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Four and a Half Years Off the Air
Vladimir Pozner has stayed off the air for four and a half years. Here is what he said when he finally sat down for an interview.
Dear readers and subscribers,
Vladimir Pozner, a man that I met in Moscow and that I admire for his work, experience, and knowledge that I acquire from him, once told American audiences that he regretted being a Soviet propagandist and would spend his life atoning.
In a recent FRONTLINE interview, at 92, he said that atonement meant leaving the air when the war began because he could no longer work as a journalist. He has chosen to stay off television for four and a half years, and we miss his show very much every Friday evening.
In this interview, he says, rightly in my opinion, that Russia had a security case against Ukraine joining NATO; “correctly or not, that’s not the issue.” His case runs from the post-Soviet NATO expansions through George Kennan’s 1998 warning that enlargement would start a new Cold War. He compares Ukraine to Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine, and he says the West “knew he was serious and wanted to provoke him.”
His strongest material is the Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy and Khrushchev, he says, ended the standoff because each stepped back, with Kennedy quietly pulling missiles from Turkey and Khrushchev losing face publicly. He mentioned new archival materials that uncovered diplomatic letters between the two leaders, proving through official back channels they chose to deescalate a situation that would have ultimately led to a third world war. Based on these materials, I wrote a book about it that you can find here:
He argues the same logic applies now, with Europe also stepping back, since NATO is “almost a proxy war.”
His account of Russian society is the most useful part for outsiders.
Restaurants and theaters are full, and the war has stopped being the main topic even among his educated circle, who now talk about artificial (super) intelligence. He thinks most Russians back the war and see it as forced on them, and that many are now “very anti-European.” He is also open about limits. He calls the exclusion of opposition parties “very bad,” calls talk of nuking the Baltics “horrendous,” and admits people are careful about two subjects, the war and the president.
Watch it and read it as testimony, as the views of an informed, cautious Moscow insider who has decided that being heard in the West means being an explainer rather than a critic. The explanations deserve a hearing.
If you want to support my work but don’t want to commit to a monthly or annual subscription, you can make a one-time or recurring donation by using PAYPAL or the “Buy Me A Coffee” buttons below. —Jerry B. Marchant
FULL TRANSCRIPT in Sections
Dear readers and subscribers,
Vladimir Pozner, a man that I met in Moscow and that I admire for his work, experience, and knowledge that I acquire from him, once told American audiences that he regretted being a Soviet propagandist and would spend his life atoning.
In a recent FRONTLINE interview, at 92, he said that atonement meant leaving the air when the war began because he could no longer work as a journalist. He has chosen to stay off television for four and a half years, and we miss his show very much every Friday evening.
In this interview, he says, rightly in my opinion, that Russia had a security case against Ukraine joining NATO; “correctly or not, that’s not the issue.” His case runs from the post-Soviet NATO expansions through George Kennan’s 1998 warning that enlargement would start a new Cold War. He compares Ukraine to Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine, and he says the West “knew he was serious and wanted to provoke him.”
His strongest material is the Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy and Khrushchev, he says, ended the standoff because each stepped back, with Kennedy quietly pulling missiles from Turkey and Khrushchev losing face publicly. He mentioned new archival materials that uncovered diplomatic letters between the two leaders, proving through official back channels they chose to deescalate a situation that would have ultimately led to a third world war. Based on these materials, I wrote a book about it that you can find here:
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He argues the same logic applies now, with Europe also stepping back, since NATO is “almost a proxy war.”
His account of Russian society is the most useful part for outsiders.
Restaurants and theaters are full, and the war has stopped being the main topic even among his educated circle, who now talk about artificial (super) intelligence. He thinks most Russians back the war and see it as forced on them, and that many are now “very anti-European.” He is also open about limits. He calls the exclusion of opposition parties “very bad,” calls talk of nuking the Baltics “horrendous,” and admits people are careful about two subjects, the war and the president.
Watch it and read it as testimony, as the views of an informed, cautious Moscow insider who has decided that being heard in the West means being an explainer rather than a critic. The explanations deserve a hearing.
If you want to support my work but don’t want to commit to a monthly or annual subscription, you can make a one-time or recurring donation by using PAYPAL or the “Buy Me A Coffee” buttons below. —Jerry B. Marchant
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FULL TRANSCRIPT in Sections
Part 1: Introduction and “atoning for sins”
Amy: Vladimir Pozner was one of the most recognizable names and faces of the Soviet era. Near the end of the Cold War, he was on the Moscow end of a telebridge with US talk show host Phil Donahue, in which both men tried to appeal to the audiences on the other side, explaining their cultures and how Soviets and Americans might find common ground. At one point you said you regretted having been a Soviet propagandist and would spend the rest of your life atoning for your sins. How has that been?
