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An entire mythology has been built around the Palestinian resistance movement (which morphed into a party) Hamas. This construct has actually taken on more legitimacy as a factual interpretation of Hamas than the facts themselves. In most of the Western media, no matter if it is on the right or the left, and in some of the “moderate” media in Arab countries, the very name of the party is coupled with terms such as “fundamentalist”, “radical” or “terrorist”. Clearly, this serves to create a fear trigger that will remove the word from being critically and honestly evaluated. The listener will immediately identify Hamas with a negative connotation and is removed from responsibility for understanding that this is a manipulation of reality. The listener is expected to accept the claims that Hamas is “anti-democratic” and “fanatical”. It is child’s play to then convince the listener that Hamas is Bad, that it is the Enemy of all We represent (in our own eyes, tolerance, democracy, Goodness itself). It is possible to then extend that reading to the belief that action must be taken against them, that they are a “cancer that must be gotten rid of”, as quoted by the institutional peacenik, Noa. How does one eradicate a cancer, once it has been diagnosed? By extirpation or bombardment. With cancer treatment, one “bombards” even the healthy parts of the body with toxic agents, waiting to see if after the battle there were enough healthy parts remaining to allow the organism to continue to exist. Once you have set into the minds of millions of people the idea that destruction is good, because the enemy is just so damaging and evil if allowed to exist, the risk of bringing the entire organism to its grave by weakening it dramatically is taken as a viable risk to run. This is a way to make them justify actions that their own eyes don’t see as therapeutic, but are pure horror and evil.
How did it work that the world was so fooled and allowed Israel to destroy Gaza to “get rid of Hamas”? It was quite simple, and it’s always the same answer: Israel and its allies keep people disinformed. Those who actually will go slightly below the screaming headlines of the newspapers might find out a few facts buried that that will contradict the spin, but not that many people will go that far, given that they are exposed to something with an element of truth buried deep within. If that were not problematic enough, even the “progressives” have done meritorious services to rendering Hamas untouchable. They might accept them as a “resistance movement” but they won’t allow their personal ideological bias to see Hamas as a progressive force for their own people’s advancement. This may be out of conviction, convenience or even lack of research or a blindspot that does not allow variations on the theme of the class struggle, where everything is “international” and the same type of rules and ideals should be considered applicable and necessary for all, going so far in some cases to “import democracy” under various more or less aggressive forms.
These people, many of whom are armed with good intentions, have chewed, swallowed, and are spitting back quite a few of the outright lies and distortions that are part of the mythology created by opponents of Hamas, created in Israel and the West, primarily.
What are the components of that mythology?
1) Hamas was created by the Israeli Mossad.
2) Hamas represents a marginal portion of the Palestinians.
3) Hamas turned democratic enough just to be able to obtain some legitimacy to later take over and turn the Palestinian Territories into an Islamic State.
4) Their victory in the polls was nothing more than a protest vote against the corruption of Fatah.
5) Hamas is comprised of a bunch of illiterates and their electors are sucked in by their own ignorance.
6) Hamas is a fundamentalist group and therefore inflexible and incapable of any modification or evolution. The oft cited Charter is used against them to stress that they are simply a radical, destructive group poised for Holy War.
7) Hamas does not seek any kind of compromise with other Palestinian political parties or factions, and are therefore the divisionary element that prohibits of the unity of the people.
8 ) Hamas operates to indoctrinate their people with hate propaganda in order to utilise them as cannon fodder.
9) Hamas is a terrorist group that exists only thanks to financing by “fundamentalist regimes”.
That Hamas is merely a resistance movement has been thoroughly disproved by the elections, but this seems to be the safe place that activists can cluster in order to allow themselves to be able to tolerate Hamas, while wishing for their quick demise. They are not viewed then as having a true heritage as a political party that can be compared to those of “democratic nations” of the “international community”, and thus, analysis of them can remain at an elementary level, lending itself to hasty generalisations.
I ask my readers to kindly forgive all the inverted quotation marks, but these words do become ironic and empty of true meaning when they are applied to the objects indicated by the spin doctors, whose task it is to do the bidding of the hegemonic powers. How can a minority of a handful of nations that always pits itself against the will of the remainder of the world community in the UN be considered as the “international community”? It’s a boy’s club that excludes practically everyone. How can a country that puts in office the candidate who obtains the lesser amount of votes be called a “democracy”? It is when we start to question our own foundations that we can detect that there is a lot of convenience in presenting any opposition as being an enemy and outside of paradigms that we consider to be core to our expectations of how to establish a just and equitable world.
