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Rising anger in Germany in response to Nord Stream “revelations”
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Rising anger in Germany in response to Nord Stream “revelations”
What role did the German authorities have in the bombing of the Nord Stream pipeline?
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Guest post by Maike Gosch (her previous two articles can be found here and here).
Last week, a number of reports and articles about the Nord Stream pipeline explosion shook the media landscape and citizens in Germany and around the world. After a long period of astonishing silence surrounding this monstrous event, things now seem to be moving. Are we slowly getting closer to the truth in this affair? In any case, the reactions from all sides were fierce and showed once again just how divided the political landscape is in Germany and Europe.
Explosive news
After the news first made the rounds in several German media outlets on August 14, 2024 that German investigators had identified a Ukrainian diving instructor (funnily enough named Volodymyr Z.) who allegedly blew up Nord Stream and then unfortunately escaped arrest due to a lack of cooperation from Polish authorities, further explosive revelations from the Wall Street Journal followed on the same day.
According to the WSJ article, the attack was led by the then-Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian armed forces and current Ukrainian ambassador to the UK, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, with president Zelenskyy having initially given the operation the green light. Then the Dutch military intelligence service MIVD found out about it, informed the CIA and the latter in turn urged president Zelensky to stop the operation. He then ordered Zaluzhnyi to abort the operation, but the general ignored the order and went ahead with the plan. According to the WSJ, just days after the attack, which occurred on September 26, 2022, the CIA gave the German Foreign Ministry a detailed account of how the covert operation went down. The Ukrainian government has rejected this account.
Much of this report seems implausible, so I consider the article to be more of a “limited hangout” than a clarification of this terrorist attack on our industrial infrastructure.
“Limited hangout” is a term from the intelligence world for a common ploy used by intelligence professionals: when the truth is beginning to emerge or the public is becoming too suspicious and impatient, and they can no longer remain silent or rely on a contrived cover story to deceive the public, part of the truth is admitted — sometimes even voluntarily — while still withholding the essential and truly risky facts in the case. The public is supposed to be distracted from and engaged with the disclosed information, so that the pressure it exerts eases (at least for a while).
One day later, on August 15, 2024, the German newspaper Die Weltpublished an interview with the former head of the BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst or Federal Intelligence Service of Germany), August Hanning, which also caused quite a stir. Mr. Hanning says that the attack, if it was carried out by the Ukrainian side, could only have been possible with strong logistical support from Poland and that for him there must obviously have been an agreement between the highest leaders in Ukraine and Poland, naming president Zelenskyy and president Duda.
These statements sound more plausible, but it is surprising that Mr. Hanning begins by saying that only Ukraine and Poland had an interest in and the means of blowing up the pipelines, and that he doesn’t mention other possible perpetrators, such as the US, but also Great Britain or the Scandinavian neighbouring states. Interestingly, however, he takes a very clear stance on the classification of the attacks and comes to a very different conclusion from most voices in the German political landscape, which we will get to below:
There has been considerable damage to the pipelines. […] I once spoke to external experts from the operators and they put it at up to 20 to 30 billion euros. The huge damage caused by state terrorism must be clearly stated and I also expect the German government to make it clear that compensation must be demanded. Also from the operators. I believe that huge damage has been caused by the activities of Ukrainian and Polish government agencies.
This astonishing accumulation of news within a few days around the investigation, which has been ongoing for two years without any results so far, has led some to suspect that this is a controlled action directed against Zelenskyy and part of the public’s preparation for him losing the support of the West and being replaced.
“Thank you, Ukraine!”
The reactions to this explosive news were not long in coming and proved once again what a divided information landscape we find ourselves in.
The German conservative newspaper FAZ led the way. In an article that directly followed the WSJ’s “revelations”, Reinhard Müller explained that the pipeline had been a legitimate military target (according to the headline); the text formulates it somewhat more cautiously: “could be considered a legitimate target”. His arguments: it is owned by a Russian state-owned company and also contributed to Moscow’s war of aggression against Ukraine. He also make an argument oft-heard from German commentators whose loyalties clearly lie with Ukraine: at the time the pipeline was blown up, it was no longer serving Germany’s energy supply. Of course, this raises the question: if it no longer served Germany’s (and Europe’s, for that matter) energy supply, how could it have contributed to Moscow’s war of aggression? But let’s leave that aside for the moment. And we will come to the ownership structure later in the text.