Pozner: It’s not been very easy, but I think I’ve managed. After 1985, after the space bridge with Phil Donahue and the coming of Gorbachev, it became possible in the Soviet Union to be a journalist and not depend on the government, or on what the Communist Party tells you. From that point on I was an independent journalist. I said what I wanted to say and invited the people I wanted to invite. There was very little pressure on me in those days.
Then I went to the United States, where I worked with Phil Donahue on CNBC for about six years, and came back in 1996. I established a show called The Times, which was extremely successful and somewhat controversial. When the general manager of Channel One began to interfere, I cancelled it and we created an interview show called Pozner. For a total of 13 years it was probably the most watched interview show in Russia.
When the so-called special military operation began, I cancelled my show, because I realized I would not be able to be a journalist in that situation. For four and a half years now I’ve not been on the air, but that is my choice. Nobody kicked me out. I figured I would not be able to atone for my sins.
Amy: Who is Vladimir Pozner today? What are your views?
Pozner: My views on journalism are that you don’t impose your opinion on people. You inform them as broadly as possible, checking the facts. In an interview, you help the audience understand who the person is, without your sympathy or dislike being evident. That’s not your job.
Since 2006 I’ve also made documentary series about different countries. It began with a big serial about the United States. Since then I’ve done 13 countries, each of eight one-hour episodes. I’ve just finished a series about the Arab world, which will probably air at the end of this year or early next year.
Amy: Vladimir Pozner was one of the most recognizable names and faces of the Soviet era. Near the end of the Cold War, he was on the Moscow end of a telebridge with US talk show host Phil Donahue, in which both men tried to appeal to the audiences on the other side, explaining their cultures and how Soviets and Americans might find common ground. At one point you said you regretted having been a Soviet propagandist and would spend the rest of your life atoning for your sins. How has that been?
Pozner: It’s not been very easy, but I think I’ve managed. After 1985, after the space bridge with Phil Donahue and the coming of Gorbachev, it became possible in the Soviet Union to be a journalist and not depend on the government, or on what the Communist Party tells you. From that point on I was an independent journalist. I said what I wanted to say and invited the people I wanted to invite. There was very little pressure on me in those days.
Then I went to the United States, where I worked with Phil Donahue on CNBC for about six years, and came back in 1996. I established a show called The Times, which was extremely successful and somewhat controversial. When the general manager of Channel One began to interfere, I cancelled it and we created an interview show called Pozner. For a total of 13 years it was probably the most watched interview show in Russia.
When the so-called special military operation began, I cancelled my show, because I realized I would not be able to be a journalist in that situation. For four and a half years now I’ve not been on the air, but that is my choice. Nobody kicked me out. I figured I would not be able to atone for my sins.
Amy: Who is Vladimir Pozner today? What are your views?
Pozner: My views on journalism are that you don’t impose your opinion on people. You inform them as broadly as possible, checking the facts. In an interview, you help the audience understand who the person is, without your sympathy or dislike being evident. That’s not your job.
Since 2006 I’ve also made documentary series about different countries. It began with a big serial about the United States. Since then I’ve done 13 countries, each of eight one-hour episodes. I’ve just finished a series about the Arab world, which will probably air at the end of this year or early next year.
Part 2: Why he doesn’t speak out against the war
Amy: You’ve been criticized for not coming out against the war, which is tearing Russian society apart, not to mention what it’s doing to Ukraine. What do you say?
Pozner: I say two things. First, a statement critical of the war isn’t going to stop it. It may be dangerous for me, which is secondary. I’m 92 and I’m not afraid of anything. But I have relatives, and I don’t want them to suffer from what I might say. More importantly, I don’t think what I have to say matters. You call me an important voice in Russia; I think that’s an exaggeration. People watched my show precisely because I tried never to give my opinion. It’s the person I’m interviewing who is important, not me. I’ve been asked many times in the West to say what I think about this, and I say it isn’t important. You just want something sensational: “Vladimir Pozner said this and that.” That’s a game I don’t play.
Amy: But it’s the elephant in the room. Does it pain you to see this going on?
Pozner: Yes.
Amy: You’ve been criticized for not coming out against the war, which is tearing Russian society apart, not to mention what it’s doing to Ukraine. What do you say?
