Print version WELT AM SONNTAG - 02/07/2021
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DeepL Translation German to English
"Maximum collaboration"
The Interior Ministry had a secret paper drafted in the first Corona wave that dramatically depicted the threat. It harnessed scientists for its tough course - internal documents show.
Text by Anette Dowideit and Alexander Nabert
In mid-March last year, Germany was in its first lockdown. Schools and stores were closed, and nerves in the country were on edge. This was also the case for Federal Minister of the Interior Horst Seehofer (CSU). This was because virologist Christian Drosten and Lothar Wieler, the head of the Robert Koch Institute (RKI), had just paid a visit to his house. The two had urgently warned the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior: Germany was threatened with dramatic consequences if the country returned to everyday life too quickly. Seehofer was now worried that the lockdown would end at Easter as planned. The minister was firmly against it. He sent his Secretary of State Markus Kerber into the lane.
Kerber had a plan: He wanted to bring together leading scientists from several research institutes and universities. Together, they were to produce a paper that would then serve as legitimation for further tough political measures, beyond Easter. He launched a corresponding call to the researchers via e-mail. Only a few days later, they had fulfilled the ministry's request. They provided input for a classified paper from the Ministry of the Interior (BMI), which presented the danger posed by the coronavirus as dramatically as possible, and which quickly spread through the media. In a "worst case scenario," they painted: If Germany did nothing, more than a million people in the country would be dead by the end of the pandemic.
Welt am Sonntag has received extensive correspondence that shows exactly what happened between the ministry's top management and the researchers during those critical days in March 2020. It shows above all this: that Seehofer's authority was intent on enlisting the commissioned scientists for the political purpose he had in mind - and that they were happy to heed the call. The 200 or so pages of e-mails thus prove that, at least in this case, the researchers were by no means acting as independently as scientists and the federal government have been constantly emphasizing since the beginning of the pandemic - but were working toward a predetermined, fixed result dictated by politicians.
The correspondence originates from the RKI. A group of lawyers, represented by Berlin attorney Niko Härting, obtained them in a months-long legal dispute with the authority and made them available to the editors. The documents are blacked out in many places, but they reveal a lot about how the Interior Ministry influenced the researchers and how they collaborated to portray the situation as threatening as possible.
The collaboration began with the Secretary of State's call on March 19. "Dear Professores," Kerber wrote to RKI head Wieler as well as to researchers at the Leibniz Institute for Economic Research (abbreviated RWI because it used to be called the Rhenish-Westphalian Institute for Economic Research), the Institute of German Business (IW), the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and several universities. The ministry wanted to form an "ad hoc research platform" between its house and the institutes with immediate effect. A calculation model was needed to "get 'in front of the situation' mentally and in terms of planning." It should help to be able to plan further "measures of a preventive and repressive nature." The secretary of state painted a dystopian picture: It was a matter of "maintaining internal security and stability of public order in Germany."
Kerber asked for secrecy: what would be discussed in these circles in the coming days should be kept confidential "outside of operationally active crisis management institutions." "Without bureaucracy. Maximum courage," Kerber wrote - and heightened the dramatic nature of his tone at the end of the e-mail: Since it was not known "whether and how long the networks would continue to function reliably," the participants were to transmit their telephone numbers and private e-mail addresses. He had compared the situation "with Apollo 13" to his "friend Lothar Wieler." "Very difficult task, but with a happy ending due to maximum collaboration."
In doing so, he set the tone for the approach that the Minister of the Interior apparently expected from the scientists he had written to: a presentation of the situation that was as threatening as possible. The result was available only four days later: That secret paper, stamped "VS - For official use only," about the looming prospect of up to a million dead. It also said how to achieve the "desired shock effect" in society in order to avoid this worst acceptable case. It said it was necessary to create images like this in people's minds: "Many seriously ill people are brought to the hospital by their relatives, but are turned away, and die agonizingly at home, gasping for breath." Thus, it is hoped to make it acceptable among citizens understanding, among other things, a "sharp but short exit restriction."
During those four days, Kerber and other high-ranking ministry officials meticulously followed the researchers' work and dictated the course of action: Correspondence shows that there were conference calls between BMI and the researchers at short intervals while they worked on their model and the resulting recommendations. The researchers' e-mails about the progress of their work went not only to the state secretary but also to several heads of departments and units at the BMI. The ministry even provided the outline for the paper via email in the distribution list.
