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zaterdag 6 juni 2026

IRAN: The Zionist -bloc narratives to discredit the Islamic Revolution

 

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IRAN: The Zionist -bloc narratives to discredit the Islamic Revolution explained - Ehsan Safarnejad

There is a tendency among some analysts to label Iran as 'part of the Satanic cabal' hurtling the world towards an oppressive technocracy... we unpack the history of the Islamic Revolution 

 
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There are many commentators in the independent media sphere who are convinced that there are no good guys, there is no real Resistance in the West Asia/Persia region, that Israel controls everything effectively, including Hamas in Gaza - this latter narrative has been fully dismantled in this long and comprehensive research article by Mujamma Haraket which you can read here.

In this (long) conversation we cover the history of the Islamic Revolution from Ayatollah Khomeini’s 3 months in France, his communications with the Carter administration and his triumphant return to Tehran in 1979. We discuss the ‘hostage crisis’, the claims of Iran’s role in election rigging that led to the Reagan presidency - the Iran-Contra subterfuge and then finally, we briefly address the Covid project and Iran’s response to the Western-centric Covid protocol. 

I will include a number of links: 

Ayatollah Khamenei - a super-spreader (during Covid) - The Ayatollah was described in various media outlets, including The Times of Israel and Al Jazeera, as one of the most powerful conspiracy theorists ref. Covid:

Khamenei was among the first and most powerful world leaders to suggest the coronavirus could be a biological weapon created by the US. During his annual address on March 22, 2020, to millions of Iranians for Nowruz, the Persian New Year, Khamenei questioned why the US would offer aid to countries such as Iran if they themselves were suffering and accused of making the virus.

Khamenei went on to refuse US assistance saying “possibly [US] medicine is a way to spread the virus more”. Last month, he refused to accept coronavirus vaccines manufactured in Britain and the US, calling them “forbidden”. The Iranian mission to the United Nations in New York did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

In March 2020 - the US State Department published a Covid disinformation fact sheet on Iran.

I also want to call attention to the Iranian regime’s misinformation campaign surrounding the origination of the Wuhan virus. Instead of focusing on the needs of the Iranian people and accepting genuine offers of support, senior Iranians lied about the Wuhan virus outbreak for weeks.”

The Iranian leadership is trying to avoid responsibility for their grossly incompetent and deadly governance. Sadly, the Iranian people have been suffering these kinds of lies for 41 years. They know the truth: The Wuhan virus is a killer and the Iranian regime is an accomplice.”

-Secretary Pompeo, Remarks to the Press March 17, 2020

From the fact sheet:

  • For years, the Iranian regime has prioritized its proxies over the Iranian people and stolen the money the Iranian people deserve and expect to go for their healthcare. In July 2019, one billion euros intended for medical supplies “disappeared” and another $170 million dollars allocated for medical goods were instead spent on tobacco. Since 2012, the regime has spent over $16 billion on terror abroad – the Iranian people know that any sanctions relief would go to sponsor terrorist, not humanitarian activities.

  • In March, the head of the IRGC, Hossein Salami, claimed the spread of COVID-19 in Iran might be due to a U.S. biological attack, and an advisor to the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament claimed coronavirus was being used as biological warfare by the United States.

It is worth taking a look at the entire ‘fact sheet’ which reads as the framing of Iran’s muted Covid response as grounds for the fomenting of protests and backlash against the government which might enable US/Zionist-orchestrated instability and potential “regime change” or civil unrest. 

In our conversation, Ehsan and I discussed the potential that Ayatollah Khomeini had actually manipulated the Carter administration, pre-1979, into allowing him to take power in an already unstable Iran. This is something which is rarely taken into consideration by media outlets that simply focus on the communications with the CIA and the Carter team. 

These quotes are taken from a lengthy BBC Persia analysis that was published in 2016. This is an outlet that is the flagship of the anti-government media complex in and outside Iran. 

Khomeini wanted a decisive victory, not a deal. But a tactical engagement with Washington suited him well. Khomeini, in fact, had a set of key questions to determine Carter’s commitment to the Shah’s regime and the orientation of the Iranian military.

“If the integrity of the army can be preserved, we believe there is every prospect the leadership will support whatever political form is selected for Iran in the future.”

In other words, Washington, in principle, was open to the idea of abolishing the monarchy, and the Shah’s military, whose top brass met daily with General Huyser, would be willing to accept such an outcome provided the process was gradual and controlled.

Khomeini’s biggest fear was that the all-powerful America was on the verge of staging a last-minute coup to save the Shah. Instead, he had just received a clear signal that the US considered the Shah finished, and in fact was looking for a face-saving way to protect the military and avoid a communist takeover.

It continues (emphasis added): 

Khomeini wanted a decisive victory, not a deal. But a tactical engagement with Washington suited him well. Khomeini, in fact, had a set of key questions to determine Carter’s commitment to the Shah’s regime and the orientation of the Iranian military.

“If the integrity of the army can be preserved, we believe there is every prospect the leadership will support whatever political form is selected for Iran in the future.”

In other words, Washington, in principle, was open to the idea of abolishing the monarchy, and the Shah’s military, whose top brass met daily with General Huyser, would be willing to accept such an outcome provided the process was gradual and controlled.