Pozner: I say two things. First, a statement critical of the war isn’t going to stop it. It may be dangerous for me, which is secondary. I’m 92 and I’m not afraid of anything. But I have relatives, and I don’t want them to suffer from what I might say. More importantly, I don’t think what I have to say matters. You call me an important voice in Russia; I think that’s an exaggeration. People watched my show precisely because I tried never to give my opinion. It’s the person I’m interviewing who is important, not me. I’ve been asked many times in the West to say what I think about this, and I say it isn’t important. You just want something sensational: “Vladimir Pozner said this and that.” That’s a game I don’t play.
Amy: But it’s the elephant in the room. Does it pain you to see this going on?
Pozner: Yes.
Part 3: Russian society and public opinion
Amy: How has Russian society changed since the war began?
Pozner: It’s very hard to say. If you came to Moscow, St. Petersburg or other towns I’ve recently visited, you would not know there is a military conflict going on. The restaurants are packed, the theaters are packed, people seem to be living normal lives. I’m sure those who’ve lost loved ones are suffering, but I travel a lot in this country and you don’t get the feeling that it’s at war.
I don’t have the numbers, but I have the feeling that the majority of Russians support the war. They think it is a result of the West forcing Russia into that situation, and of the West trying to destroy Russia and using Ukraine for that purpose. There are many people against it, but I think they’re a minority.
Amy: In the West we hear that opinions have changed, because Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure are dramatic and have caused gasoline shortages.
Pozner: I really believe the war still feels far away. You do see lines at gas stations sometimes, and sometimes you don’t, because there’s no gas so there’s nothing to line up for. People say, “I wish it weren’t like this,” but you don’t get the feeling that this should change anything. Some prominent people, like Herman Gref, chairman of one of Russia’s most important banks, recently said very publicly that what the Russian people want most is for the war to stop. I hope he’s right. I don’t get that feeling. Among my own circle, more intellectual people with university educations, the war used to be the number one subject. That’s gone. We all hope it stops and ask when it will, but we talk more about artificial intelligence now. I can’t explain it. I really don’t know.
Amy: How has Russian society changed since the war began?
Pozner: It’s very hard to say. If you came to Moscow, St. Petersburg or other towns I’ve recently visited, you would not know there is a military conflict going on. The restaurants are packed, the theaters are packed, people seem to be living normal lives. I’m sure those who’ve lost loved ones are suffering, but I travel a lot in this country and you don’t get the feeling that it’s at war.
I don’t have the numbers, but I have the feeling that the majority of Russians support the war. They think it is a result of the West forcing Russia into that situation, and of the West trying to destroy Russia and using Ukraine for that purpose. There are many people against it, but I think they’re a minority.
Amy: In the West we hear that opinions have changed, because Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure are dramatic and have caused gasoline shortages.
Pozner: I really believe the war still feels far away. You do see lines at gas stations sometimes, and sometimes you don’t, because there’s no gas so there’s nothing to line up for. People say, “I wish it weren’t like this,” but you don’t get the feeling that this should change anything. Some prominent people, like Herman Gref, chairman of one of Russia’s most important banks, recently said very publicly that what the Russian people want most is for the war to stop. I hope he’s right. I don’t get that feeling. Among my own circle, more intellectual people with university educations, the war used to be the number one subject. That’s gone. We all hope it stops and ask when it will, but we talk more about artificial intelligence now. I can’t explain it. I really don’t know.
Part 4: Who provoked whom? NATO and the Wolfowitz doctrine
Amy: You say most Russians believe the West provoked this war, but the West didn’t invade Ukraine. Russia did. I assume Russian propaganda has convinced the average Russian that it wasn’t Putin’s fault. From a Western perspective that doesn’t make sense. Can you explain?
Pozner: I can, but it’s a very long story. I don’t know how familiar your audience is with the Wolfowitz doctrine [Wolfowitz Doctrine / 1992 Defense Planning Guidance], a paper written when the Soviet Union disappeared. It was a road map for how the United States should act now that it was the only superpower. The basic idea, later associated with the Bush Jr. era, was that all countries should conform to what the United States wants. One thing it said was that Russia should not be allowed to become a great power again. If you look at how relations developed over the years, you will see that this is gradually what happened.
Take the enlargement of NATO under Clinton. People who knew what was going on said it would be the beginning of a new Cold War. The Russians could not accept it. They were promised NATO would not be enlarged, and yet there it was, and it kept going. I believe that had there been an agreement whereby Ukraine would not become a NATO member... let’s not forget Ukraine has a border with Russia like Mexico does with the United States. Would the US allow Mexico to become suddenly not pro-American? You have the Monroe Doctrine, and we all know what that means.
