'November 3, 2008
The U.S. Doesn't Know How Alone It is in Iraq Friends Like These
By PATRICK COCKBURN
Over the past five years, America and its Iraqi allies have pointed triumphantly at a series of spurious milestones meant to mark turning points on the road to stability and security. But the ongoing stalemate over a new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which the Iraqi government refuses to sign despite intense American pressure, marks a true turning point in the conflict: it is a clear sign that American political influence in Iraq is weaker than ever.
It is the first time that an Iraqi government has rebuffed the US on a crucial issue since the invasion of 2003. The agreement, the subject of prolonged and divisive negotiations since March, was rejected by the Iraqi cabinet and is unlikely to be submitted to parliament in its present form.
The Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al Maliki, who could not have obtained nor held his job without American backing, says he will not sign it as it is.
Meanwhile the US is increasingly desperate to conclude the status agreement before the UN mandate that legalises the US occupation runs out at the end of the year. The US ambassador Ryan Crocker petulantly threatened that without an agreement "we do nothing – no security training, no logistical support, no border protection, no training, equipping, manning checkpoints, no nothing." President Bush has himself pushed hard for the accord over the last eight months without success. His failure to secure the pact shows that the US is unable to get its way despite exaggerated claims of military success by the White House and the Pentagon.
The accord that has been rejected is markedly less favourable to the US than the original draft that was first discussed in March. The Americans, who could have presented the agreement to the Iraqis as a means of bringing the occupation to an end or eliminating its most objectionable aspects, instead produced a blank cheque that suggested no limit to the number of American troops in the country and no date for eventual withdrawal.
The March draft was a typical example of the US tendency to overplay its hand in Iraq, where the agreement was denounced as a successor to the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty that gave Britain de facto control over a nominally independent Iraq. The draft provoked a nationalist backlash, and many Iraqi politicians who supported the agreement did so covertly for fear of being labelled American pawns.
The final draft of the accord agreed by negotiators on October 13 was very different. By then the Bush administration had been forced to concede a timetable for an American military withdrawal: combat troops were to leave Iraqi cities, towns and villages by the end of June 2009, and all American forces were to depart by the end of 2011. Contractors lost their immunity from Iraqi law. The US tried to make the military retreat from Iraq conditional on the security situation at the time, but by the end of the negotiations even this had been conceded.
Nothing better illuminates the real political landscape in Iraq – and the absurdity of the fantasies pumped out in Washington and broadly accepted in the US – than the concessions forced on the Americans. The American problem in Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein has always been political rather than military. Simply put, the Americans have had too few friends in Iraq, and their allies have sided with the US for tactical reasons alone. The majority Shia community initially co-operated with the US in order to achieve political domination, and it needed American military force to crush the Sunni Arab uprising of 2004-7. But the Shia leaders always wanted power for themselves and never intended to share it with the Americans in the long term. The Sunni guerrillas did surprisingly well against the American army, but their community was decisively defeated in the bloody battle for Baghdad fought by government death squads and sectarian militias. It was this defeat – and not simply hostility to al Qa’eda in Iraq – that led the Sunni rebels to seek their own alliance with the US.
I was in Baghdad during the first half of October and then flew to New York. Never has there been such a deep gap between what Americans think is happening in Iraq and the reality on the ground. Senator John McCain keeps celebrating the supposed triumph of the "surge", and seems to imagine that "victory in Iraq" is now in sight. His exotic running mate Sarah Palin sneers at the "defeatist" Barack Obama. And Obama, afraid to appear unpatriotic, has recanted his earlier doubts about the surge and attempted to avoid discussion of Iraq in general. With American voters understandably absorbed by the financial crash and coming depression, attention to events in Iraq has evaporated: the American media have barely mentioned the rejection of the SOFA.'
It is the first time that an Iraqi government has rebuffed the US on a crucial issue since the invasion of 2003. The agreement, the subject of prolonged and divisive negotiations since March, was rejected by the Iraqi cabinet and is unlikely to be submitted to parliament in its present form.
The Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al Maliki, who could not have obtained nor held his job without American backing, says he will not sign it as it is.
Meanwhile the US is increasingly desperate to conclude the status agreement before the UN mandate that legalises the US occupation runs out at the end of the year. The US ambassador Ryan Crocker petulantly threatened that without an agreement "we do nothing – no security training, no logistical support, no border protection, no training, equipping, manning checkpoints, no nothing." President Bush has himself pushed hard for the accord over the last eight months without success. His failure to secure the pact shows that the US is unable to get its way despite exaggerated claims of military success by the White House and the Pentagon.
The accord that has been rejected is markedly less favourable to the US than the original draft that was first discussed in March. The Americans, who could have presented the agreement to the Iraqis as a means of bringing the occupation to an end or eliminating its most objectionable aspects, instead produced a blank cheque that suggested no limit to the number of American troops in the country and no date for eventual withdrawal.
The March draft was a typical example of the US tendency to overplay its hand in Iraq, where the agreement was denounced as a successor to the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty that gave Britain de facto control over a nominally independent Iraq. The draft provoked a nationalist backlash, and many Iraqi politicians who supported the agreement did so covertly for fear of being labelled American pawns.
The final draft of the accord agreed by negotiators on October 13 was very different. By then the Bush administration had been forced to concede a timetable for an American military withdrawal: combat troops were to leave Iraqi cities, towns and villages by the end of June 2009, and all American forces were to depart by the end of 2011. Contractors lost their immunity from Iraqi law. The US tried to make the military retreat from Iraq conditional on the security situation at the time, but by the end of the negotiations even this had been conceded.
Nothing better illuminates the real political landscape in Iraq – and the absurdity of the fantasies pumped out in Washington and broadly accepted in the US – than the concessions forced on the Americans. The American problem in Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein has always been political rather than military. Simply put, the Americans have had too few friends in Iraq, and their allies have sided with the US for tactical reasons alone. The majority Shia community initially co-operated with the US in order to achieve political domination, and it needed American military force to crush the Sunni Arab uprising of 2004-7. But the Shia leaders always wanted power for themselves and never intended to share it with the Americans in the long term. The Sunni guerrillas did surprisingly well against the American army, but their community was decisively defeated in the bloody battle for Baghdad fought by government death squads and sectarian militias. It was this defeat – and not simply hostility to al Qa’eda in Iraq – that led the Sunni rebels to seek their own alliance with the US.
I was in Baghdad during the first half of October and then flew to New York. Never has there been such a deep gap between what Americans think is happening in Iraq and the reality on the ground. Senator John McCain keeps celebrating the supposed triumph of the "surge", and seems to imagine that "victory in Iraq" is now in sight. His exotic running mate Sarah Palin sneers at the "defeatist" Barack Obama. And Obama, afraid to appear unpatriotic, has recanted his earlier doubts about the surge and attempted to avoid discussion of Iraq in general. With American voters understandably absorbed by the financial crash and coming depression, attention to events in Iraq has evaporated: the American media have barely mentioned the rejection of the SOFA.'
Lees verder: http://www.counterpunch.org/patrick11032008.html
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