It’s time to debunk a few of these myths with facts.
1) Hamas was not created by Mossad. Although Israel does like to claim credit for many things, this one is not their doing. Political Islam in Palestine has had a presence since the early 40s in Mandate Palestine, and Hamas was born as part of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), with many of its early leaders formally affiliated. It was the experience of refugeehood that turned Hamas into a more autonomous element with a particular nationalist basis to it, a natural result of the urgent and real human situation of displacement and loss of their cultural and national identity.
There were close relations of this group with the Egyptian base, and the first offices of the Ikhwan in Palestine were created in Gaza in 1945, led by a member of one of the most important families of the zone, Sheykh Zafer al Shawwa. During the first Arab-Israeli war, Islamist volunteers reinforced the ranks, coming primarily from Jordan and Syria, and this support showed the refugees that the Ikhwan had the courage to defend itself, even during the “Israeli War of Independence”. The growing number of refugees gave a stronger identity and sense of purpose to the Islamist movement in Palestine. Therefore, in the civil society and in the population in general, a motivation from any other source was not required to be able to pledge: “I promise to be a good Muslim in defending Islam and the lost land of Palestine. I promise to be a good example for the community and for others.” These were the words spoken by those who swore their loyalty to the Ikhwan in Palestine (source: Beverly Milton Edwards, “Islamic Politics in Palestine”, p. 43). The local Ikhwan had its own agenda, defending its lost land. It didn’t require fanaticism, outside influence or even propaganda. The refugees themselves were living proof of the horrors of deportation and suffering. The identification as part of an international movement was concomitant with the recognition of the particularity of the Palestinian experience. The official foundation, dating 9 December 1987, was only the culmination of an organisation in the works for decades. Organised Islamic resistance was further utilised when the situation precipitated dramatically in 1967 and a new generation was born as refugees. For this generation, a return to Islam was considered as a necessity for the moral and political future of a people that was being literally destroyed. The cause of the Nakba was seen by many as the result of the distancing from a normal society, the Palestinian one, in which the ethical, religious, cultural and traditional values had been devastated by the occupation, and the descent into further degradation, poverty, disenfranchisement and social instability was seen not only as the result of the occupation, but part of its cause.
The “international community” would not come to the rescue of these people, the rest of the Ummah was not caught up in their national struggle, largely because they were not directly involved or were even prohibited from involvement. The extreme pain and disgrace of losing one’s land at that time was a new element to the area, where previous colonisation avoided expelling the indigenous inhabitants, and throwing off the usurpers was not complicated with the total loss of roots and a base. The basis for the formal dimension of Hamas was thus present for decades prior to its official birth. In order to operate, being under the thumb of the occupation, these organised groups that existed had established charities and benefit organisations for their people. These institutions were tolerated by Israel in the Occupied Territories. Israel conceded some operating space through granting of licenses. As General Yitzhak Sager said in an interview to the International Herald Tribune in 1981, the Israeli government “…gave money that the military governor allocated to the mosques […] the sums were used both by the mosques and the religious schools, with the purpose of reinforcing a subject that would contrast that of the Left that was in favour of the PLO.” If there was some motivation for Israel to be involved, it was really as an act of ‘divide and rule’, a bit of tolerance, a bit of economic support to the various religious associations in order to see if an opposition to the nationalists of the PLO could develop. They really were only looking for a way to see the weakening of the PLO, which was gaining some support in the West, and they did not found, provide major financing or in any way influence a movement that they would in some way infiltrate or control. That is pure mythology. Why give Israel credit where none is due?
2) That Hamas represents only a marginal portion of Palestinians is another myth to debunk. It is indeed true that all Palestinians are not refugees, and it is also true that virtually all of the leaders of Hamas were born in exile or at some point were subjected to the experience of expulsion and loss of their homes and possessions. This is a core Palestinian experience, and it is true that even those (few) Palestinians who were not uprooted can identify with the loss of their cultural and national identity, and all of them know that their national aspirations and cohesion as a group have been destroyed by Israel. Thus, even a movement or party that has its own identity in the refugee camps and in exile or in religious roots, is recognised as an intrinsic, legitimate and natural representative of Palestinians as a whole. They even obtained the majority vote in areas of the West Bank that were not considered as Hamas strongholds, as well as obtaining votes from many Christian areas.
