Met grote stelligheid verkondigde Ian Buruma in 2002 in The Guardian:
For an alliance to work, you need a common enemy. And many Europeans don't see Iraq as a common enemy. Instead, that nagging fear of being dragged into wars by bellicose America, of being rudely wrenched from our peaceful dreams, is growing. But this is the fear of the powerless bystander. One reason for wanting the US to be part of the ICC, or other international institutions, is to check its power and curb its excesses. Perhaps even to pacify it. At the same time, we expect the US to do the dirty work for us.
Tegenwoordig wordt de vraag almaar relevanter waarom de zogeheten ‘liberals,’ veelal sociaaldemocraten met neoconservatieve opvattingen, bewust het risico willen lopen een Derde Wereldoorlog uit te lokken? Gezien de rampzalige consequenties is hun oorlogszuchtige mentaliteit verbijsterend, en wel omdat een oorlog met massavernietigingswapens ‘will bomb’ de mensheid ‘back to the Stone Age,’ zoals Bob Bowman, luitenant-kolonel b.d. van de Amerikaanse Luchtmacht, mij eens vertelde. Het is daarom angstaanjagend dat de ‘liberals’ Barack Obama zo bewonderen, want het was juist onder deze president dat het Witte Huis besliste het huidige kernwapenarsenaal van de VS geheel te vernieuwen, à raison van naar schatting één biljoen dollar, een miljoen keer een miljoen. Als geen ander zijn de ‘liberals’ de steunpilaren van een doodscultuur, met haar ‘rationality without reason.’ De Amerikaanse voormalige minister van Buitenlandse Zaken en National Security Adviser van president Nixon, Henry Kissinger, benadrukte nog eens die doodsdrift van de Obama-regering, toen hij zomer 2015 publiekelijk ervoor waarschuwde dat het buitenlands beleid van de Obama-regering erop gericht was ‘Rusland uiteen te laten vallen.’ In een interview met The National Interest, een tijdschrift dat zich focust op ‘Amerikaanse belangen’ en geleid wordt door de overtuiging:
that nothing will enhance those interests as effectively as the approach to foreign affairs commonly known as realism — a school of thought traditionally associated with such thinkers and statesmen as Disraeli, Bismarck, and Henry Kissinger.
Laatst genoemde merkte op als één van de best ingevoerde deskundigen op het gebied van de hedendaagse Amerikaanse buitenlandse politiek dat een:
number of things need to be recognized. One, the relationship between Ukraine and Russia will always have a special character in the Russian mind. It can never be limited to a relationship of two traditional sovereign states, not from the Russian point of view, maybe not even from Ukraine’s. So, what happens in Ukraine cannot be put into a simple formula of applying principles that worked in Western Europe, not that close to Stalingrad and Moscow. In that context, one has to analyze how the Ukraine crisis occurred. It is not conceivable that Putin spends sixty billion euros on turning a summer resort into a winter Olympic village in order to start a military crisis the week after a concluding ceremony that depicted Russia as a part of Western civilization.
Door dit en een reeks andere feiten kwam Kissinger tot de conclusie dat ‘breaking Russia has become an objective,’ van zowel de Obama-regering als het ontelbare dollars verslindende Amerikaans militair-industrieel complex, terwijl toch ‘the long-range purpose should be to integrate it.’
Wat denken de ‘liberals’ van de Democratische Partij te bereiken met ‘het uiteen laten vallen’ van de Russische Federatie, een soevereine staat die qua oppervlakte het grootste land ter wereld is, en uit 186 etnisch groeperingen bestaat? Het creëren van nog meer chaos in de wereld, dan Washington en Wall Street nu al hebben geschapen in het Midden-Oosten? Waar berust deze waanzin op?
Nu het militair-industrieel complex de kernwapenwedloop nieuw leven heeft ingeblazen, blijven ook de meeste Nederlandse opiniemakers slaafs aansturen op een gewapend conflict met Rusland. Dit terwijl 'Het Pentagon een nieuw tijdperk [voorziet] waarin nucleaire wapens weer een belangrijke rol zullen spelen,’ aldus berichtte The New York Times op 16 januari 2018 over de Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), een rapport waarin de kernwapen-strategie van de Verenigde Staten wordt herzien. De NYT zette uiteen dat de ‘newly drafted United States nuclear strategy,’ het gebruik van kernwapens zal toestaan:
to respond to a wide range of devastating but non-nuclear attacks on American infrastructure, including what current and former government officials described as the most crippling kind of cyberattacks.