He is also of the opinion that if the Ukrainian president or another commander commissioned it, it could also be seen as an act of defense permissible under international law. Müller takes the opportunity, while he’s on the subject of steep theses on international law, to take a similarly idiosyncratic swipe at the German government’s critics of its stance in the Gaza war:
Here, Ukraine, with its back to the wall, gives little cause for concern in terms of the selection of targets, the treatment of prisoners of war and also the prosecution of war crimes and international observation. In such extreme situations, the value of the Western community’s value-based approach is proven. The end does not justify every means — this also applies to Israel, which is also in a struggle for survival. The commitment to human rights, even in the fight against those who do not care about them, makes the decisive difference. Any far-sighted government should also recognise that this is in its own best interests. Only those who fight under the flag of humanity will be able to live in peace with their neighbors at all times in the long term.
So again, because this may be misleading, his statement is: Ukraine and Israel respect human rights, unlike their opponents, and thus fight under the flag of humanity and now the Western community’s value-based approach shows its worth in that we support them in this noble fight (also against our own industrial infrastructure), because (only) in this way can we live in peace with our neighbors in the long term. I would like to award the prize for the most absurd take to Mr. Müller.
But please read the article in its entirety yourself, which also claims that all allies have a duty (!) to rush to the aid of the invaded Ukraine at any time, including with their own soldiers. In legal terms, one would speak of a “minority opinion”; I would like to use stronger words, but I’m trying to control myself so as not to further the division here.
A few days later, the FAZ reported that Germany would be cutting back on military aid for Ukraine and that, according to the German government’s current budgetary planning, no new money would be made available for this with immediate effect.
What initially appeared to be a possible reaction to the revelations and a concession to the large part of the population that is critical of the German government’s NATO course (because of the upcoming elections in some German states?), turns out on closer inspection to be a less major change in policy. This year everything will continue unchanged, next year military support is to be halved and then in 2027 it will shrink to less than a tenth of the current amount. However, most geopolitical analysts expect the war to end by 2025 at the latest. And after that, according to Christian Lindner’s plans, the support will no longer come from the federal budget, but will be financed from the proceeds (interest) of the Russian central bank assets frozen by the G7 states.
There were also comments from abroad that caused an uproar. Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, for example, commented the revelations in a tweet as follows:
To all the initiators and patrons of Nord Stream 1 and 2. The only thing you should do today about it is apologise and keep quiet.
The tweet went viral and has been viewed 2.6 million times so far, which is no wonder as it was provocative to the max and triggered correspondingly emotional reactions. So not only should we silently accept the blowing up of the pipelines; we should also be ashamed to have built and supported them in the first place.
But what seems like pure election advertising for the AfD and Sahra Wagenknecht’s new party, BSW, may also have other economic and geopolitical backgrounds:
Since the beginning of the Ukraine war, we have been wondering about the increasingly aggressive and militant rhetoric against Germany from our neighboring country and cannot shake off the feeling that the new favourite child of the US and Great Britain is finally trying to get back at its neighbour, which is often perceived as overpowering, with borrowed courage.
In general, Poland plays an interesting role in the whole Nord Stream pipeline affair, a role that has received very little attention to date. This is because Poland (not just Ukraine) also lost both leverage/pressure and considerable transit income through the construction and commissioning of the pipelines, which allowed Russian natural gas to be supplied directly to Germany and the rest of Europe. And they worked together with the US, Denmark and Norway on an alternative to gas supplies from Russia and also wanted to get back into the game as a transit country for gas supplies from other countries of origin to Germany and Europe. However, as long as Nord Stream 1 and then Nord Stream 2 were available, the economic prospects for these plans were poor. It is a strange coincidence that the Baltic Pipe, a natural gas pipeline from Denmark to Poland, was opened on September 27, 2022 (only one day after the Nord Stream pipelines were blown up).
But back to Germany, where other politicians and journalists made it clear that even a possible terrorist attack by Ukraine would not change their “Nibelungentreue” — a German expression meaning absolute loyalty. CDU politician Roderich Kiesewetter initially explained in a video interview with Die Welt that the operation of Nord Stream 1 and 2 did not generate any income for Russia, as no gas was flowing through them at the time of the attack (I assume in order to substantiate his otherwise unfounded suspicions of Russia as the perpetrator, more on that later).
