'Middle East talks in Annapolis: photo-op or talk-fest
Phyllis Bennis
Institute for Policy Studies.
Phyllis Bennis
Institute for Policy Studies.
The forthcoming Middle East peace conference has two main goals, buying support from Arab regimes for Washington's war in Iraq and escalating threats against Iran, and providing a photo-op to restore Rice's tarnished legacy.
· There is one thing certain about the international (or regional or bilateral) Middle East peace conference (or meeting or get-together) called by Condoleezza Rice (or George Bush or Elliott Abrams) for November (or maybe December): it's going to be held in Annapolis, Maryland (probably).
· Rice's sudden renewal of interest in and commitment to a new Middle East "peace process" has two main goals: buying support from Arab regimes for Washington's war in Iraq and escalating threats against Iran, and providing a photo-op to restore Rice's tarnished legacy.
· The agenda for the talks has not yet been finalized, but it will not include the goal of reversing Israeli occupation and dispossession and ending Israel's discriminatory apartheid policies.
· Because of U.S.-Israeli control of the agenda, "success" in Annapolis will depend on whether the Palestinian leadership can be coerced to sign on to a U.S.-Israeli text that many Palestinians will view as further abandonment of Palestinian national goals, and many in international civil society will see as violations of international law and human rights. There are serious questions whether the meeting as currently envisioned will be convened at all because of Palestinian refusal to accept U.S.-backed Israeli preconditions.
· With the U.S.-Israeli-led international boycott remaining intact, the conference is unlikely to lead to any even short-term improvement in the humanitarian crisis exploding across Gaza.
There is serious doubt about even the official viability of the conference. Ten days from the anticipated opening, invitations have not been issued (because Arab governments and even the Palestinian leadership have not so far agreed to U.S.-Israeli terms), an agenda has not been announced, and no preliminary statement of goals and/or principles has been agreed to. Palestinian officials have so far - at least publicly - rejected at least some of Israel's preconditions.
Besides her urgent need to update her legacy (which is currently that of the person who stood before the world at the United Nations and announced "we don't want a ceasefire yet" as Israeli jets bombarded Lebanon in summer 2006), Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urgently needs to win flagging Arab government support for the Bush administration's failing war and occupation in Iraq and its escalating mobilization against Iran. While most Arab governments remain quite happy to join the U.S. crusade, their people do not share support for the occupation of Iraq or for the anti-Iranian fervor now ascendant in Washington. As a result, the unpopular and often unstable Arab regimes (absolute monarchies, family dynasties and military regimes masquerading as democracies) must provide some kind of concession for the Arab rulers to pacify their restive populations. The latest version is to offer a high-profile (however low the results) diplomatic show aimed at allowing Arab governments to announce that the U.S. is now helping to give the Palestinians a state. As the New York Times described it, "now the United States is mired in Iraq and looking for a way to build good will among Arab allies."
The Bush administration apparently anticipated that Arab governments, at the highest levels, would welcome invitations to Annapolis. But so far, even Jordan and Egypt, the two Arab governments with full diplomatic relations with Israel, have hesitated, and Saudi Arabia has remained unconvinced. Even if the Arab governments agree to participate, they may send low- to mid-level officials, without the political clout - and photo-op value - of kings and prime ministers.
The stated U.S. goal for the Annapolis meeting is to realize a two-state solution. But in fact, if the conference takes place at all, the result will be to continue the approach of the long-moribund 2003 "Roadmap to Peace." It will, at most, provide a high-visibility launch of a new edition of the same Israeli-Palestinian "peace process" that has failed so many times before: a process based on acceptance of Israeli dominance over Palestinian lives and territory. Its real goal will be to create something that the U.S. can anoint as an "independent Palestinian state," while leaving largely unchallenged Israeli strategic, military, and economic domination over the entire area of Israel-Palestine.
The meeting's agenda will not be based on what international law, as well as Palestinian and global public opinion, requires for a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the conflict: an end to Israeli occupation and settlement projects, realization of the Palestinians' rights of self-determination and return, and an end to Israeli discrimination and apartheid policies.