3) The myth that Hamas turned “democratic enough” just to get its foot in the door as the first step of forcing an Islamic State upon the entirety of Palestine is a very widespread one, especially in the progressive circles that do not recognise the popularity of the movement or who have an ideological prejudice against any religious movement. There is much to be said in favour of separation of church and state, but this of course is something that cannot be imposed from afar, and furthermore, there are many levels of separation to take into consideration. Those who subscribe to this position of “Hamas buying time before introducing the Sharia” tend to deny that a democracy has certain characteristics, and it is not necessarily a synonym of “secularism”. When the word “democracy” is applied correctly, it has certain characteristics, and Hamas meets these. Hamas has popular consensus. It has an internal structure that is autonomous and recognised as legitimate by its constituency. It follows the rules of elections, meeting the requirements for participation. Once elected, it assumes its role within the existing system, not having overthrown or staged coups against established structures. It is a political movement with several factions (some of them armed, as is true of many parties in areas under occupation, Fatah included) with a history and an organisation. There is widespread discussion among its constituencies, including those who are political prisoners, prior to making decisions, and the majority decides the actions to be undertaken. If one thing must be said about it to set it apart from parties that Westerners are familiar with, highest level leaders generally do not assume the governing roles. This is understandable in a party where a great quantity of the leaders are routinely assassinated by Israel. That the current political director, Khaled Meshaal, must live in exile after having once been victim of an attempted assassination says more about this anomalous situation than a thousand words can.
4) That Hamas’s victory in the Legislative Council election was nothing more than a protest vote (another pet theory of the left) was brilliantly illustrated as false by Paola Caridi in her very good book (despite the sensationalist subtitle) “Hamas, What it is and what the Radical Palestinian Movement Wants”, published by Feltrinelli and only available in Italian at this time. I am translating a few paragraphs that deal with this question.
“There is a precise political reason for which the majority of Palestinians voted for Hamas. It is a reason that concerns the decision made by the Islamist movement formally on 23 January 2005. (translator’s note, a year prior to the Legislative elections): a unilateral truce, reached together with the Islamic Jihad (that had instead broken it on several occasions), which had turned words into facts: that there would be the end of the season of terrorist attacks made by Hamas inside Israel as indicated within the confines of the 1949 armistice, the Israel within the Green Line, in other words. The ending of suicide attacks in Israeli cities, substantially bringing an end to the Intifada as well as (Hamas’s) participative choice is interpreted by the Palestinian population as a precise political proposal: an alternative to those who had governed and controlled them, holding the hegemony up to that moment. A proposal that poses at the same time new de facto limits to Hamas’s resistance strategy. The Islamist movement has not been, therefore, chosen only as a protest against the corruption, patronage and inefficiency of Fatah, which as a party is often confused with the PA. Corruption, patronage and inefficiency that are related, at least from a temporal point of view, with the failure of the Oslo Accords and the “facts on the ground” realised by the Israelis.
“The people of Hamas were considered people who are serious, who did not enrich themselves at the expense of the population, in fact, they continued to live in normal neighbourhoods and in the refugee camps.” (Caridi, p. 171).
5) An extremely offensive smear, oft repeated, is that Hamas’s followers and its leaders are a “bunch of illiterates” or “religious fanatics”. Almost all the leaders are (or were, given the number of assassinations within their ranks, the past tense is de rigueur) university graduates in fields ranging from medicine and physics to jurisprudence, economics and theology, is testament itself that this smear is merely to throw dirt on them and paint them as having read only religious texts and therefore “under-developed” when compared to other movements. Education has always been one of the pillars of Hamas and its charity work. The people of Palestine don’t need to be told this, it is a reality for them, where in many cases without this foundation, Palestinians would be left wanting in this area.
6) The inflexibility of Hamas is another myth, especially yanked out when speaking of the 1988 Charter (Mithaq). Shiekh Hamed Bitauri, “religious authority of Nablus, president of the Union of the Palestinian Ulemas, known for his radical positions had no problem confirming that ‘the Charter is not the Qu’ran. We can change it. It is only the synthesis of the positions of the Islamist movement in its relations with the other factions, and its politics.’ Aziz Dweik, founder of the Department of Geography of the University of Nablus, later to become the spokesman of the Palestinian Parliament after the 2006 elections, and imprisoned in Israeli jails since the summer of that year, went even further, declaring the political and pragmatic necessity of distancing from the Mithaq of 1988 to Khalid Amayreh, Palestinian journalist that is sensitive to Islamist positions, he said that ‘Hamas would not remain as a hostage to rhetorical slogans of the past like those of the ‘destruction of Israel’.” (Khalid Amayreh, Hamas Debates the Future: Palestine’s Islamic Resistance Movement Attempts to Reconcile Ideological Purity and Political Realism, in “Conflicts Forum”, Nov. 2007, p.4) (Caridi p. 90).