He may be hoping for a poor memory on the part of the audience here, but I think most Germans who have studied the topic still have a good memory of the situation in the autumn of 2022 and know very well that Russia had only halted gas supplies through Nord Stream 1 for a short time due to problems with the sanctions and turbine maintenance. This may also have been an attempt by Russia to mitigate or avert the sanctions in exchange for the resumption of gas supplies, or it may have been an attempt by Russia to force the certification and opening of Nord Stream 2, which was ready for use at that time.
In any case, it is clear that Russia was expressly willing and also able to start supplying gas via Nord Stream 2 at any time and that this was blocked by the German government for political reasons (keyword: certification procedure) and that the pressure from the population in this direction grew considerably, especially in the period shortly before the blast (keyword: hot autumn, we remember).
Mr. Kiesewetter omits these connections here in order to give the impression that the pipelines were actually already irrelevant at the time of the blast, which unfortunately — in the interest of truth — many other commentators also claim. As with so many issues these days, one would like to see neutral fact checks, which unfortunately we rarely get.
When Mr. Kiesewetter goes on to say that many elements of the article do not seem very credible, I even agree with him, but then he tries several times in the course of the interview to cast suspicion on Russia and talk about a “false flag” operation, albeit without any indications, arguments or evidence, so who is the conspiracy theorist now?
In addition, he then says that no German property was damaged because the attack took place in international waters. The location of the attack is obviously irrelevant to the ownership status, but Mr. Kiesewetter certainly knows that. And Nord Stream 2 is indeed owned by Nord Stream 2 AG, which is wholly owned by Gazprom, which in turn is a state-owned company. However, Germany has invested around 3.9 billion euros in goods and services in Nord Stream 2. And the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which was also damaged, is held by Nord Stream AG, of which only 51 percent is owned by Gazprom through its subsidiary Gazprom International Projects North 1 LLC, while the other 49 percent is held by German, Dutch and French companies from the energy infrastructure sector.
In this respect, both German and European property was destroyed. Furthermore, the ownership structure under civil law is not the decisive factor in classifying the destruction of important energy infrastructure as a threat to national security, as the issue is how important it is for Germany’s economy and population, and not who owns the pipelines under civil law. Of course, Mr. Kiesewetter knows all about that too, he is an experienced politician who has been in the political business for a long time. Finally, the sentence that caused the most uproar:
Besides, Ukraine is the attacked (sic!), the security of Ukraine, whether they destroyed it or not, is in our interest.
So, in plain language: Ukraine’s security is in our (i.e., Germany’s) interest, even if it jeopardises our security with such a massive attack.
Finally, Julian Röpcke, full-time editor at the Bild newspaper, in his spare time apparently something of a war correspondent for the Ukrainian army and, according to his own description, an “arms delivery ultra”: he reposted his own tweet from November 2023 (i.e., shortly after the attack) with the note “Due to current events”, in which he praised the destruction of the pipelines:
Just to make this clear again: If Ukraine attacked Nord Stream: thank you very much. It was a Russian infrastructure project that made us dependent on their gas. Thanks a lot for ending that dependency, no matter who did it.
In other words: “Thank you, Ukraine!” (paraphrasing the famous tweet by Polish politician Radek Sikorski, shortly after the attack itself).
Moving the goalpost
What the reactions also reveal is an exciting shift in terms and evaluations among representatives and supporters of the German government’s and the EU’s current Ukraine policy. When the rather unlikely thesis of Russia being the perpetrator was initially put forward, Ursula von der Leyen, for example, was still saying:
Any deliberate disruption of active European energy infrastructure is unacceptable & will lead to the strongest possible response.
In short, right after the attack, it was clear to everyone and was not disputed by anyone (except perhaps by the German Greens, but that is such an extreme position that I am leaving it out here) that this was a massive terrorist attack against the energy infrastructure of Russia, Germany and also Europe, which was supplied with energy via these pipelines. It was also largely undisputed that this constituted a “casus belli” under international law, i.e., it was tantamount to a declaration of war and should actually trigger a NATO defense case under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
But that’s yesterday news. Now that there is evidence that Ukraine was at least complicit in this act, the supporters sound very different: the pipelines were irrelevant (so why were they blown up at all?), the demolition was justified and Germany should be ashamed of having built them in the first place.