For decades, American presidents have threatened ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons against enemies in only very narrow and limited circumstances, such as in response to the use of biological weapons against the United States. But the new document is the first to expand that to include attempts to destroy wide-reaching infrastructure, like a country’s power grid or communications, that would be most vulnerable to cyberweapons.
Het Pentagon:
called the strategic picture facing the United States quite bleak, citing not only Russian and Chinese nuclear advances but advances made by North Korea and, potentially, Iran.
‘We must look reality in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we wish it to be,’ the draft document said. The Trump administration’s new initiative, it continued, ‘realigns our nuclear policy with a realistic assessment of the threats we face today and the uncertainties regarding the future security environment.’
Saillant feit is tevens dat:
Gary Samore, who was a top nuclear adviser to President Barack Obama, said much of the draft strategy ‘repeats the essential elements of Obama declaratory policy word for word’ — including its declaration that the United States would ‘only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.’
Maandag 28 januari 2019 schreef The Guardian’s ‘world affairs editor’ Julian Borger onder de kop ‘US nuclear weapons: first low-yield warheads roll off the production line’ dat dit ‘[n]ew type of weapon’ volgens deskundigen het gevaar vergroot dat gewapende conflicten zullen uitbreken. Bovendien zette Borger uiteen dat:
Last week, the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office issued a report projecting the nuclear weapons costs over the next decade as nearly a half trillion dollars, up 23% from the last estimate two years ago.
‘I don’t think we need as many as they’re talking about,’ Adam Smith, the new head of the House armed services committee, said in a C-Span interview. ‘I just don’t think we can afford what the NPR is calling for and I don’t think it is necessary.’
Hoe krankzinnig Amerikaanse beleidsfunctionarissen kunnen zijn blijkt wel uit het feit dat het Jewish News Syndicate op 11 september 2019 met nauwelijks ingehouden trots meldde dat:
Following the resignation on Tuesday of U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton, Charles Kupperman has taken up the post on an interim basis.
Kupperman, a former defense-contractor executive, served in the Reagan administration and was appointed deputy national security adviser in January,
terwijl bekend is dat de joodse pro-Israel Charles Kupperman:
once argued a nuclear war could be won ‘in the classical sense’ if one side emerged the stronger, even if there were tens of millions of casualties.
New National Security Advisor Once Said U.S. Could Take Losing 20 Million People in a Nuclear War
Vrijdag 13 september 2019 berichtte The Huffington Post dat:
Before becoming the national security adviser, Kupperman served as an informal adviser to Bolton and worked as a defense industry executive at Boeing and Lockheed Martin. He was a critic of the Iranian nuclear deal and in 2017 co-signed a letter to Trump backing Bolton’s plan to withdraw from the agreement.
Here are excerpts of Kupperman’s comments from his interview with Scheer (Robert Scheer, kritische, joods Amerikaanse journalist. svh):
Scheer: On what kind of life we could visualize after a nuclear attack:
It means that, you know, it would be tough. It would be a struggle to reconstitute the society that we have. It certainly wouldn’t be the same society [as] prior to an exchange, there is no question about that. But in terms of having an organized nation, and having enough means left after the war to reconstitute itself, I think that is entirely possible. It may take 15 years, but geez, look how long it took Europe to recover after the Second World War.
On disagreeing with the Physicians for Social Responsibility organization’s view of nuclear war:
Scheer: But in terms of nuclear war, do you factor in what those doctors were saying?
Kupperman: Yes, that is why I want to have a civil defense system, because it can be very effective in reducing casualties. That is my point. If doctors are so concerned about it, the answer isn’t necessarily disarming the United States or cutting our weapons programs… it might be having a civil defense program. You can make a very good case that is exactly what those doctors ought to be shouting for.
Scheer: But they say that it is impossible to protect the population from nuclear attack.
Kupperman: Yes, but the thing is, nuclear weapons have certain effects and if you take steps to deny those effects, you save a lot of people. And unless you are right in the middle of ground zero, you are not going to have a lot of burn victims if you take those steps. And if you evacuate these people out of the targeted areas, or what you think are targeted areas, they are not going to get burned or destroyed.
On society surviving nuclear war:
Scheer: Is it possible to survive it with your civilization intact?