Haniyeh has mentioned on many occasions that the Charter has been surpassed in its substance by the other official documents, the most important of which, the Electoral Programme of the Reform and Change List (the list in which Hamas ran for office). This programme is structured like a document that goes far beyond the needs of a political campaign, according to the leader of Hamas, and it indicates the policy of the movement. It was not written in the heat of the revolution of the Intifada, and reflects the evolution of the party. The changes present are not ideological so much as ones of a strategic and political nature. The positions have been reiterated so many times in interviews and public interventions, it seems incredible that the complexity and maturity of Hamas should by now not be apparent to everyone. It is clear that they are still dedicated to the liberation of Palestine, but they are attempting to achieve it through reaffirmation of the rights of the people, knowing full well that as a party, Hamas is not equipped to overthrow the occupation in any practical way or to destroy what they recognise as a reality.
Many of us who follow events in the Middle East hope that they do not surrender to pragmatism so far as to recognise Israel not only as a reality, but as a “Jewish State”, however, we must watch from the sidelines and evaluate facts. The people of Palestine will be vigil about what rights are being surrendered, if any, and many of us believe that backs to the wall, they will not capitulate and lose what they know is theirs for reasons of political expediency. Hamas too is aware of this fact.
7) Hamas has been far less divisionary than its principle counterpart, Fatah. The Gaza “coup” that shocked and saddened the world was actually a preventive measure to the thwart the planned takeover by the Fatah forces faithful to Dahlan (in collaboration with Israel). That Hamas was the party that was awarded victory by its own people has never been recognised by the “international community” that nevertheless pushed for elections and insisted that this was the necessity for Palestinians, because this would mean that the resistance had been granted legitimacy and would become policy within the governing body, the rejection of negotiations as sub-alternates with Israel, which was Fatah policy, had been officially sanctioned by the populace and it would only be a matter of time before the programme would become policy. So, any steps by the Fatah “Security Forces” to overtake Gaza would actually have been the coup. But in the backwards way of viewing events, fuelled by disinformation, the tragic bloodbath between Palestinians prevented the real overthrow of democracy that would have taken place had Dahlan had the chance. Again and again, Hamas has sought to work together with the opposition party, and this is something they would not tolerate in the vain hope that their economic advantage and political nulla osta from the boy’s club would allow them to command even in absence of the popular mandate to do so.
8 ) It’s not necessary to use propaganda to show to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and in exile, and even to many within Israel, the ongoing destruction of the Palestinian civilisation and people. Blockades, bombardments, assassinations, war, checkpoint humiliations, restrictions, separation of families, imprisonment and further abuses are not isolated incidents, but they are the daily bread and water of Palestinian life. No one needs to invent a rage over a phantasmagoric enemy. There is a real one that is subjecting the people of all ages and conditions to humiliation, deprivation and death. Showing a man in a mouse costume to insist that children are being indoctrinated in hate might go down well with the uninformed masses, but a glimpse into the reality makes Farfur look like the sweetest kind of way for a child to assimilate and tolerate that he or she is a prisoner doomed for life to suffer in the most atrocious way for being born as a lesser being in the oppressors’ eyes.
9) The worst smear against Hamas is the one to keep them as the symbol of evil: that they are a terrorist group, financed by “rogue States in the axis of evil”. Bearing in mind that their financing is abysmally inferior to the gigantic economic and “military aid” package given to Israel by America, Canada and many other nations in the “international community” in an official way, why should the claim of foreign financing be considered as unacceptable when it is simply the way the that Israel keeps afloat through billions of dollars annually, up front, and heaven only knows what other financing comes in through the thousands of “charities” that are really little more than fronts for mass immigration to Israel to curtail Arab growth? If Zionism and its charities are considered as legitimate and noble, why are Islamic ones put on blacklists and the donors treated as if they are financing terrorism? There is a double standard here.
Lees verder: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article23799.htm
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Christopher Hitchens on Obama's undeserved Nobel Peace Prize.
(Published Oct. 21, 2009): The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees won the award twice. The original version of this story omitted that organization's 1981 prize.
Alfred Nobel had one odd thing in common with Mark Twain and Ernest Hemingway and Marcus Garvey. He had the chance to read about his own death in the newspapers. It seems that he was so depressed by the emphasis that the obituarists laid on his pioneering work on dynamite—the WMD of its day—that he resolved at once to upgrade his real death notice by endowing an award for international peace.