Khomeini’s biggest fear was that the all-powerful America was on the verge of staging a last-minute coup to save the Shah. Instead, he had just received a clear signal that the US considered the Shah finished, and in fact was looking for a face-saving way to protect the military and avoid a communist takeover.

The US had effectively told Khomeini that the military had lost its nerve. “These officers fear the unknown; they fear an uncharted future,” Zimmermann told Yazdi during the same meeting.

To Washington’s relief, the ayatollah pledged not to destroy the military. His emissary urged America not to pull its sophisticated weapons systems out of Iran. […]

Khomeini and Carter both wished to avoid a violent clash between the military and the opposition. But their aims were fundamentally different.

Carter wanted to preserve the military - which Sullivan once described as an unpredictable “wounded animal” - in order to use it as powerful leverage in the future.

But Khomeini wanted to trap the beast and finish it. The military was a long-term threat to his regime. Its decapitation and destruction was a top priority.

Washington had answered Khomeini’s questions about the future of the monarchy and the orientation of the military. Now, it was the ayatollah’s turn. The Carter administration wanted to know about the future of US core interests in Iran: American investments, oil flow, political-military relations, and views on the Soviet Union.

Khomeini answered the questions in writing the next day - sent back with Yazdi.

It was an artfully-crafted portrait of an Islamic Republic, mirroring what Carter had sketched at a conference of world leaders on Guadeloupe Island earlier that month: an Iran free of Soviet domination, neutral, if not friendly to America, one that would not export revolution, or cut oil flow to the West.

“We will sell our oil to whoever purchases it at a just price,” Khomeini wrote.

“The oil flow will continue after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, except for two countries: South Africa and Israel,” he added.

To develop the country, Iran needed the assistance of others, “in particular the Americans”, Khomeini wrote.

As for foreign investments, the US was likely to have a role. He implied that the Islamic Republic would be interested in buying tractors, not tanks, making it also clear that he had no “particular affinity” for the Russians.

“The Russian government is atheistic and anti-religion. We will definitely find it more difficult to have a deep understanding with the Russians,” Yazdi added to Zimmermann as he delivered the answers.

“You are Christians and believe in God and they don’t. We feel it easier to be closer to you than to Russians,” Yazdi said.

Khomeini also vowed not to destabilise the region.

“Non-interference in other people’s affairs”, he wrote, would be the policy of the future government.

The Islamic Republic, unlike the Shah’s regime, would not act as the policeman of the Gulf, but it would not get into the business of exporting the revolution either.

“We will not ask the people of Saudi, Kuwait, or Iraq to kick the foreigners out,” Khomeini wrote.

The chaos in Iran had alarmed most of Iran’s Arab neighbours, who feared that after the Shah’s downfall armed Marxist groups would take over. A CIA assessment concluded Arab conservatives found it hard to believe Khomeini or a regime associated with his ideas could be a lasting government in Iran.

Three days later, Khomeini himself made a direct appeal to the White House.

“It is advisable that you recommend to the army not to follow Bakhtiar,” wrote Khomeini in his “first first-person” message on 27 January.

Khomeini, in effect, had three requests: smooth the way for his return, press the constitutional government to resign, and force the military to capitulate.

The ayatollah also included a subtle warning that if the army cracked down, his followers would direct their violence against US citizens in Iran.

Still, he made sure to end on a positive note, emphasising the urgent need for a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Cabled from the US embassy in France after being delivered by Yazdi, the message reached the highest levels of the US government.

Khomeini arrived at Tehran airport on the morning of 1 February, mobbed by thousands of supporters. In a few days, he had appointed a rival prime minister.

By then, the military had no fundamental problems with a change in the form of government, so long as change was done “legally and gradually”, a CIA report, only declassified in 2016, concluded on 5 February, 1979.

At this point, the army’s cohesion had significantly eroded. Many junior officers and conscript soldiers were now with Khomeini. [….]

The day Khomeini won his first revolution, President Carter wasn’t in Washington. Over the weekend, he had hit the slopes around Camp David. In the morning of Sunday, 11 February, Mr Carter and his Secretary of State were at a church, temporarily out of reach.

In their absence, the President’s National Security Advisor convened an emergency meeting at the White House Situation Room.

The once-powerful Iranian armed forces had disintegrated, but Brzezinski, who had been among the most pro-Shah voices in the Carter administration, was thinking of Option C, but he was told it wouldn’t be possible, given the state of the military.

But it’s now clear that, in the final stages of the crisis, America had in effect hedged its bet by keeping a firm foot in both camps in the hopes of a soft landing after the fall of the Shah’s regime.

But Carter’s gambit proved to be a massive blunder. The real danger was overlooked, Khomeini’s ambitions were underestimated, and his moves were misread.

Unlike Carter, Khomeini pursued a consistent strategy and played his hand masterfully. Guided by a clear vision of establishing an Islamic republic, the ayatollah engaged America with empty promises, understood its intentions, and marched toward victory.

Less than a year later, Khomeini - while holding the US Charge d’Affaires and dozens of other Americans during the Iranian hostage crisis - declared: “America can’t do a damn thing.”

He then celebrated the first anniversary of his victory with a major proclamation: Iran was going to fight American Imperialism worldwide.


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