Kupperman: Well, it is possible to survive it with a certain amount of society intact, it depends on what steps we take to ensure that survivability. It certainly won’t be the same as before the war. But generally societies have been intact ― like Germany and Japan and Western Europe in the Second World War weren’t the same after the war as they were before. But generally societies have been intact. The question really gets down to political credibility in the conduct of your foreign policy. If you look like you are serious about defending yourself and your allies with real civil defense programs and other measures, I think that has political credibility with the adversary. An adversary isn’t going to take somebody seriously if they don’t take steps to protect themselves. Nuclear war is a destructive thing, but it is still in large part a physics problem.
Scheer: What do you mean?
Kupperman: Well, sheltering yourself against nuclear effects can be done, it just depends on how much effort and money one wants to spend on it, but a certain layer of dirt and some reinforced construction materials can assure the survivability of somebody, assuming they are not at ground zero of a detonation. Hiroshima, after it was bombed, was back and operating three days later. So it is certainly a destructive weapon, and nobody wants a nuclear war, but I don’t think the United States in the past has been serious enough about planning for its survival in the event of a nuclear war...
On winning nuclear war ‘in a classical sense’ (een ‘all-out nuclear war,’ aldus Scheer. svh):
Kupperman: It depends on what one considers all-out. If the objective in a war is to try to destroy as many Soviet civilians and as many American civilians as is feasible, and the casualty levels approached 150 million on each side, then it’s going to be tough to say you have a surviving nation after that. But depending on how the nuclear war is fought, it could mean the difference between 150 casualties and 20 million casualties. I think that is a significant difference, and if the country loses 20 million people, you may have a chance of surviving after that.
Scheer: Would that mean the other nation would survive as well? You’re not talking about winning a nuclear war, you’re talking about a stalemate of some kind.
Kupperman: It may or may not be a stalemate, depending on who had more surviving national power and military power.
Scheer: So you think it is possible to win?
Kupperman: I think it is possible to win, in the classical sense.
Scheer: What does that mean, ‘in the classical sense’?
Kupperman: It means that it is clear after the war that one side is stronger than the other side, the weaker side is going to accede to the demands of the stronger side.
Charles Kupperman: 'Hiroshima, after it was bombed, was back and operating three days later.'
Maar over deze variant van misdadig ’hooliganism’ van als ‘normaal’ doorgaande democratische politici, gedreven ‘by tribal hatreds,’ spreekt een mainstream-opiniemaker als Ian Buruma nooit. Alleen wanneer populistische ‘political leaders deliberately exploit these rifts and whip up hostile emotions even further’ wordt hij wakker. Hij schrijft dan dat alleen populistische politici ‘immense harm’ toebrengen aan ‘the institutions that guarantee people’s freedom and safety.’
Kenmerkend voor de gekte van Charles Kupperman, als de joodse dr. Strangelove, is het fictieve getal van 20 miljoen doden in zowel Rusland als de Verenigde Staten, dus in totaal 40 miljoen doden, die volgens hem acceptabel zijn om te kunnen spreken van een ‘winbare oorlog,’ uitgevochten met ‘bruikbare nucleaire wapens.’ Ook daarover blijft professor Buruma muisstil. Naar aanleiding van ‘liberals’ zoals Ian B., wees begin februari 2018 de Amerikaanse historicus Eric Zuesse op het volgende:
What seems to have escaped the numerous media reports on the 2018 NPR is that the development of ‘more usable nuclear weapons’ had already been put forth in George W. Bush’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which was adopted by the US Senate in late 2002.
In this regard, Senator Edward Kennedy had accused the Bush Administration for having developed ‘a generation of more usable nuclear weapons,’ namely tactical nuclear weapons (B61-11 mini-nukes) with an explosive capacity between one third and 6 times times a Hiroshima bomb.
The term ‘more usable’ emanates from debate surrounding the 2001 NPR, which justified the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the conventional war theater on the grounds that tactical nuclear weapons, namely bunker buster bombs with a nuclear warhead, are, according to scientific opinion on contract to the Pentagon [and thus hired in order to buttress the Pentagon’s viewpoint] ‘harmless to the surrounding population because the explosion is underground.’
Even if a ‘small nuke’ explodes underground, it can still be achieving a strategic objective — maybe even a decisive one, in a war that possesses major strategic significance.
Nuclear war starts when nuclear weapons are first used. Period.
The military opponent might be a non-nuclear power, in which case there won’t be nuclear retaliation. This would be like Japan 1945 (and the bombs that were used on those cities were ‘small’ enough to qualify to be referred to today as having been ‘small nukes’, or ‘tactical nuclear weapons’).
But America’s use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was ‘strategic’ nonetheless. To deny this is simply to lie. It’s what Mattis-Trump-Obama-Bush do/did, and what almost all neoconservatives are committed to doing in order to increase the bottom lines of ‘Defense’ contractors.