Storm of outrage
From other quarters, there was a lot of outrage about the news. Alice Weidel from the German right-wing AfD-Party commented the news as follows:
The economic damage to our country caused by the blasting of #Nordstream allegedly ordered by #Zelenskyy — and not #Putin, as we were led to believe — should be “billed” to #Ukraine. Any “aid payments” that burden the German taxpayer should be stopped.
Sahra Wagenknecht of the left-wing BSW (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht or Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance) wrote):
Should German authorities have known in advance about the attack plan on Nord Stream 1 and 2, then we would have a scandal of the century in German politics.
Many private commentators were equally stunned:
Nobody deserves a government that allows critical infrastructure to be blown away with complete equanimity.
For some, angry comments were not enough and they wanted to see action. Opposition Cologne-based lawyer Markus Haintz, for example, filed chargesagainst Kiesewetter with the Ellwangen public prosecutor’s office due to his comments regarding the blowing up of the Nord Stream pipelines in the Die Welt interview.
Laughter through the tears
Fortunately for the soul, there were also many funny and satirical reactions. Berlin-based AI artist and satirist Snicklink posted this video. But other X users also had fun with pictures and photos making fun of the — from their point of view — implausible descriptions in the WSJ article.
What’s next?
So far (at the time of writing this article) no German government representative has commented on the WSJ investigation or the Die Weltinterview, which is incredible in itself. I assume there were some emergency meetings on the weekend where the line of communication is being discussed and we can expect a statement soon. We can look forward to seeing how they position themselves here.
Sahra Wagenknecht is now calling for a committee of inquiry in the German Parliament to investigate the role of the German government in connection with the attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines.
This seems urgently needed — because that would be the appropriate forum to shed light on all these issues. For as interesting and sometimes entertaining as the reactions and discussions in the regular and social media are, such a state affair cannot be solved by swarm intelligence.
This article first appeared in German on Nachdenkseiten.
Thomas Fazi
Website: thomasfazi.net
Twitter: @battleforeurope
What role did the German authorities have in the bombing of the Nord Stream pipeline?
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Guest post by Maike Gosch (her previous two articles can be found here and here).
Last week, a number of reports and articles about the Nord Stream pipeline explosion shook the media landscape and citizens in Germany and around the world. After a long period of astonishing silence surrounding this monstrous event, things now seem to be moving. Are we slowly getting closer to the truth in this affair? In any case, the reactions from all sides were fierce and showed once again just how divided the political landscape is in Germany and Europe.
Explosive news
After the news first made the rounds in several German media outlets on August 14, 2024 that German investigators had identified a Ukrainian diving instructor (funnily enough named Volodymyr Z.) who allegedly blew up Nord Stream and then unfortunately escaped arrest due to a lack of cooperation from Polish authorities, further explosive revelations from the Wall Street Journal followed on the same day.
According to the WSJ article, the attack was led by the then-Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian armed forces and current Ukrainian ambassador to the UK, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, with president Zelenskyy having initially given the operation the green light. Then the Dutch military intelligence service MIVD found out about it, informed the CIA and the latter in turn urged president Zelensky to stop the operation. He then ordered Zaluzhnyi to abort the operation, but the general ignored the order and went ahead with the plan. According to the WSJ, just days after the attack, which occurred on September 26, 2022, the CIA gave the German Foreign Ministry a detailed account of how the covert operation went down. The Ukrainian government has rejected this account.
Much of this report seems implausible, so I consider the article to be more of a “limited hangout” than a clarification of this terrorist attack on our industrial infrastructure.
“Limited hangout” is a term from the intelligence world for a common ploy used by intelligence professionals: when the truth is beginning to emerge or the public is becoming too suspicious and impatient, and they can no longer remain silent or rely on a contrived cover story to deceive the public, part of the truth is admitted — sometimes even voluntarily — while still withholding the essential and truly risky facts in the case. The public is supposed to be distracted from and engaged with the disclosed information, so that the pressure it exerts eases (at least for a while).
