Het joods-Amerikaanse tijdschrift Tikkun analyseert de zionistische mythen die de pro-Israel journalistiek telkens weer gebruikt. Tikkun olam (Hebrew: תיקון עולם) is a Hebrew phrase that means "repairing the world" or "perfecting the world." In Judaism, the concept of tikkun olam originated in the early rabbinic period. The concept was given new meanings in the kabbalah of the medieval period and further connotations in modern Judaism.'Jerome Slater’s critique of Thomas Friedman raises important questions about the role of journalists in mis-shaping public understanding of the Israel/Palestine struggle. As we have repeatedly argued in Tikkun, the mistakes made in the creation and perpetuation of that struggle come from both sides, and any historical reading must acknowledge the continued propensity on both sides to engage in acts of violence. Palestinian extremists and terrorists are culpable too—not just Israelis. Because this magazine emerges from the West, where Israel’s side of the story is well known and largely accepted blindly, while the Palestinian side is systematically kept from public consideration, we have often tried to re-balance the story by presenting the facts that the American media and the cheerleaders for the right wing in Israel have kept out of public view. Slater’s critique of Thomas Friedman is part of that effort. In 2003 Tikkun published the book Healing Israel/Palestine in which we try to give a more fully balanced account of the struggle, recognizing that both sides have full culpability for the origin and continuation of the struggle, and we are proud to say that the book is as relevant today as it was when we first published it. Saying that does not diminish the importance of Slater’s challenging of the deep misunderstandings of the situation perpetrated in Western media—misunderstandings which continue to constrain the possibilities of rational pro-peace intervention by the United States.]
As close observers of the century-old conflict between the Zionist movement and the Arab residents of Palestine increasingly understand, the Zionist narrative is riddled with historical mythologies that do not stand up under close and dispassionate examination. But these myths have had the devastating consequence of blinding Israelis—and their unthinking American supporters—to their own role in the never-ending Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as in the wider Arab-Israeli conflict.
To be sure, the Palestinians and the Arabs as a whole have their own historical mythologies, and it is obvious that Israel does not bear all the blame for the ongoing conflict. Still, it is the Israeli mythologies, largely accepted by most Americans, which have been the greater obstacle to a peace settlement, especially in recent years.
Before 2000, three major mythologies were refuted by serious historians and journalists—most of them Israeli. First, there was the myth that in 1948 a weak Israeli army (David) heroically overcame a strong Arab army (Goliath) that intended to destroy the new Jewish state; in fact, the Israeli armies outnumbered and outgunned a small coalition of half-hearted Arab armies, whose primary purpose was to prevent each other from grabbing off pieces of Palestine, rather than to “drive the Jews into the sea.” Second, there was the myth that hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees voluntarily fled their homes and villages in 1947-48; the evidence is overwhelming that the main reason the Palestinians fled was either out of the justified fear they might be massacred, as had happened at Deir Yassin and elsewhere, or because the Zionist armed forces rounded them up and forced them across the borders into Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. Third, there was the myth that both the Palestinians and their Arab neighbors “never lost an opportunity to lose an opportunity” to reach peaceful political settlements with Israel; in fact it is Israel that has repeatedly turned down real opportunities for peaceful settlements—with Egypt until the 1970s, with Jordan until the 1980s, and with the Palestinians, Syria, and the Arab world as a whole today.
In all these cases, Israel’s leading enemies, as well as the Arab League, representing most Arab countries, were and still are ready not only to end their conflict with the Jewish state but to normalize diplomatic and economic relations with it, in exchange for full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza, and Arab East Jerusalem, followed by the creation of an independent Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem. Consequently, the main reason for the continuation of Israel’s conflict with the Arab world (other than with Egypt) is that Israel has refused to withdraw from the expanded territory it conquered in 1967.
Since 2000 there has been a new myth, one that may be even more factually wrong and pernicious in terms of its consequences in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to this myth, the last serious peace negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, at Camp David in July 2000, broke down because Yasir Arafat and the Palestinians rejected a generous settlement offered by Prime Minister Ehud Barak. This myth says the Palestinians made no counteroffers of their own, and turned instead to terrorist violence against the Israeli population.
One of the most important purveyors of this myth has been Thomas Friedman, the lead foreign policy columnist of the New York Times. In part because of the position he holds as a writer for the world’s most influential newspaper, in part because he often appears to be moderate and balanced in his analyses and commentaries, and perhaps even because of the glibness of his writing style, it is reasonable to assume that Friedman has had an important influence on U.S. understanding of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.* *Dennis Ross, the head of the U.S. delegation at Camp David and a close adviser to Bill Clinton, has been equally influential, and equally misleading, in placing most of the blame for the breakdown of the peace process on the Palestinians in general and Yasir Arafat in particular. It is unlikely, however, that Ross had much influence on Friedman’s thinking, because Ross’s book on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, The Missing Peace, appeared in the spring of 2004, whereas most of Friedman’s columns on Camp David and the intifada appeared in the 2001-03 period. I have criticized Ross’s arguments in “The Missing Pieces in The Missing Peace,” Tikkun, May-June 2005.