The Russian viewpoint, correctly or not, and that’s not the issue, was that Ukraine joining NATO was an existential threat to Russia. Putin said many times, “We will not allow it.” Did the West think he was bluffing or serious? I happen to believe the West knew he was serious and wanted to provoke him. Should he have been provoked? That’s a different question. But they wanted to provoke him.
This war has certainly not made Russia more powerful or helped it. It has created a very anti-Russian atmosphere all over the world. And what has Russia won? On the battlefield Russia will eventually win. There’s no doubt about that; it has many more men and armaments. But what does winning actually mean?
It’s not just propaganda. People have become pretty savvy, not only in Russia but in many countries. They believe the media less and less. With 600 million bloggers, when any person can say what he or she wants, it changes the equation, which I think is a good thing. So propaganda plays a role, but there is a feeling here that Russia was forced into this. Whether Ukraine should have been allowed to join NATO is something you can argue about. But it’s almost like Kennedy’s reaction to Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba: an existential threat to the United States, and “if we need to start World War III to stop it, we shall.” Here the feeling is that Ukraine in NATO would be an existential threat. That’s what Putin believes, and not only Putin.
Amy: But was destroying Ukraine the answer?
Pozner: If you go to war, obviously you’re going to destroy. The question is whether going to war was the answer. Some say yes, some say no. But what do you do if you don’t go to war? If you feel your country is being threatened, and you say “Please, we cannot allow this,” and they go ahead and do it anyway, you can sit back and agree, which is a sign of weakness, and that’s not good in politics either. I don’t have the answer. Thank God I don’t have to make those decisions.
Amy: The new NATO members, former Warsaw Pact countries, asked to join because they were afraid of Russia. They weren’t gobbled up. That’s different from NATO provoking Russia.
Pozner: Certainly not gobbling up. I didn’t say that. During Gorbachev’s short period and the longer Yeltsin period, Russia was clearly moving toward democracy and did nothing to remind the West of Soviet times. I agree these countries had a history of fearing Russia, but Russia at that time was in no way threatening. The issue was on the American side: the first three were the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Does it make sense to enlarge NATO with them, clearly understanding that the Russians will be shocked and unhappy, when Russia is threatening no one and moving toward democracy? It’s a balancing act. George Kennan, probably the most knowledgeable person about Russia and the Soviet Union, told the New York Times it was the beginning of a new Cold War and that it should never have been done. It’s not a question of gobbling up. It’s a question of what your policy is and what aim you follow. I think it was a tremendous mistake, and had it not happened, the world today would be in a much better place.
Amy: You say most Russians believe the West provoked this war, but the West didn’t invade Ukraine. Russia did. I assume Russian propaganda has convinced the average Russian that it wasn’t Putin’s fault. From a Western perspective that doesn’t make sense. Can you explain?
Pozner: I can, but it’s a very long story. I don’t know how familiar your audience is with the Wolfowitz doctrine [Wolfowitz Doctrine / 1992 Defense Planning Guidance], a paper written when the Soviet Union disappeared. It was a road map for how the United States should act now that it was the only superpower. The basic idea, later associated with the Bush Jr. era, was that all countries should conform to what the United States wants. One thing it said was that Russia should not be allowed to become a great power again. If you look at how relations developed over the years, you will see that this is gradually what happened.
Take the enlargement of NATO under Clinton. People who knew what was going on said it would be the beginning of a new Cold War. The Russians could not accept it. They were promised NATO would not be enlarged, and yet there it was, and it kept going. I believe that had there been an agreement whereby Ukraine would not become a NATO member... let’s not forget Ukraine has a border with Russia like Mexico does with the United States. Would the US allow Mexico to become suddenly not pro-American? You have the Monroe Doctrine, and we all know what that means.
The Russian viewpoint, correctly or not, and that’s not the issue, was that Ukraine joining NATO was an existential threat to Russia. Putin said many times, “We will not allow it.” Did the West think he was bluffing or serious? I happen to believe the West knew he was serious and wanted to provoke him. Should he have been provoked? That’s a different question. But they wanted to provoke him.
This war has certainly not made Russia more powerful or helped it. It has created a very anti-Russian atmosphere all over the world. And what has Russia won? On the battlefield Russia will eventually win. There’s no doubt about that; it has many more men and armaments. But what does winning actually mean?