Hoe kan een bloedoffer van 40 miljoen ongewapende burgers aanvaardbaar zijn voor een joodse extremist als Kupperman, voor wie de dood van 6 miljoen even onschuldige joodse Europeanen — terecht — onacceptabel blijft? Waarom is voor hem een ruim zesvoudige Shoah wel acceptabel? Welke normen hanteert deze misdadiger die tevens vele tientallen miljoenen verminkte slachtoffers op de koop toe neemt? Met wat voor soort NAVO-monsters heeft het ‘Vrije Westen’ te maken? Een relevante vraag aangezien zij uit naam van ons handelen.
De in 1936 gestorven joods-Oostenrijkse satiricus Karl Kraus besefte al in het interbellum dat hij, door de moderne krankzinnigheid, als auteur op de grenzen van de taal was gestoten, aangezien ‘Gewalt kein Objekt der Polemik, Irrsinn kein Gegenstand der Satire’ kan zijn. Vanuit dit perspectief was het niet vreemd dat Rijkskanselier Hitler hem aan niets deed denken. Niets is immers opgewassen tegen pure staatsterreur. En dus bleef de man, voor wie woorden zijn instrument waren, sprakeloos. ‘Unsagbar’ was de werkelijkheid geworden, zo ‘onzegbaar’ dat tegelijkertijd het ondenkbare denkbaar werd. Sindsdien is het ondenkbare zelfs de norm geworden. Begin van de jaren zestig schreef de joods-Nederlandse auteur Harry Mulisch dan ook in zijn boek De Zaak 40/61:
Eichmann is definitief geschiedenis geworden. Waar praat ik nog over? Mensen bedreigen mensen met een vernietiging, waarnaast de jodenmoord een bagatel zal worden, een herinnering uit de goeie oude tijd. En geen Amerikaan of Rus die, komt het bevel, zal weigeren de bommen in het zachte vlees van hele volkeren te werpen — zo min als Eichmann weigerde. Wat hebben wij eigenlijk over Eichmann te beweren? Wij, die zelfs de ongeborenen bedreigen: en die oorlog tegen ons nageslacht is al sinds zestien jaar aan de gang! Maar zoiets heet geen 'oorlog' meer, dat heet een vervloeking. Hier vervloekt de mens zichzelf, zijn eigen kindskinderen, hieruit spreekt een haat zo fundamenteel, dat wij wel moeten vrezen, de mens nog altijd overschat te hebben.
In deze culturele leegte kon een Kupperman die:
worked at two defense contractors, Lockheed Martin and Boeing; he was the vice president for business development for missile defense systems for Boeing and the vice president of Washington Space Operations for Lockheed Martin Corporation,
in januari 2019, de ‘Deputy National Security Advisor’ worden. Eerder verklaarde de voormalige Amerikaanse minister van Defensie ‘William Perry, an arms control advocate,’ dat:
he was less worried about the number of nuclear warheads left in the world than by the return of cold war talk about such weapons being ‘usable.’
‘The belief that there might be tactical advantage using nuclear weapons — which I haven’t heard that being openly discussed in the United States or in Russia for a good many years — is happening now in those countries which I think is extremely distressing,’ Perry said. ‘That’s a very dangerous belief.’
In zijn boek met de veelzeggende titel My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (2015) waarschuwt de insider Perry voor het immense gevaar van een nucleair armageddon. Onder de kop ‘A Stark Nuclear Warning’ schreef de Gouverneur van Californië Jerry Brown in een recensie voor The New York Review of Books van 14 juli 2016 dat:
Since the book’s publication, the dangers identified by Perry have only intensified (dus onder de liberal Barack Obama. svh): the latest US defense budget proposes spending $1 trillion on nuclear modernization over the next several decades. This modernization plan contemplates a complete update of our nuclear triad, including new cruise missiles, nuclear submarines, ICBM’s, and bombers. The Russian defense minister recently announced in response that Russia will ‘bring five new strategic nuclear missile regiments into service.’ This comes after President Putin revealed that Russia will add more than forty new intercontinental ballistic missiles to its nuclear arsenal.