The Camp David mythology underlies the policies of the Bush administration, as well as the dominant attitudes in Congress, the general American public, and the American Jewish community. Within a few months of Camp David, however, a number of important works began appearing, all of them challenging various aspects of the mythology. Within the next three years, the literature became extensive, and today no part of this mythology has survived serious examination by numerous Israeli, American, Palestinian, and European scholars and journalists, and—especially—by Israeli diplomats and academic advisors who were directly involved in the events of 2000, as well as former military, intelligence, and government officials (see box on p. 49). '
As close observers of the century-old conflict between the Zionist movement and the Arab residents of Palestine increasingly understand, the Zionist narrative is riddled with historical mythologies that do not stand up under close and dispassionate examination. But these myths have had the devastating consequence of blinding Israelis—and their unthinking American supporters—to their own role in the never-ending Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as in the wider Arab-Israeli conflict.
To be sure, the Palestinians and the Arabs as a whole have their own historical mythologies, and it is obvious that Israel does not bear all the blame for the ongoing conflict. Still, it is the Israeli mythologies, largely accepted by most Americans, which have been the greater obstacle to a peace settlement, especially in recent years.
Before 2000, three major mythologies were refuted by serious historians and journalists—most of them Israeli. First, there was the myth that in 1948 a weak Israeli army (David) heroically overcame a strong Arab army (Goliath) that intended to destroy the new Jewish state; in fact, the Israeli armies outnumbered and outgunned a small coalition of half-hearted Arab armies, whose primary purpose was to prevent each other from grabbing off pieces of Palestine, rather than to “drive the Jews into the sea.” Second, there was the myth that hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees voluntarily fled their homes and villages in 1947-48; the evidence is overwhelming that the main reason the Palestinians fled was either out of the justified fear they might be massacred, as had happened at Deir Yassin and elsewhere, or because the Zionist armed forces rounded them up and forced them across the borders into Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. Third, there was the myth that both the Palestinians and their Arab neighbors “never lost an opportunity to lose an opportunity” to reach peaceful political settlements with Israel; in fact it is Israel that has repeatedly turned down real opportunities for peaceful settlements—with Egypt until the 1970s, with Jordan until the 1980s, and with the Palestinians, Syria, and the Arab world as a whole today.
In all these cases, Israel’s leading enemies, as well as the Arab League, representing most Arab countries, were and still are ready not only to end their conflict with the Jewish state but to normalize diplomatic and economic relations with it, in exchange for full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza, and Arab East Jerusalem, followed by the creation of an independent Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem. Consequently, the main reason for the continuation of Israel’s conflict with the Arab world (other than with Egypt) is that Israel has refused to withdraw from the expanded territory it conquered in 1967.
Since 2000 there has been a new myth, one that may be even more factually wrong and pernicious in terms of its consequences in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to this myth, the last serious peace negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, at Camp David in July 2000, broke down because Yasir Arafat and the Palestinians rejected a generous settlement offered by Prime Minister Ehud Barak. This myth says the Palestinians made no counteroffers of their own, and turned instead to terrorist violence against the Israeli population.
One of the most important purveyors of this myth has been Thomas Friedman, the lead foreign policy columnist of the New York Times. In part because of the position he holds as a writer for the world’s most influential newspaper, in part because he often appears to be moderate and balanced in his analyses and commentaries, and perhaps even because of the glibness of his writing style, it is reasonable to assume that Friedman has had an important influence on U.S. understanding of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.* *Dennis Ross, the head of the U.S. delegation at Camp David and a close adviser to Bill Clinton, has been equally influential, and equally misleading, in placing most of the blame for the breakdown of the peace process on the Palestinians in general and Yasir Arafat in particular. It is unlikely, however, that Ross had much influence on Friedman’s thinking, because Ross’s book on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, The Missing Peace, appeared in the spring of 2004, whereas most of Friedman’s columns on Camp David and the intifada appeared in the 2001-03 period. I have criticized Ross’s arguments in “The Missing Pieces in The Missing Peace,” Tikkun, May-June 2005.
The Camp David mythology underlies the policies of the Bush administration, as well as the dominant attitudes in Congress, the general American public, and the American Jewish community. Within a few months of Camp David, however, a number of important works began appearing, all of them challenging various aspects of the mythology. Within the next three years, the literature became extensive, and today no part of this mythology has survived serious examination by numerous Israeli, American, Palestinian, and European scholars and journalists, and—especially—by Israeli diplomats and academic advisors who were directly involved in the events of 2000, as well as former military, intelligence, and government officials (see box on p. 49). '