One day later, on August 15, 2024, the German newspaper Die Weltpublished an interview with the former head of the BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst or Federal Intelligence Service of Germany), August Hanning, which also caused quite a stir. Mr. Hanning says that the attack, if it was carried out by the Ukrainian side, could only have been possible with strong logistical support from Poland and that for him there must obviously have been an agreement between the highest leaders in Ukraine and Poland, naming president Zelenskyy and president Duda.
These statements sound more plausible, but it is surprising that Mr. Hanning begins by saying that only Ukraine and Poland had an interest in and the means of blowing up the pipelines, and that he doesn’t mention other possible perpetrators, such as the US, but also Great Britain or the Scandinavian neighbouring states. Interestingly, however, he takes a very clear stance on the classification of the attacks and comes to a very different conclusion from most voices in the German political landscape, which we will get to below:
There has been considerable damage to the pipelines. […] I once spoke to external experts from the operators and they put it at up to 20 to 30 billion euros. The huge damage caused by state terrorism must be clearly stated and I also expect the German government to make it clear that compensation must be demanded. Also from the operators. I believe that huge damage has been caused by the activities of Ukrainian and Polish government agencies.
This astonishing accumulation of news within a few days around the investigation, which has been ongoing for two years without any results so far, has led some to suspect that this is a controlled action directed against Zelenskyy and part of the public’s preparation for him losing the support of the West and being replaced.
“Thank you, Ukraine!”
The reactions to this explosive news were not long in coming and proved once again what a divided information landscape we find ourselves in.
The German conservative newspaper FAZ led the way. In an article that directly followed the WSJ’s “revelations”, Reinhard Müller explained that the pipeline had been a legitimate military target (according to the headline); the text formulates it somewhat more cautiously: “could be considered a legitimate target”. His arguments: it is owned by a Russian state-owned company and also contributed to Moscow’s war of aggression against Ukraine. He also make an argument oft-heard from German commentators whose loyalties clearly lie with Ukraine: at the time the pipeline was blown up, it was no longer serving Germany’s energy supply. Of course, this raises the question: if it no longer served Germany’s (and Europe’s, for that matter) energy supply, how could it have contributed to Moscow’s war of aggression? But let’s leave that aside for the moment. And we will come to the ownership structure later in the text.
He is also of the opinion that if the Ukrainian president or another commander commissioned it, it could also be seen as an act of defense permissible under international law. Müller takes the opportunity, while he’s on the subject of steep theses on international law, to take a similarly idiosyncratic swipe at the German government’s critics of its stance in the Gaza war:
Here, Ukraine, with its back to the wall, gives little cause for concern in terms of the selection of targets, the treatment of prisoners of war and also the prosecution of war crimes and international observation. In such extreme situations, the value of the Western community’s value-based approach is proven. The end does not justify every means — this also applies to Israel, which is also in a struggle for survival. The commitment to human rights, even in the fight against those who do not care about them, makes the decisive difference. Any far-sighted government should also recognise that this is in its own best interests. Only those who fight under the flag of humanity will be able to live in peace with their neighbors at all times in the long term.
So again, because this may be misleading, his statement is: Ukraine and Israel respect human rights, unlike their opponents, and thus fight under the flag of humanity and now the Western community’s value-based approach shows its worth in that we support them in this noble fight (also against our own industrial infrastructure), because (only) in this way can we live in peace with our neighbors in the long term. I would like to award the prize for the most absurd take to Mr. Müller.
But please read the article in its entirety yourself, which also claims that all allies have a duty (!) to rush to the aid of the invaded Ukraine at any time, including with their own soldiers. In legal terms, one would speak of a “minority opinion”; I would like to use stronger words, but I’m trying to control myself so as not to further the division here.
A few days later, the FAZ reported that Germany would be cutting back on military aid for Ukraine and that, according to the German government’s current budgetary planning, no new money would be made available for this with immediate effect.
What initially appeared to be a possible reaction to the revelations and a concession to the large part of the population that is critical of the German government’s NATO course (because of the upcoming elections in some German states?), turns out on closer inspection to be a less major change in policy. This year everything will continue unchanged, next year military support is to be halved and then in 2027 it will shrink to less than a tenth of the current amount. However, most geopolitical analysts expect the war to end by 2025 at the latest. And after that, according to Christian Lindner’s plans, the support will no longer come from the federal budget, but will be financed from the proceeds (interest) of the Russian central bank assets frozen by the G7 states.