And, just this month, as the US broke ground on a future missile defense site in Poland and formally activated a missile defense site in Romania, Putin warned: ‘Now after the placement of these missile defense elements, we have to think how to neutralize the threats for the security of the Russian Federation…’
No one I have known, or have even heard of, has the management experience and the technical knowledge that William Perry brings to the subject of nuclear danger. Few have his wisdom and integrity. So why isn’t anyone paying attention to him? Why is fear of a nuclear catastrophe far from the minds of most Americans? And why does almost all of official Washington disagree with him and live in nuclear denial? Perry himself may provide the answer:
‘Our chief peril is that the poised nuclear doom, much of it hidden beneath the seas and in remote badlands, is too far out of the global public consciousness. Passivity shows broadly. Perhaps this is a matter of defeatism and its cohort, distraction. Perhaps for some it is largely a most primal human fear of facing the “unthinkable.” For others, it might be a welcoming of the illusion that there is or might be an acceptable missile defense against a nuclear attack. And for many it would seem to be the keeping of faith that nuclear deterrence will hold indefinitely — that leaders will always have accurate enough instantaneous knowledge, know the true context of events, and enjoy the good luck to avoid the most tragic of military miscalculations.’
Intussen blijft de ware oorzaak van de collectieve lethargie ten aanzien van massavernietigingswapens het domme feit dat de commerciële massamedia ‘the subject of nuclear danger’ niet echt serieus nemen, en er daarom geen structurele aandacht aan besteden. Mijn oude vriend Buruma mag dan wel stellen dat ‘Dictators and demagogues have always tapped the consuming resentments of people who feel that life has treated them badly,’ maar daarmee dépolitiseert hij de huidige politiek, die na de Eerste Wereldoorlog haar definitieve vorm kreeg. In zijn boek A History Of Bombing (2001) wijst de auteur en voormalig Zweeds cultureel attaché in China, Sven Lindqvist, op het gegeven dat, zodra het erop aankomt, de macht niet voor het belang van de eigen bevolking kiest. Lindqvist schreef:
1918. Several months later when the war was over, a demand was made that the German pilots who had bombed London be brought to trial as war criminals. The British Air Ministry protested. Trials of that sort 'would be placing a noose round the necks of our airmen in future wars.' Since the aim of the British air attacks against German cities had been 'to weaken the morale of civilian inhabitants (and thereby their 'will to win') by persistent bomb attacks which would both destroy life (civilian and otherwise) and if possible originate a conflagration which should reduce to ashes the whole town,' the application of the Hague Convention in these cases would defeat the very purpose of bombardment.
This was top secret. Publicly the air force continued to say something quite different, just as the navy had done throughout the 19th century. This was the best tack to take, wrote the air staff in 1921: 'It may be thought better, in view of the allegations of the of the “barbarity” of air attacks, to preserve appearances by formulating milder rules and by still nominally confining bombardment to targets which are strictly military in character... to avoid emphasizing the truth that air warfare has made such restrictions obsolete and impossible.'
Dit publiekelijk onuitgesproken standpunt geldt nog steeds. De officiële houding van de macht in zelfs een — formeel gesproken — 'democratie' is daarom zonder overdrijven extremistisch te noemen, totalitair en zelfs terroristisch, tenminste als men de definitie hanteert van het Amerikaanse Leger Handboek, waarin terrorisme omschreven staat als 'het bewust geplande gebruik van geweld of dreiging van geweld om doelen te bereiken die politiek, religieus, of ideologisch van aard zijn.' Het bombarderen van de burgerbevolking heeft sinds 1914 tot doel, ik citeer de Britse autoriteiten:
om het moreel van de burgerbevolking te verzwakken (en daarmee de ‘wil te winnen’) door aanhoudende bomaanvallen die zowel het leven vernietigen (van burgers en anderen), en zo mogelijk een vuurzee veroorzaken die een hele stad in as zal leggen.
Men kan zonder overdrijven ervan uitgaan dat de NAVO-strategie van 'Shock and Awe' bewust erop gericht is zo massaal mogelijk terreur toe te passen 'to weaken the morale of civilian inhabitants.' En wat de ene macht kan, kan de andere ook, met als gevolg dat zowel de beleidsbepalers in een ‘democratie’ als die in een 'dictatuur' de eigen bevolking opofferen met het oog op het behalen van een Pyrrhus-overwinning. Dit veelzeggende feit vormt de achtergrond van de onvoorwaardelijke steun aan staatsterreur die de ‘liberals,’ de ‘urban elites,’ de ‘politiek-literaire elite,’ het ‘establishment,’ telkens weer bereid is te geven. En inderdaad, Ian Buruma heeft gelijk wanneer hij schrijft dat 'For an alliance to work, you need a common enemy,' waaraan ik alleen nog zou willen toevoegen: én een zogenaamde 'vrije pers.'
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