1. For service to diplomacy and realpolitik. In this category might fall Theodore Roosevelt—no peace-lover—for his part in negotiating an end to the Russo-Japanese war, that now-forgotten disaster that presaged both the First World War and the Russian Revolution. One might add here the other awards to statesmen who were still active politicians, such as Chancellor Willy Brandt of (then) West Germany in 1971 and Mikhail Gorbachev, effectively the last leader of the Soviet Union, in 1990.
3. For service to human rights. These may or may not have something or anything to do with peace, though the terms of Alfred Nobel's bequest do specify those who "shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses." Few would doubt that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. honored the spirit if not the letter of this rubric, though it is hard to see how it applies to Agnes Bojaxhiu, more widely known to the media as Mother Teresa, who never claimed to be working for peace and who announced in her acceptance speech that the chief threat to world peace was abortion. By even nominating Carl von Ossietzky in 1935, when he was in a German concentration camp, and Andrei Sakharov four decades later, the Nobel committee may not have helped avert or shorten any war, but it did honor human rights and the human spirit. There is a growing case for a separate or specific prize that does just that, and only that.
4. For service to random but vague feelings of good will. You might have thought that 1946 would have been a good year for Mohandas K. Gandhi, known to Hindus as "the Mahatma." I might not agree, but I do think the first year of the postwar era was an absurd time to give the prize to Emily Balch and John Mott, the latter perhaps best known for his efforts as an international officer of the YMCA. The history of the peace prize is littered with such quaint absurdities, often weighted toward superannuated French and Belgian dignitaries, or overpoliticized groups like Amnesty International.5. For fealty to supranational institutions and to the United Nations and its cadet or satellite outfits. The International Red Cross—which assumes that war is inevitable and has no position at all on "peace"—won the award in 1917, 1944, and 1963. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which necessarily makes the same assumption as a cleanup crew and second-responder, won in 1954 and 1981. The U.N. itself, under Kofi Annan's -secretary-generalship, graciously accepted the prize a few years ago as if—even after Rwanda and Bosnia—the recognition was no more than its due.
Friday's award to our much-admired chief executive falls into none of these categories but aims at satisfying the conditions of the first, the fourth, and the fifth. Answering a question that rather bluntly asked "Why?," Nobel committee spokesman Thorbjørn Jagland defended the choice of Barack Obama by saying, first, that the prize had often been intended to "enhance" the ongoing work of sitting heads of government, citing the precedents of Brandt and Gorbachev. He added, second, that the president's emphasis on the primacy of the United Nations was meritorious in and of itself. This, it has to be said, is ridiculous. Here we have the Nobel committee's first "virtual" award.
By 1971, when he was given the prize, Herr Brandt had already paid his imperishable visit to Warsaw and dropped to his knees at the memorial to that city's infamous ghetto. His Ostpolitik, or reconciliation with Nazism's former vassals and victims in the East, was a reality. It would have continued with or without a pat on the head from Scandinavia. Indeed, the year before he was chosen for the award, Germany's chancellor had been given another supreme if meretricious accolade, in the gift of an American newsmagazine that I need not mention, of being named "Man of the Year." Mikhail Gorbachev was garlanded in 1990, several years after he had made a historic agreement on disarmament with Ronald Reagan. (If you can picture Ronald Reagan getting an invitation to Oslo, your imagination is a great deal more vivid than mine.) So those examples—of moral and political courage given due recognition—might also hold in the instance of Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin but are not even remotely applicable in the present case. Very well, then, what about the idea of encouraging future statesmanlike and peace--loving conduct? In this roseate conception, we have Barack Obama as Tom Cruise, praised and promoted for nipping crime in the bud by arresting people before they actually commit any offense. (A whole new slogan on which to run: "Tough on pre-crime"!)
We thus find ourselves in a rather peculiar universe where good intentions are rewarded before they have undergone the strenuous metamorphosis of being translated into good deeds, or hard facts. And it becomes increasingly difficult to avoid entertaining the suspicion that there is something explicitly political in the underlying process of Nobelista decision making. I do not think that I am shying at shadows here, either. Especially of late, the literature awards, on which I am more qualified to pronounce, have reflected the same or a similar mentality. The choices of an Italian anarchist, an Austrian Stalinist, a Portuguese Stalinist, and the hysterical anti-American Harold Pinter are or should be fresh in our minds, and we might remember that this is a Nobel committee that let Vladimir Nabokov and Jorge Luis Borges go to their graves unrecognized.