There were also comments from abroad that caused an uproar. Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, for example, commented the revelations in a tweet as follows:
To all the initiators and patrons of Nord Stream 1 and 2. The only thing you should do today about it is apologise and keep quiet.
The tweet went viral and has been viewed 2.6 million times so far, which is no wonder as it was provocative to the max and triggered correspondingly emotional reactions. So not only should we silently accept the blowing up of the pipelines; we should also be ashamed to have built and supported them in the first place.
But what seems like pure election advertising for the AfD and Sahra Wagenknecht’s new party, BSW, may also have other economic and geopolitical backgrounds:
Since the beginning of the Ukraine war, we have been wondering about the increasingly aggressive and militant rhetoric against Germany from our neighboring country and cannot shake off the feeling that the new favourite child of the US and Great Britain is finally trying to get back at its neighbour, which is often perceived as overpowering, with borrowed courage.
In general, Poland plays an interesting role in the whole Nord Stream pipeline affair, a role that has received very little attention to date. This is because Poland (not just Ukraine) also lost both leverage/pressure and considerable transit income through the construction and commissioning of the pipelines, which allowed Russian natural gas to be supplied directly to Germany and the rest of Europe. And they worked together with the US, Denmark and Norway on an alternative to gas supplies from Russia and also wanted to get back into the game as a transit country for gas supplies from other countries of origin to Germany and Europe. However, as long as Nord Stream 1 and then Nord Stream 2 were available, the economic prospects for these plans were poor. It is a strange coincidence that the Baltic Pipe, a natural gas pipeline from Denmark to Poland, was opened on September 27, 2022 (only one day after the Nord Stream pipelines were blown up).
But back to Germany, where other politicians and journalists made it clear that even a possible terrorist attack by Ukraine would not change their “Nibelungentreue” — a German expression meaning absolute loyalty. CDU politician Roderich Kiesewetter initially explained in a video interview with Die Welt that the operation of Nord Stream 1 and 2 did not generate any income for Russia, as no gas was flowing through them at the time of the attack (I assume in order to substantiate his otherwise unfounded suspicions of Russia as the perpetrator, more on that later).
He may be hoping for a poor memory on the part of the audience here, but I think most Germans who have studied the topic still have a good memory of the situation in the autumn of 2022 and know very well that Russia had only halted gas supplies through Nord Stream 1 for a short time due to problems with the sanctions and turbine maintenance. This may also have been an attempt by Russia to mitigate or avert the sanctions in exchange for the resumption of gas supplies, or it may have been an attempt by Russia to force the certification and opening of Nord Stream 2, which was ready for use at that time.
In any case, it is clear that Russia was expressly willing and also able to start supplying gas via Nord Stream 2 at any time and that this was blocked by the German government for political reasons (keyword: certification procedure) and that the pressure from the population in this direction grew considerably, especially in the period shortly before the blast (keyword: hot autumn, we remember).
Mr. Kiesewetter omits these connections here in order to give the impression that the pipelines were actually already irrelevant at the time of the blast, which unfortunately — in the interest of truth — many other commentators also claim. As with so many issues these days, one would like to see neutral fact checks, which unfortunately we rarely get.
When Mr. Kiesewetter goes on to say that many elements of the article do not seem very credible, I even agree with him, but then he tries several times in the course of the interview to cast suspicion on Russia and talk about a “false flag” operation, albeit without any indications, arguments or evidence, so who is the conspiracy theorist now?
In addition, he then says that no German property was damaged because the attack took place in international waters. The location of the attack is obviously irrelevant to the ownership status, but Mr. Kiesewetter certainly knows that. And Nord Stream 2 is indeed owned by Nord Stream 2 AG, which is wholly owned by Gazprom, which in turn is a state-owned company. However, Germany has invested around 3.9 billion euros in goods and services in Nord Stream 2. And the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which was also damaged, is held by Nord Stream AG, of which only 51 percent is owned by Gazprom through its subsidiary Gazprom International Projects North 1 LLC, while the other 49 percent is held by German, Dutch and French companies from the energy infrastructure sector.