It’s not just propaganda. People have become pretty savvy, not only in Russia but in many countries. They believe the media less and less. With 600 million bloggers, when any person can say what he or she wants, it changes the equation, which I think is a good thing. So propaganda plays a role, but there is a feeling here that Russia was forced into this. Whether Ukraine should have been allowed to join NATO is something you can argue about. But it’s almost like Kennedy’s reaction to Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba: an existential threat to the United States, and “if we need to start World War III to stop it, we shall.” Here the feeling is that Ukraine in NATO would be an existential threat. That’s what Putin believes, and not only Putin.
Amy: But was destroying Ukraine the answer?
Pozner: If you go to war, obviously you’re going to destroy. The question is whether going to war was the answer. Some say yes, some say no. But what do you do if you don’t go to war? If you feel your country is being threatened, and you say “Please, we cannot allow this,” and they go ahead and do it anyway, you can sit back and agree, which is a sign of weakness, and that’s not good in politics either. I don’t have the answer. Thank God I don’t have to make those decisions.
Amy: The new NATO members, former Warsaw Pact countries, asked to join because they were afraid of Russia. They weren’t gobbled up. That’s different from NATO provoking Russia.
Pozner: Certainly not gobbling up. I didn’t say that. During Gorbachev’s short period and the longer Yeltsin period, Russia was clearly moving toward democracy and did nothing to remind the West of Soviet times. I agree these countries had a history of fearing Russia, but Russia at that time was in no way threatening. The issue was on the American side: the first three were the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Does it make sense to enlarge NATO with them, clearly understanding that the Russians will be shocked and unhappy, when Russia is threatening no one and moving toward democracy? It’s a balancing act. George Kennan, probably the most knowledgeable person about Russia and the Soviet Union, told the New York Times it was the beginning of a new Cold War and that it should never have been done. It’s not a question of gobbling up. It’s a question of what your policy is and what aim you follow. I think it was a tremendous mistake, and had it not happened, the world today would be in a much better place.
Part 5: How does the war end?
Amy: How do you see the war ending?
Pozner: I wish I knew. Russia clearly has an overwhelming advantage in armaments and personnel. I wouldn’t be surprised if in a month or so the Ukrainian front collapses. But then, how do you establish a solid peace after all these years? What conditions is each side ready, or forced, to accept? Both sides have to back off on some things.
Look at the Cuban missile crisis in ‘62. Kennedy said, “If you don’t turn your ships around, we will sink them,” even if it starts World War III. Not long ago the US National Archives published the letters between Khrushchev and Kennedy. Khrushchev wrote, “Okay, I’ll turn those ships around, provided you take out your ICBMs [missiles] in Turkey,” of which there were 15. Kennedy answered, “Okay, deal, but don’t tell anyone, because the US press will take me to pieces.” Khrushchev agreed. He turned the ships around, losing face as far as public opinion was concerned, and six months later Kennedy pulled the missiles out of Turkey. Two statesmen agreed to take a step back. I feel the only way to end this war is for both sides to step back, and not just Ukraine and Russia, because NATO is playing an extremely active role. It’s almost a proxy war. Europe would also have to agree to step back from certain conditions. I’m not the one negotiating, and I’m happy about that.
Amy: How do you see the war ending?
Pozner: I wish I knew. Russia clearly has an overwhelming advantage in armaments and personnel. I wouldn’t be surprised if in a month or so the Ukrainian front collapses. But then, how do you establish a solid peace after all these years? What conditions is each side ready, or forced, to accept? Both sides have to back off on some things.
Look at the Cuban missile crisis in ‘62. Kennedy said, “If you don’t turn your ships around, we will sink them,” even if it starts World War III. Not long ago the US National Archives published the letters between Khrushchev and Kennedy. Khrushchev wrote, “Okay, I’ll turn those ships around, provided you take out your ICBMs [missiles] in Turkey,” of which there were 15. Kennedy answered, “Okay, deal, but don’t tell anyone, because the US press will take me to pieces.” Khrushchev agreed. He turned the ships around, losing face as far as public opinion was concerned, and six months later Kennedy pulled the missiles out of Turkey. Two statesmen agreed to take a step back. I feel the only way to end this war is for both sides to step back, and not just Ukraine and Russia, because NATO is playing an extremely active role. It’s almost a proxy war. Europe would also have to agree to step back from certain conditions. I’m not the one negotiating, and I’m happy about that.
Part 6: Putin’s popularity and elections
Amy: People say Putin doesn’t want to end the war because if it ends, he’s done.