Perhaps not coincidentally, the choice of ex-president Jimmy Carter for the peace prize in 2002 was accompanied by statements from Oslo that said outright that he was being rewarded for his opposition to the foreign policy of an elected sitting president of the United States. (On that basis, Carter could have been given the prize for writing to Arab heads of state in 1991, urging them not to join the coalition against Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait: an act of lawless annexation that involved the actual obliteration of a member state of the United Nations and the Arab League. Again, I find it difficult to imagine a Republican ex-president being honored in such a way for publicly undermining one of his successors.)
A case can be made that it isn't good for sitting presidents to get their recognition and their praise in advance of their actual attainments. A case could even be made that this isn't really the American hardscrabble, triumph-in-adversity way, of the kind that promises all sorts of honor to those who bear the heat and burden of the day, who show the scars of battle and struggle, and who have been tempered and fashioned in combat and adversity. As it is, President Obama has admitted in his own rather captivating books of autobiography that he feels pervaded by a sense of his own luck and good fortune. So, don't tempt fate by accepting a prize for a race you haven't yet entered, let alone won. Maybe, like Roman potentates of old, Obama should engage a servant who whispers to him on a regular basis to remember that he, too, is mortal. (Rahm Emanuel strikes me as the near-perfect servitor for that essential everyday job.) Meanwhile, just as he must already regret crossing the seas to try and hustle an Olympic deal for his adopted hometown, the president may live to wish that he didn't go all the way to Oslo to accept the unearned adulation of what Saul Bellow once called the Good Intentions Paving Company.
Hitchens Is A Newsweek contributor and columnist for Vanity Fair.


Een van de mensen van wie ik telkens weer leer is de Britse auteur John Berger. Ik meld dit omdat zijn analyse zoveel intelligenter is dan het wat jolige artikel van Rutger Pontzen in de Volkskrant over de kunstverzameling van Dirk Scheringa, dat in zijn ogen 'grotesk, megalomaan en voor niets anders geschikt dan als een buitenproportioneel statement voor zijn eigen ondernemersschap. En precies dat zou de toekomstige bestemming en uitstraling van het museum moeten zijn: conform de verzamelwoede van de naamgever zou alles wat hij heeft gekocht en bezat moeten worden opgehangen. Niet omdat het allemaal even waardevol is of kwalitatief goed, maar omdat Scheringa aan alles zijn goedkeuring heeft verleend. Omdat het van hem was. Een museum als ultieme spiegel van de grondlegger. Waar rijp en groen, goed en slecht, oud en nieuw, naast, boven en door elkaar hangt,' aldus Pontzen. Een museum als een vorm van bestraffing. Het volk wil hun kunst en zal het weten ook. We zullen de lui die niet meetellen er met de neus induwen.
Bravo Rutger, je hebt gelijk, ik ben het eens met deze gedachte. Er is alleen 1 zwak punt in je betoog, en dat zwakke punt is van cruciaal belang. Niet alleen Scheringa zelf en zijn kunstverzameling is 'grotesk, megalomaan, buiten proportie', maar ook dit hele postmoderne, neoliberale tijdperk (waarbinnen die kunst ontstaat) is 'grotesk, megalomaan, buiten proportie', met alles erop en eraan. De moderne kunst is het product en een antwoord op het groteske van onze tijd. Jouw voorgestelde museum zou dan ook veel meer dit tijdperk uitbeelden dan welke andere kunstverzameling dan ook zou kunnen. Welnu, wij leven in een barok tijdperk, dat wil zeggen, de oorspronkelijke impuls van het modernisme is uitgewerkt, en bijna het enige dat beroepsmatige aandacht krijgt is een herhaling van zetten, een herhaling van de vorm in steeds extremere mate, terwijl de inhoud volledig achter de facade is verdwenen. Maar daarover zwijg je, je suggereert zelfs het tegendeel. Ik bedoel: wat jij als een soort bestraffing voorstelt is in feite geen bestraffing, maar zal een magnifieke uitbeelding zijn van jouw eigen tijd, jouw eigen wereldje, jouw eigen carrieredrift. Je doet alsof Scheringa en zijn verzameling een aberratie zijn en alsof de mainstream nog op het rechte pad verkeert. Dat is een absurde voorstelling van zaken.
