities similar to the “underground school” have been built across Zaporizhzhia city and the surrounding region since summer 2024. These are reinforced concrete structures buried several meters underground, based on a standardized radiation-shelter design jointly developed by UNICEF and Ukraine’s Ministry of Education and Science. Each facility cost between $2.5-3.7 million, depending on the specific geological features of the site. Ukrainian authorities acknowledge these underground facilities were intended for dual use: classrooms in peacetime and protected spaces during war. The specific facility in Komyshuvakha was the 13th so-called “safe underground school” constructed in the region, and opened with great fanfare on October 17, 2025. The school operated as part of a larger network of online education centers known as the “Dzherelo Gymnasium”, and was designed for up to 600 children from grades 1-12 to be remotely educated in “spacious, bright modern classrooms.” The Ukrainian Minister of Social Policy, Family and Unity, Denys Uliutin, spoke at the opening of the school, declaring that “The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child guarantees the right to education for every child. Even in times of war, when Russia is destroying childhood, Ukraine — with the support of international partners — continues to uphold these guarantees for its children. Thanks to safe educational spaces, they can communicate, learn, and grow. This is the foundation of our future.” In person classes were conducted until the middle of December 2025, when the worsening situation at the front prompted a switch to remote learning. By April 2026, all educational activities were halted, as the civilian population of Komyshuvakha had largely been evacuated because of the deteriorating security situation. The underground classrooms were repurposed by the local administration, housing police and other governmental bodies, including those responsible for the distribution of humanitarian aid to the remaining civilian population. In short, the underground classrooms in Komyshuvakha were not functioning as a school in the months leading up to the attack on 2 November. The question now becomes, what function was this facility performing at the time of the attack? Komyshuvakha was located around 15 kilometers from the frontline, and had become a critical logistics and command center for Ukrainian military units operating in the Orikhiv sector. Orikhiv had been the focus of Russian offensive action since early this year. Ukraine’s 65th separate mechanized brigade “Velyky Lug” had primary responsibility for defense in this area, and reported that the situation had become difficult. By September Ukraine had begun reinforcing the Orikhiv sector with units from the 158th Mountain Brigade. At the time of the attack, Russia declared that Komyshuvakha was being used as an assembly area for forces belonging to the 158th Mountain Brigade. A Ukrainian officer who has been identified as an infantry battalion commander was seen on video inside the Komyshuvakha underground school at the time of the attack, and later declared to have been killed in the attack. But there was apparently an even greater reason for the Russians to consider the Komyshuvakha underground school to be a military, vice civilian, object. On September 17, Roman Piatyhorets, a political analyst and volunteer from Zaporizhzhia, told a Ukrainian television channel that the former classrooms had been put to a different use. “Each of our underground schools was a dual-purpose facility,” Pyatyhorets noted. “What is built in Komyshuvakha—the whole management is now sitting there, all the power of Komyshuvakha is there. And all our UAV operators are sitting.” Pyatyhorets likened the underground school to an impregnable “fortress”. But the reality is that it was the very features that made the facility attractive as a remote learning facility—generator power, communications and internet connectivity, etc.—made it ideal for use as a drone command center. Throughout the month of October, the “Ronin” battalion of the 65th Brigade—responsible for drone operations—had published videos online highlighting its role in what they called “middle strike” drone attacks: the use of Starlink-enabled Hornet drones to attack Russian logistics and lines of communications in the Russian rear areas of Zaporizhzhia. Such attacks have become the bane of Russian military and civilian life, and the location and destruction of Ukrainian units involved in such activity has become one of the top targeting priorities of the Russian military. The high-profile self-promotion done by the “Ronin” battalion exposed it to potential exploitation by Russian intelligence. Indeed, some of the video posted by the “Ronin” battalion showed classroom-like structures of similar construction to the classrooms of the Komyshuvakha underground school.  The confluence of open source reporting from Ukraine (the Pyatyhorets revelations) coupled with the forensic investigation techniques of Russian intelligence provided sufficient clarity as to the military nature of the activity taking place inside the Komyshuvakha underground school, and on 2 November it was targeted for destruction. It is at this juncture that the case opened up by the Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia regional prosecutor’s office under Article 43(2) of Ukraine’s Criminal Code takes a decidedly different turn. Using a civilian or other protected person as a shield for military operations is a clear violation of International Humanitarian Law. The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) defines as a war crime in international armed conflicts “the use of the presence or presence of a civilian or other protected person to prevent certain military objectives from being the object of military operations.” While the fact that Ukraine used civilians as human shields in violation of international humanitarian law is demonstrably clear, Russia remains bound to respect the rules of international humanitarian law protecting civilians. The presence of human shields in or around a legitimate military objective does not relieve Russian military commanders of their duty of distinction, precaution and proportionality towards these human shields as civilians or otherwise protected persons. Given the fact that the distribution of humanitarian aid by Ukraine was covering both the assembly of military forces destined to reinforce nearby frontline positions, and for drone operations that posed a serious threat to Russian logistics, issues of distinction, precaution and proportionality all favor the Russian side when it came to attacking Komyshuvakha underground school. Moreover, because the presence of drone operators inside the school was public knowledge, a case can be made that the people involved in the distribution of humanitarian aid were voluntarily acting as human shields. International Humanitarian Law considers persons who voluntarily act as human shields as being considered to be taking a direct participation in hostilities, since they are physically obstructing an attack on a lawful military objective. There was a war crime committed on 2 November when Russia bombed the Komyshuvakha underground school. But the criminals were Ukrainian.