Pozner: There was an idea that sanctions would make people live worse and worse and finally rise up and get rid of Putin. That shows no understanding of who the Russians are. It’s out of the question. Is he as popular as ten years ago? Probably not, but still quite popular, believe me. In the recent elections, and I have my reservations about elections, 56.6% of the population came out and voted, and the majority voted for Putin’s party. There’s no way to dodge that. People weren’t forced at gunpoint.
Amy: But in many cases they were bussed from work and pressured, and certain parties weren’t allowed to run.
Pozner: Absolutely, and I think that was very bad. Yabloko [”the Obla party” in the transcript], which would sadly have gotten a very small vote, used to be quite popular and should have been allowed to participate. But that’s secondary. The ballot is secret, so even if people were bussed to vote, how they voted was their own choice.
I don’t think the end of the war would be the end of Putin. If you’re saying the only reason he wants the war to continue is to preserve his power, I wouldn’t agree. [Amy: They often say an important enemy keeps a leader strong.] I agree with that in general, but to me it’s not the case. There are anti-Putin people clearly, but I don’t feel a general attitude like that toward a once extremely popular leader. His popularity was over 80%. Now it’s probably around 60, which isn’t bad.
Amy: People say Putin doesn’t want to end the war because if it ends, he’s done.
Pozner: There was an idea that sanctions would make people live worse and worse and finally rise up and get rid of Putin. That shows no understanding of who the Russians are. It’s out of the question. Is he as popular as ten years ago? Probably not, but still quite popular, believe me. In the recent elections, and I have my reservations about elections, 56.6% of the population came out and voted, and the majority voted for Putin’s party. There’s no way to dodge that. People weren’t forced at gunpoint.
Amy: But in many cases they were bussed from work and pressured, and certain parties weren’t allowed to run.
Pozner: Absolutely, and I think that was very bad. Yabloko [”the Obla party” in the transcript], which would sadly have gotten a very small vote, used to be quite popular and should have been allowed to participate. But that’s secondary. The ballot is secret, so even if people were bussed to vote, how they voted was their own choice.
I don’t think the end of the war would be the end of Putin. If you’re saying the only reason he wants the war to continue is to preserve his power, I wouldn’t agree. [Amy: They often say an important enemy keeps a leader strong.] I agree with that in general, but to me it’s not the case. There are anti-Putin people clearly, but I don’t feel a general attitude like that toward a once extremely popular leader. His popularity was over 80%. Now it’s probably around 60, which isn’t bad.
Part 7: Trump and Putin
Amy: How do you evaluate the Trump-Putin relationship?
Pozner: I really don’t understand it. I have little understanding of Mr. Trump. I met him once, by accident. My wife was the promoter of a Tina Turner concert in the Soviet Union, and Trump, who couldn’t get a ticket, called her and they met. I don’t know what he wants. Today he says one thing, tomorrow something completely different, and then he goes back. Maybe it’s a game, the way he negotiates. I have a feeling that on a human level the Putin-Trump relationship is not bad, probably better than Trump’s relationship with any European leader.
Russia is a European country, if you look at its literature, music, art and philosophy. But Russians today are very anti-European. They feel real animosity. There are people who say Europe wants to destroy us and break our country into little chunks, and when you listen to some European leaders you almost say, “Well, it looks like it.”
Amy: How do you evaluate the Trump-Putin relationship?
Pozner: I really don’t understand it. I have little understanding of Mr. Trump. I met him once, by accident. My wife was the promoter of a Tina Turner concert in the Soviet Union, and Trump, who couldn’t get a ticket, called her and they met. I don’t know what he wants. Today he says one thing, tomorrow something completely different, and then he goes back. Maybe it’s a game, the way he negotiates. I have a feeling that on a human level the Putin-Trump relationship is not bad, probably better than Trump’s relationship with any European leader.
Russia is a European country, if you look at its literature, music, art and philosophy. But Russians today are very anti-European. They feel real animosity. There are people who say Europe wants to destroy us and break our country into little chunks, and when you listen to some European leaders you almost say, “Well, it looks like it.”
Part 8: Hybrid attacks and the Baltics
Amy: Russian hybrid attacks on Europe have increased. The Estonian foreign minister said yesterday that Russia is boiling European countries like a frog, turning up the heat slowly.
Pozner: Excuse me, Amy, I’m very doubtful about anything the Baltic leaders say. They’re very anti-Russian, and historically they have reason to be, but some of what they say is, in my opinion, outrageous. Incidentally, the frog usually boils itself; it’s not boiled by someone else. But that’s a different story.
Amy: What about the failed drone attack on an aircraft at Leipzig airport and arson attacks on military and robotics factories in Western Europe? You don’t think those are Russian hybrid operations?