Nu dus Berger. Die schrijft in Ways of Seeing: 'The art of the past no longer exists as it once did. Its authority is lost. In its placve there is a language of images. What matters now is who uses that language for what purpose.' Dit schreef John Berger over 'the dealers of the Free Market and their corollary, the Mafia': 'they now have the world in their pocket. They have. But to maintain their confidence they have to change the meaning of all the words used in languages to explain or praise or give value to life: every word, according to them now, is the servant of profit. And so they have become dumb. Or, rather, they can no longer speak any truth. Their language is too withered for that. As a consequence they have also lost the faculty of memory. A loss which one day will be fatal.'
De technologie heeft een beeldcultuur geschapen. Die beelden bepalen de gedachten en handelingen van de massamens. Die beelden kunnen natuurlijk niet al te gecompliceerd zijn. De massamens dient namelijk permanent gemobiliseerd te blijven en dat gebeurd via geconditioneerde reflexen, niet via weloverwogen bespiegelingen. Kunst speelt daar geen enkele rol in. John Berger's analyse is juist dat 'als gevolg van de grootscheepse culturele deprivatie... er grote delen van de… arbeiders en middenklasse bestaan die zich niet helder kunnen uitdrukken. De middelen om datgene wat ze weten te vertalen in gedachten is hen ontnomen… Ze bezitten geen voorbeelden die ze kunnen volgen, waarbij woorden ervaringen duidelijk maken.’ Een avondje televisie kijken en men weet wat Berger bedoeld. ‘Wat kan er, uitgezonderd halve waarheden, grove simplificaties of onbenulligheden, overgebracht worden aan dat halfgeletterde massale gehoor, dat… overal de voorstelling mag bijwonen?’ zo schreef George Steiner. En je kunt het de mensen niet kwalijk nemen. Immers, beste Rutger, je kunt de massamens niet eerst gemobiliseerd houden zodat die allerlei troep koopt en dan verwachten dat hij belangstelling toont voor kunst. Dus je toon ten opzichte van de Scheringa's in deze wereld is onterecht en laf. Kies de echte machtigen als vijand uit, de mensen die uit commerciele overwegingen volstrekt ondemocratisch bepalen hoe onze wereld eruit dient te zien en dan heb ik het zowel over 'de kunstmafia' als de financiele mafia die voor de banken en de multinationals werkt.
Opnieuw, kunst speelt in dit wereldbeeld geen enkele rol. Kunst in de massacultuur is niets anders dan marketing van bepaalde producten. En daar doet ook jouw kunstwereldje aan mee. Sterker nog: het is hun raison d'etre. Het probleem is alleen dat niet langer meer een kleine groep het monopolie bezit op de waardebepaling. Niet langer kan een kongsi 'kunstkenners' bepalen wat kunst is en wat niet. Kennelijk is de strekking van het werk van Andy Warhol nooit echt tot je doorgedrongen. Meer daarover later. Het is allemaal publicity, publicity, publicity. Dat moet je toch weten. Rutger Pontzen, je verdient er notabene je geld mee.
Sunday 25 October 2009
by: Kelpie Wilson, t r u t h o u t | Book Review
So, it came as a surprise to learn that this warrior of the id and defender of the flesh has produced an illustrated version of Genesis. That's right, the Bible. What would he do with it? Obviously, Crumb would portray the cruel and jealous God of the Old Testament as some version of the cynical, abusive Mr. Natural, holding secret orgies in Heaven with Devil Girl, and he would base his Abraham on Flakey Foont, Mr. Natural's pathetic sycophant.
But that's not how Crumb did it. On this one, he played it (mostly) straight. And why not? If you have never read Genesis from start to finish, you might not be aware that the stories are as full of sexual perversity and surreal plot points as any comic book. Genesis has lust, inebriation, nudity, polygamy, harlots, men pimping their wives, masturbation, penis cutting, sex with a 90-year-old woman who gives birth, sodomy, incest and a father who offers his virgin daughters up for strangers to rape.
That's a lot of great material for an artist like Crumb, and the genius of his Genesis is that he portrays it all - every word and every illustration is given equal weight. That's not how they taught it to us back in Sunday school. Our Bible coloring books had only selected scenes: Noah and his animals, but never Noah lying passed out drunk and naked in his tent. And even when we outgrew the Sunday school cookies and punch and graduated to wafers and wine, we still never heard about Abraham selling his wife Sarah to Pharaoh in exchange for cattle, gold and slaves. It was a kind of scam for the couple, and they did it more than once, targeting King Abimelech of Gerar next and getting cattle, sheep, slaves and land in return.