In this respect, both German and European property was destroyed. Furthermore, the ownership structure under civil law is not the decisive factor in classifying the destruction of important energy infrastructure as a threat to national security, as the issue is how important it is for Germany’s economy and population, and not who owns the pipelines under civil law. Of course, Mr. Kiesewetter knows all about that too, he is an experienced politician who has been in the political business for a long time. Finally, the sentence that caused the most uproar:
Besides, Ukraine is the attacked (sic!), the security of Ukraine, whether they destroyed it or not, is in our interest.
So, in plain language: Ukraine’s security is in our (i.e., Germany’s) interest, even if it jeopardises our security with such a massive attack.
Finally, Julian Röpcke, full-time editor at the Bild newspaper, in his spare time apparently something of a war correspondent for the Ukrainian army and, according to his own description, an “arms delivery ultra”: he reposted his own tweet from November 2023 (i.e., shortly after the attack) with the note “Due to current events”, in which he praised the destruction of the pipelines:
Just to make this clear again: If Ukraine attacked Nord Stream: thank you very much. It was a Russian infrastructure project that made us dependent on their gas. Thanks a lot for ending that dependency, no matter who did it.
In other words: “Thank you, Ukraine!” (paraphrasing the famous tweet by Polish politician Radek Sikorski, shortly after the attack itself).
Moving the goalpost
What the reactions also reveal is an exciting shift in terms and evaluations among representatives and supporters of the German government’s and the EU’s current Ukraine policy. When the rather unlikely thesis of Russia being the perpetrator was initially put forward, Ursula von der Leyen, for example, was still saying:
Any deliberate disruption of active European energy infrastructure is unacceptable & will lead to the strongest possible response.
In short, right after the attack, it was clear to everyone and was not disputed by anyone (except perhaps by the German Greens, but that is such an extreme position that I am leaving it out here) that this was a massive terrorist attack against the energy infrastructure of Russia, Germany and also Europe, which was supplied with energy via these pipelines. It was also largely undisputed that this constituted a “casus belli” under international law, i.e., it was tantamount to a declaration of war and should actually trigger a NATO defense case under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
But that’s yesterday news. Now that there is evidence that Ukraine was at least complicit in this act, the supporters sound very different: the pipelines were irrelevant (so why were they blown up at all?), the demolition was justified and Germany should be ashamed of having built them in the first place.
Storm of outrage
From other quarters, there was a lot of outrage about the news. Alice Weidel from the German right-wing AfD-Party commented the news as follows:
The economic damage to our country caused by the blasting of #Nordstream allegedly ordered by #Zelenskyy — and not #Putin, as we were led to believe — should be “billed” to #Ukraine. Any “aid payments” that burden the German taxpayer should be stopped.
Sahra Wagenknecht of the left-wing BSW (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht or Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance) wrote):
Should German authorities have known in advance about the attack plan on Nord Stream 1 and 2, then we would have a scandal of the century in German politics.
Many private commentators were equally stunned:
Nobody deserves a government that allows critical infrastructure to be blown away with complete equanimity.
For some, angry comments were not enough and they wanted to see action. Opposition Cologne-based lawyer Markus Haintz, for example, filed chargesagainst Kiesewetter with the Ellwangen public prosecutor’s office due to his comments regarding the blowing up of the Nord Stream pipelines in the Die Welt interview.
Laughter through the tears
Fortunately for the soul, there were also many funny and satirical reactions. Berlin-based AI artist and satirist Snicklink posted this video. But other X users also had fun with pictures and photos making fun of the — from their point of view — implausible descriptions in the WSJ article.
What’s next?
So far (at the time of writing this article) no German government representative has commented on the WSJ investigation or the Die Weltinterview, which is incredible in itself. I assume there were some emergency meetings on the weekend where the line of communication is being discussed and we can expect a statement soon. We can look forward to seeing how they position themselves here.
Sahra Wagenknecht is now calling for a committee of inquiry in the German Parliament to investigate the role of the German government in connection with the attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines.
This seems urgently needed — because that would be the appropriate forum to shed light on all these issues. For as interesting and sometimes entertaining as the reactions and discussions in the regular and social media are, such a state affair cannot be solved by swarm intelligence.
This article first appeared in German on Nachdenkseiten.
Thomas Fazi
Website: thomasfazi.net
Twitter: @battleforeurope
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