Pozner: I don’t know. I will say that much of the weaponry Ukraine has is produced in the West. The Russians are saying, “You send them weapons to fight us and we’re not supposed to react? You’re participating in this war without sending your men, but you’re arming the person we’re fighting.” I think that’s a very dangerous situation. And there are people here, with whom I totally disagree, who have spoken about nuking the Baltic countries, not with major nuclear weapons, they say, but nonetheless. I find that absolutely horrendous, because it would lead to all-out nuclear war. But there is that feeling, and I can kind of understand it when people say, “If Europe is actively helping Ukraine with weapons that are killing our people, aren’t we supposed to react?”
Amy: Russian hybrid attacks on Europe have increased. The Estonian foreign minister said yesterday that Russia is boiling European countries like a frog, turning up the heat slowly.
Pozner: Excuse me, Amy, I’m very doubtful about anything the Baltic leaders say. They’re very anti-Russian, and historically they have reason to be, but some of what they say is, in my opinion, outrageous. Incidentally, the frog usually boils itself; it’s not boiled by someone else. But that’s a different story.
Amy: What about the failed drone attack on an aircraft at Leipzig airport and arson attacks on military and robotics factories in Western Europe? You don’t think those are Russian hybrid operations?
Pozner: I don’t know. I will say that much of the weaponry Ukraine has is produced in the West. The Russians are saying, “You send them weapons to fight us and we’re not supposed to react? You’re participating in this war without sending your men, but you’re arming the person we’re fighting.” I think that’s a very dangerous situation. And there are people here, with whom I totally disagree, who have spoken about nuking the Baltic countries, not with major nuclear weapons, they say, but nonetheless. I find that absolutely horrendous, because it would lead to all-out nuclear war. But there is that feeling, and I can kind of understand it when people say, “If Europe is actively helping Ukraine with weapons that are killing our people, aren’t we supposed to react?”
Part 9: Casualties, “was it worth it?”, Zelensky
Amy: It looks like as many as 1.4 to 1.5 million Russians have been killed or maimed for a further 12% of Ukrainian territory. Will people start asking whether it was worth it?
Pozner: First, where do you get that figure? We have no figures on how many soldiers the Russians or the Ukrainians have lost. I think it’s much less than you say. But probably a time does come when people say enough is enough. That time hasn’t come on either side, it seems. In Ukraine, one of the big problems is people trying to escape service and being grabbed in the street. A Ukrainian couple who worked at our summer home went back when the war began. Their 30-year-old son, medically certified as unfit for the army, went out to buy bread and was grabbed in the street, put in a car and put in uniform. That means they’re pretty desperate. I’d say on the Ukrainian side there’s more of a feeling of “enough is enough,” but you have the leadership. And I happen to think that when this war is over, Zelensky is going to be out, and out big time. Well, we’ll see. I don’t like to predict. I’m not a clairvoyant.
Amy: Is there sadness among Russians you know about Ukraine’s condition and the broken ties?
Pozner: Absolutely, no doubt. Many people I know feel it’s terrible. We used to be very close and speak very similar languages. Ukraine became part of the Russian empire in 1654, so there are centuries of being together, with intermarriage and children. When the war began, many people were shocked and saddened, and still are.
Amy: It looks like as many as 1.4 to 1.5 million Russians have been killed or maimed for a further 12% of Ukrainian territory. Will people start asking whether it was worth it?
Pozner: First, where do you get that figure? We have no figures on how many soldiers the Russians or the Ukrainians have lost. I think it’s much less than you say. But probably a time does come when people say enough is enough. That time hasn’t come on either side, it seems. In Ukraine, one of the big problems is people trying to escape service and being grabbed in the street. A Ukrainian couple who worked at our summer home went back when the war began. Their 30-year-old son, medically certified as unfit for the army, went out to buy bread and was grabbed in the street, put in a car and put in uniform. That means they’re pretty desperate. I’d say on the Ukrainian side there’s more of a feeling of “enough is enough,” but you have the leadership. And I happen to think that when this war is over, Zelensky is going to be out, and out big time. Well, we’ll see. I don’t like to predict. I’m not a clairvoyant.
Amy: Is there sadness among Russians you know about Ukraine’s condition and the broken ties?
Pozner: Absolutely, no doubt. Many people I know feel it’s terrible. We used to be very close and speak very similar languages. Ukraine became part of the Russian empire in 1654, so there are centuries of being together, with intermarriage and children. When the war began, many people were shocked and saddened, and still are.