If the U.S.-Israeli goals for Annapolis are realized, they would probably lead to the following "two-state solution" results:'
· There is one thing certain about the international (or regional or bilateral) Middle East peace conference (or meeting or get-together) called by Condoleezza Rice (or George Bush or Elliott Abrams) for November (or maybe December): it's going to be held in Annapolis, Maryland (probably).
· Rice's sudden renewal of interest in and commitment to a new Middle East "peace process" has two main goals: buying support from Arab regimes for Washington's war in Iraq and escalating threats against Iran, and providing a photo-op to restore Rice's tarnished legacy.
· The agenda for the talks has not yet been finalized, but it will not include the goal of reversing Israeli occupation and dispossession and ending Israel's discriminatory apartheid policies.
· Because of U.S.-Israeli control of the agenda, "success" in Annapolis will depend on whether the Palestinian leadership can be coerced to sign on to a U.S.-Israeli text that many Palestinians will view as further abandonment of Palestinian national goals, and many in international civil society will see as violations of international law and human rights. There are serious questions whether the meeting as currently envisioned will be convened at all because of Palestinian refusal to accept U.S.-backed Israeli preconditions.
· With the U.S.-Israeli-led international boycott remaining intact, the conference is unlikely to lead to any even short-term improvement in the humanitarian crisis exploding across Gaza.
There is serious doubt about even the official viability of the conference. Ten days from the anticipated opening, invitations have not been issued (because Arab governments and even the Palestinian leadership have not so far agreed to U.S.-Israeli terms), an agenda has not been announced, and no preliminary statement of goals and/or principles has been agreed to. Palestinian officials have so far - at least publicly - rejected at least some of Israel's preconditions.
Besides her urgent need to update her legacy (which is currently that of the person who stood before the world at the United Nations and announced "we don't want a ceasefire yet" as Israeli jets bombarded Lebanon in summer 2006), Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urgently needs to win flagging Arab government support for the Bush administration's failing war and occupation in Iraq and its escalating mobilization against Iran. While most Arab governments remain quite happy to join the U.S. crusade, their people do not share support for the occupation of Iraq or for the anti-Iranian fervor now ascendant in Washington. As a result, the unpopular and often unstable Arab regimes (absolute monarchies, family dynasties and military regimes masquerading as democracies) must provide some kind of concession for the Arab rulers to pacify their restive populations. The latest version is to offer a high-profile (however low the results) diplomatic show aimed at allowing Arab governments to announce that the U.S. is now helping to give the Palestinians a state. As the New York Times described it, "now the United States is mired in Iraq and looking for a way to build good will among Arab allies."
The Bush administration apparently anticipated that Arab governments, at the highest levels, would welcome invitations to Annapolis. But so far, even Jordan and Egypt, the two Arab governments with full diplomatic relations with Israel, have hesitated, and Saudi Arabia has remained unconvinced. Even if the Arab governments agree to participate, they may send low- to mid-level officials, without the political clout - and photo-op value - of kings and prime ministers.
The stated U.S. goal for the Annapolis meeting is to realize a two-state solution. But in fact, if the conference takes place at all, the result will be to continue the approach of the long-moribund 2003 "Roadmap to Peace." It will, at most, provide a high-visibility launch of a new edition of the same Israeli-Palestinian "peace process" that has failed so many times before: a process based on acceptance of Israeli dominance over Palestinian lives and territory. Its real goal will be to create something that the U.S. can anoint as an "independent Palestinian state," while leaving largely unchallenged Israeli strategic, military, and economic domination over the entire area of Israel-Palestine.
The meeting's agenda will not be based on what international law, as well as Palestinian and global public opinion, requires for a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the conflict: an end to Israeli occupation and settlement projects, realization of the Palestinians' rights of self-determination and return, and an end to Israeli discrimination and apartheid policies.
If the U.S.-Israeli goals for Annapolis are realized, they would probably lead to the following "two-state solution" results:'
Lees verder: http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?act_id=17591
Geen opmerkingen:
Een reactie posten