The researchers did not limit themselves to providing figures, but also made concrete suggestions on how to address "fear and readiness to follow in the population," for example, and they made policy recommendations. "Söder is intuitively right," wrote one, whose name is redacted in the document. "The spreading sense of powerlessness must probably be held in check by the impression of strong state interventionism."
The e-mails show something else, perhaps far more serious: The scientists did not agree on the scientific assessment of the situation. They discussed among themselves, for example, which figures they should use as a basis for calculating the desired scenarios. On Sunday, for example, after the Secretary of State's call, the responsible scientists from the Robert Koch Institute and those from the RWI exchanged views on this. The question was: What assumption should be made about what percentage of infected persons in Germany would die from the virus? This value was not easy to quantify; there was little experience with the virus. The RKI had just published its own model. According to it, 0.56 percent of infected persons in Germany were expected to die from the virus. The RWI, however, argued for a death rate of 1.2 percent. Its responsible researcher wrote that one should argue in the paper "from the goal", namely "to show high pressure for action" and from the precautionary principle "rather worse than too good". State Secretary Kerber read along with all this.
It is conspicuous that both figures appear in the paper finally prepared by the ministry. There it says: "In a very moderate scenario, the RKI currently assumes a lethality of 0.56 percent. Further modeling uses a case mortality of 1.2 percent." In other words, the BMI explicitly decided against using only the RKI's restrained value for its calculations - even though Wieler's agency is, after all, the one that is responsible for precisely that in Germany: providing the figures on the basis of which the government argues when planning its measures.
Instead, the ministry used the "worst case" - how many would die if life continued completely as before Corona? - the more impactful numbers. This follows the logic of the Ministry of the Interior: Because Seehofer's agency is responsible for the internal security of the country, they always want to be prepared for the greatest possible damage. In retrospect, the researchers involved were not grossly wrong with the mortality rate of 1.2 percent (remark by the translator: This is typical “Damage Control”). The proportion of people who die from COVID 19 infection cannot be clearly quantified, partly because the actual number of infected people is never known. However, most scientists assume that about one percent of infected people in Germany die from the coronavirus.
In retrospect, BMI State Secretary Kerber explained the creation of the paper to WELT AM SONNTAG as follows: "We did not need an all-encompassing theoretical treatise. We had concrete problems in mind and were faced with the task of preventing a worst-case scenario."
The RKI does not comment on its involvement - because it was an "internal discussion paper." And the RWI research institute writes that there was no policy brief for the research findings.
From the point of view of the Ministry of the Interior, at any rate, the project was successful. State Secretary KErber formulated on March 23 to the round: "Our paper was [...] very well received and will now find its way into the crisis cabinet of the federal government due to its high quality and prudence."
Collaboration: Birgit Herden
We do not know whether and how long the networks will continue to function reliably, so we should still give Ms. Müller private e-mail addresses and telephone numbers in each case. Better safe than sorry.
I thank you already now from all my heart in advance. I have compared the situation with Apollo 13 to my friend and neighbor Lothar Wieler. Very difficult task, but with happy end by maximum collaboration.
Best regards (HG) your MK
In my opinion, the model developed by GESCHWÄRZT is ideal from a political-administrative point of view, as it shows us different stress scenarios for which we can then plan measures of a preventive and repressive nature. If everyone agrees and if all confidentiality is maintained with regard to this and all other research results still to be worked out by all of us, then I would want to make the RWI model the starting point for all considerations. Based on scenarios (base, best, worst?) that have yet to be jointly selected and different time courses of the crisis (3, 6, 12, 24 months?), we should then be able to depict the economic-societal impact.
How should we work?
Without thinking templates. Maximally interdisciplinary. Without bureaucracy. Maximum courage.
>Söder is intuitively right: The spreading feeling of powerlessness
>must be kept in check by the impression of a strong state interventionism.
>be kept in check
>Thank you. Have now directly incorporated without further comment. See attached in blue font. But the RKI would thus come to significantly fewer deaths in the worst case. Then we should justify our higher number, even if we reach the same conclusions, which I would do about the SHARP data. There seem to be different views here between SHIELD and RKI that I cannot resolve. I would argue from the goal, namely "show high pressure for action" and from the precautionary principle: "better worse than too good".
Greetings
Dear comrades-in-arms,
I report the following from today:
1. Our paper was very well received by the two SHARED and will now find its way into the crisis cabinet of the federal government because of its high quality and prudence.
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