Part 10: Trump’s elections, Biden, 2016
Amy: Did Putin help get Trump elected?
Pozner: [laughs] That’s a great question. If I knew, I’d tell you. I don’t believe that one country, whatever it is, can make another country vote a certain way. Maybe there were attempts. Did the Russians try? I don’t know. I have no proof. There’s a lot of talk, but I’ve long learned to ignore general statements. I like to see proof: touch it, taste it, smell it. Why Biden lost seems to me very clear. I can watch American television, as can many Russians with a little device on the set. I saw the debate and thought, this is a catastrophe.
Amy: What about 2016?
Pozner: Hillary got about three million more votes than Trump, but in America the popular vote isn’t decisive. To me that’s not very democratic. I think she should have won, but the Constitution works that way. And it would be strange to think Putin had his finger on the scale. We didn’t even know who Trump was, a businessman who wanted to build a Hilton in Moscow. A lot of American businessmen came to Russia in those days and made fortunes. Money attracts Trump a lot.
Amy: Did Putin help get Trump elected?
Pozner: [laughs] That’s a great question. If I knew, I’d tell you. I don’t believe that one country, whatever it is, can make another country vote a certain way. Maybe there were attempts. Did the Russians try? I don’t know. I have no proof. There’s a lot of talk, but I’ve long learned to ignore general statements. I like to see proof: touch it, taste it, smell it. Why Biden lost seems to me very clear. I can watch American television, as can many Russians with a little device on the set. I saw the debate and thought, this is a catastrophe.
Amy: What about 2016?
Pozner: Hillary got about three million more votes than Trump, but in America the popular vote isn’t decisive. To me that’s not very democratic. I think she should have won, but the Constitution works that way. And it would be strange to think Putin had his finger on the scale. We didn’t even know who Trump was, a businessman who wanted to build a Hilton in Moscow. A lot of American businessmen came to Russia in those days and made fortunes. Money attracts Trump a lot.
Part 11: Fear and repression
Amy: How paranoid are people in Russia today, given the repression?
Pozner: I lived in Soviet times. When I arrived in this country at almost 19, Stalin was still alive; he died two months later, thank heavens. I remember the fear, which was always there, even for me, like most people. You’d come back from vacation thinking, maybe I said something, maybe something will happen to me. That changed radically under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. But there is a history that doesn’t leave you, and when things start to change again, it comes back. Probably some people today fear what might happen to them, but there’s no comparison to what it was. It’s a very different country. I lost my job in the United States because Roger Ailes didn’t like my politics. He closed the show. Bingo. Nobody said anything. That’s called freedom of speech. We tend to believe the stories told to us because of the political situation. Yes, some people are careful. You’re careful about two things: the war and the president. Everything else is open for discussion.
Amy: But some have been arrested, and some designated foreign agents.
Pozner: Yes, absolutely, and that’s an unpleasant situation financially and otherwise.
Amy: How paranoid are people in Russia today, given the repression?
Pozner: I lived in Soviet times. When I arrived in this country at almost 19, Stalin was still alive; he died two months later, thank heavens. I remember the fear, which was always there, even for me, like most people. You’d come back from vacation thinking, maybe I said something, maybe something will happen to me. That changed radically under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. But there is a history that doesn’t leave you, and when things start to change again, it comes back. Probably some people today fear what might happen to them, but there’s no comparison to what it was. It’s a very different country. I lost my job in the United States because Roger Ailes didn’t like my politics. He closed the show. Bingo. Nobody said anything. That’s called freedom of speech. We tend to believe the stories told to us because of the political situation. Yes, some people are careful. You’re careful about two things: the war and the president. Everything else is open for discussion.
Amy: But some have been arrested, and some designated foreign agents.
Pozner: Yes, absolutely, and that’s an unpleasant situation financially and otherwise.
Part 12: Closing
Amy: Would you come back and talk about American politics ahead of the midterms?
Pozner: I’d be delighted. Though I’m an American citizen who doesn’t live in the United States; I was actually forced to leave. Some might say, “Why should he talk about American politics?” But I’m happy to, and I do have opinions.
Amy: Thank you very much.
Pozner: Thank you for having me.
IS IT PROPAGANDA?® is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
Amy: Would you come back and talk about American politics ahead of the midterms?
Pozner: I’d be delighted. Though I’m an American citizen who doesn’t live in the United States; I was actually forced to leave. Some might say, “Why should he talk about American politics?” But I’m happy to, and I do have opinions.
Amy: Thank you very much.
Pozner: Thank you for having me.
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IS IT PROPAGANDA?® is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