Crumb's compositions are cinematic and the rendering of detail is deliciously fine. One is amazed at how well the text adapts to the comic book form with its speech balloons and narrative boxes. The "sweet" Crumb comes through here with tenderly drawn and emotionally insightful expressions. And the faces! Where did he get them all? Each individual in the "begats" is unique. They are all raw, rich and human.
Some years ago, when Bill Moyers convened an interfaith dialogue on Genesis, it was the human dimension of the stories that he found so gripping: "Because their emotions and struggles are so real," Moyers said, "the people of Genesis come to life in every generation, and their stories live on."
Scholars have often said that the Hebrew texts are the first example of written history. Earlier writing from Sumeria recorded myths (including the flood story), genealogies, laws and accounts, but the Hebrews were the first to write a narrative history of their people. Before the "people of the book," the common culture of a clan or tribe was formed exclusively by oral tales and images.
Images are fundamentally different from words. Leonard Shlain, in his book "The Alphabet Versus the Goddess," lays out a theory about this difference and the impact it has had on cultural evolution. Shlain thought that writing stimulated left brain, linear, cause-and-effect thinking, associated with males, while a focus on images produced a more intuitive and holistic style of thought, associated with females.
The "people of the book" crusaded against images, as their God warned them away from the "alien gods" of other people. The most interesting scenes in Genesis revolve around the struggles within the tribe of Abraham over images and other vestiges of goddess worship, for clearly these stories are about a people in transition. And this is where Crumb's work becomes important.
By rendering every letter of Genesis faithfully into images, Crumb has given us a blank canvas on which to color new meaning. Combining words and images together allows us to escape the fundamentalism of either one alone. Shlain discusses this fundamentalism in his chapters on the Protestant Reformation in 16th century Europe. The Catholic Church had never allowed free access to the Bible texts. Only ordained priests were authorized to read and interpret the Bible for congregations. The only direct access people had to the stories was the depiction of selected stories in church windows and other decorations. Then along came the printing press, making the Bible available to lay people, and Martin Luther declared "every man is his own priest." But liberating the Bible from church control courted chaos, and there was suddenly no room for any interpretation at all. Bible literalism was born. And since no one really knew how to respond to incidents like Abraham selling Sarah to Pharaoh, or Lot offering his virgin daughters to a ravenous mob, those stories are generally ignored by all.
Crumb's Genesis does not let you ignore the problem stories - they are imaged just as faithfully as all the others.
Crumb addresses some of these more puzzling stories in his afterword commentary where he quotes from a book by Near East scholar Savina Teubal titled "Sarah the Priestess." I read Teubal's book as background material for my novel "Primal Tears" a few years ago and it revolutionized my thinking about human history. Teubal found it very likely that the biblical Sarah was a high priestess from a disappearing matriarchal culture that still existed in Mesopotamia, alongside an emerging patriarchy.
Lees verder: http://www.truthout.org/1025091
Israelisch bombardement van Gaza, een van de dichtst bevolkte gebieden ter wereld.Opmerkelijk en tegelijkertijd typerend dat er geen enkele kritische noot wordt geplaatst Linda Polmans recensie van ‘Worse than War’ van Daniel Jonah Goldhagen (Boeken 16-10-09). Dit boek handelt schijnbaar over de verschrikkingen van genocide en levert uitgesproken kritiek op het wegkijken door de westerse gemeenschap, wanneer het moorden niet gebeurt op een ons bekende wijze zoals tijdens de Jodenvervolging. Zijn betoog gaat geheel voorbij aan het isoleren en verhongeren van de Palestijnen in Israël. In plaats daarvan wordt Hamas een invloed toegekend die reikt tot alle landen ter wereld en de stap gemaakt naar een serieuze waarschuwing: Hoed u voor de ‘politieke islam’.
Het is mij zeer duidelijk uit welk vaatje wordt getapt. Het is het goed recht van Goldhagen om zijn persoonlijke visie op de geschiedenis te geven, maar van een NRC-recensent verwacht ik een kritischer blik op zijn uiteenzettingen. Zeker als zijn advies luidt: ‘de VN heffen we gewoon op’. Dat zou inderdaad goed uitkomen, nu de VN-raad het rapport-Goldstone heeft aangenomen, waardoor vervolging van de geconstateerde oorlogsmisdaden tijdens de recente Gaza-oorlog dichterbij is gekomen.
Jacqueline Kuyt, via e-mail
In response to my story about the 28-year-old Bulgarian woman Joanna M. ( https://stanvanhoucke.blogspot.com/2026/10/joannas-narcissism.html...