How New York Times Propaganda Works

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John Pilger

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Ukraine's president Zelensky has denied his country faces an imminent Russian invasion. 'Don't create panic,' he tells the US and UK. With Ukraine off-script, the war mongering of Biden and his UK echoes is exposed, like Blair's, as a crime.

STRIPPING AWAY THE BULLS**T: U.S. and Russian Threats Over Ukraine—What They’re About and Who’s the...

Threats and counter-threats flying between Washington and Moscow over Ukraine have caused a flurry of fear and confusion... 

covertactionmagazine.com

For weeks now The New York Times has warned or promised its readers that Putin's armed forces would invade Ukraine. Of course this was all propaganda to support the American military-industrial complex, now the wars in the Middle East have been lost. The only thing the Russian leaders wanted was the promise of the West that Ukraine will never be a NATO-member to be fulfilled, so the Russian Federation would not become extremely vulnerable. It would be the same when Russia will station weapons of mass-destruction in, well why not, Cuba. The first Cuba Crisis ended almost in a nuclear armageddon. Besides, the American foreign secretary promised the Russian leaders it would not expand its military bases towards Russia's borders. Well known is:

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous 'not one inch eastward' assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990.

This:

was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu).

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early

Now the White House and NATO have informed the Russians they are not willing to fulfill their promise, we arrive in the next phase, just as dangerous as the first one. Don't forget the Americans and NATO are gambling with the life of hundreds of millions of citizens, as soon as their poker game is going wrong, by mistake or on purpose. But it is not so far yet, all in due time, and that means that The New York Times has to explain now to its readers why it was warning all these weeks in vain. 

Well, first read this, and later on I will try to explain why this leading newspaper is trying to blame their own bluff on one man, president Putin. Hallelujah, Lord have mercy:

GUEST ESSAY

Putin Is Caught in a Trap of His Own Making

Jan. 28, 2022

Credit...Alexander Demianchuk/Tass, via Getty Images

By Yulia Latynina

Ms. Latynina is a journalist who has reported extensively on Russia’s politics and foreign policy.

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MOSCOW — The question is on everyone’s lips. Will President Vladimir Putin go to war against Ukraine? To judge by Russia’s propaganda machine, where media moguls are predicting a victory “in 48 hours,” the answer is an emphatic yes.

Yet the truth is more complex. While Mr. Putin undoubtedly regards Ukraine as little more than a Russian province, as he argued in a lengthy pseudo-historical treatise in July, it’s far from clear his aim was war. Outright conflict — as opposed to sudden swoops, covert operations or hybrid warfare — isn’t really Mr. Putin’s style. It’s probable that the troop buildup in November was an attempt to force the West to relinquish any claims over Ukraine. That would be a great P.R. victory at minimal cost.

But the West called his bluff. In the past week especially, the United States and NATO have taken a markedly sharper tone when discussing Russia — and have, more important, sent military hardware across Eastern Europe and put troops on standby. The message is clear: If Russia won’t de-escalate, then neither will the West.

Instead of trapping the United States, Mr. Putin has trapped himself. Caught between armed conflict and a humiliating retreat, he is now seeing his room for maneuver dwindling to nothing. He could invade and risk defeat, or he could pull back and have nothing to show for his brinkmanship. What happens next is unknown. But one thing is clear: Mr. Putin’s gamble has failed.

                                                                                                                                

Likewise, when Turkish drones struck down Russian mercenaries and equipment in Libya and Syria, there wasn’t a peep of acknowledgment either. In fact, it seems that Mr. Putin was so conscious of Turkey’s might that he didn’t dare to join forces with Armenia when, in September 2020, its territory was attacked by Turkish-backed Azerbaijan. And after triumphantly sending in his troops to Kazakhstan for an indefinite time, Mr. Putin started to withdraw them very soon after Russia’s foreign minister took a call from his Chinese counterpart.

Tellingly, Russia’s major successful military operations under Mr. Putin — the defeat of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimeain 2014 — happened when the West was looking the other way. In both cases, the world was caught unawares and Russia could complete its designs without the threat of armed international opposition. That is not the case now.

What’s more, there are no internal reasons for pursuing a war. Yes, Mr. Putin’s ratings are down and prices are up, but there’s no major domestic unrest and elections are two years away. Mr. Putin doesn’t require an expansionist escapade to either shore up his rule or distract the population from its troubles. War is a big red button that can be pushed only once. Right now, there’s no need.

And then there’s the main reason: Russia would not be assured of victory. The Ukrainian Army is much improved, having upscaled its equipment and preparations for a ground invasion, and the Russian troops deployed near the border are most likely insufficient to conquer the country. Because of its sheer bulk, the Russian Army might be able to advance: Quantity has a quality of its own, as Stalin reportedly said. But it would surely come at the cost of catastrophic losses in human life.

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If he had little intention of invading, why did Mr. Putin raise the stakes so high? The answer is simple: Afghanistan. The West’s disastrous withdrawal from the country in August signaled the United States’ waning appetite for entanglement abroad. Emboldened, Mr. Putin clearly decided it was a good time to press his case for a revision of the post-Cold War order. Without the usual bargaining chips — no sound economy, no superior weapons, no fanatical followers — he fell back on unpredictability. The more irrational his behavior, went the thinking, the more likely the United States would accept his demands.

Those demands, published in mock-treaty form in December, were in many cases absurd. The call for NATO to withdraw its troops from members in Eastern Europe, for example, would never be met. The core request — that NATO deny membership to Ukraine — was silly in a different way. There was no chance of Ukraine becoming a member any time soon, ultimatum or not. But that was Mr. Putin’s point: By demanding something that was already happening, Mr. Putin aimed to claim a victory over the West.

Further Reading:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/28/opinion/putin-russia-ukraine.html