The Arab wall begins to fall
The impossible happened
by Serge Halimi
Political leaders often claim a situation is so complex that any attempt to change it would be disastrous. This is not always the case. After 9/11, President George Bush offered a clear choice: “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” According to President Sarkozy, the choice in Tunisia was between a friendly dictator and “a Taliban-type regime in North Africa” (1). This suits both sides: a dictator can claim to be the last bastion against militant Islam, and the Islamists can claim that they alone oppose the dictator.
But if there is a social or democratic movement, and new players, the scenario suddenly changes. The embattled authorities look out for subversive activity among the protesters. If they find it, they exploit it. If not, they invent it.
In an interview with the Tunisian ambassador to Unesco, Mezri Haddad, on 13 January (the day before Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fled), the opposition leader Nejib Chebbi criticised “development in which low pay provided the only comparative advantage in international competition” and “provocative displays of illicit wealth in the cities”, and claimed that “the people are all against the regime” (2). Haddad responded: “The people will ransack your fine house in La Marsa, that is what people do in societies where there is no fear of the police … Ben Ali saved Tunisia from the fanatics and fundamentalists in 1987… He must remain in power, come what may, because the country is under threat from the fanatics and their neo-Bolshevik allies.”
A few hours later, Haddad called on the man who “saved Tunisia” to stand down. On 16 January, Chebbi became the new minister for regional and local development. Revolution in Arab nations is rare but rapid. Less than a month after Mohamed Bouazizi’s suicide drew attention to the grievances of unemployed graduates, the Trabelsi family houses in Carthage had been seized, political prisoners had been released and Tunis was full of peasants demanding the abolition of privileges.
The historic events in Tunis had a familiar, French Revolutionary feel. A spontaneous movement spreads, widely diverse social strata are brought together, absolutism is vanquished. At which point, there are two alternatives left: take your winnings and leave, or double your stakes. Generally, one section of society (the liberal bourgeoisie) tries to stem the flood; another (peasants, employees in dead-end jobs, unemployed workers, poor students) backs the tide of protest, in the hope that the ageing autocracy and the monopolists will be swept away. Some of the protestors, especially the young, do not want to have risked their lives so that others, less daring but better placed, can use the protests to their own advantage. The social system survives, minus the police and the mafia.
Extending opposition to dictatorship in the person of the Ben Ali family to opposition to economic domination by an oligarchy would not suit the tourists, the money markets or the International Monetary Fund. The only freedom they want is for tourists, trade and movement of capital. Moody’s rating agency naturally downgraded Tunisia’s bond ratings on 19 January, citing “political instability and uncertainties caused by the collapse of the previous political regime”.
Imagine the outcry if police had opened fire on demonstrators in Tehran or Caracas, leaving a hundred dead. Such comparisons were rejected in principle over 30 years ago in an article by the US academic, Jeane Kirkpatrick (3), in which she claimed that pro-western “authoritarian” regimes were always preferable and more susceptible to reform than the “totalitarian” regimes that might succeed them.
President Ronald Reagan was so impressed that he appointed her ambassador to the UN. Her article, published in November 1979, examines major blows the US had suffered that year, the revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua. She maintained that the Carter administration, in its efforts to promote democracy, had in both cases “actively collaborated in the replacement of moderate autocrats friendly to American interests [the shah of Iran and Augusto Somoza] with less friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion.” These friendly regimes had their faults. Both were “led by men who had not been selected by free elections, … who sometimes invoked martial law to arrest, imprison, exile, and occasionally, it was alleged [sic], torture their opponents.” But “they were positively friendly to the US, sending their sons and others to be educated in our universities, voting with us in the United Nations, and regularly supporting American interests and positions even when these entailed personal and political cost. The embassies of both governments were… frequented by powerful Americans. And the shah and Somoza themselves were both welcome in Washington, and had many American friends.”
Then, “viewing international developments in terms of… a contemporary version of the same idea of progress that has traumatised western imaginations since the Enlightenment”, the Carter administration made a fatal mistake: it encouraged regime change. “Washington overestimated the political diversity of the opposition (especially the strength of ‘moderates’ and ‘democrats’), … underestimated the strength and intransigence of radicals in the movement, and misestimated the nature and extent of American influence on both the government and the opposition”, preparing the way for the ayatollahs and the Sandinistas.
There is nothing new about the idea of a “dictatorship of the lesser evil”, which is pro-western and may mend its ways given endless time, or the fear of finding fundamentalists (or communists) masquerading as democratic demonstrators. But the spirit of Jeane Kirkpatrick seems to have influenced Paris more than Washington. The US was reassured by the relatively minor role of Islamists in the Tunisian uprising, enabling a broad social and political front against Ben Ali. WikiLeaks had revealed the State Department’s feelings about the “mafia-esque elite” and the “sclerotic regime” of the ruling family. The White House left them to their fate, trusting that the liberal bourgeoisie would provide a replacement friendly to western interests.
But the Tunisian uprising has had wider repercussions, notably in Egypt. For the conditions that caused it are to be found elsewhere: unequal growth, high unemployment, protest crushed by grossly overblown police forces, well-educated young people with no prospects, bourgeois parasites living like tourists in their own country. Tunisians will not solve all these problems at a stroke but they have made a start. Like the rest of us, they were told there was no alternative. Yet they have shown us that “the impossible happens” (4).
But if there is a social or democratic movement, and new players, the scenario suddenly changes. The embattled authorities look out for subversive activity among the protesters. If they find it, they exploit it. If not, they invent it.
In an interview with the Tunisian ambassador to Unesco, Mezri Haddad, on 13 January (the day before Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fled), the opposition leader Nejib Chebbi criticised “development in which low pay provided the only comparative advantage in international competition” and “provocative displays of illicit wealth in the cities”, and claimed that “the people are all against the regime” (2). Haddad responded: “The people will ransack your fine house in La Marsa, that is what people do in societies where there is no fear of the police … Ben Ali saved Tunisia from the fanatics and fundamentalists in 1987… He must remain in power, come what may, because the country is under threat from the fanatics and their neo-Bolshevik allies.”
A few hours later, Haddad called on the man who “saved Tunisia” to stand down. On 16 January, Chebbi became the new minister for regional and local development. Revolution in Arab nations is rare but rapid. Less than a month after Mohamed Bouazizi’s suicide drew attention to the grievances of unemployed graduates, the Trabelsi family houses in Carthage had been seized, political prisoners had been released and Tunis was full of peasants demanding the abolition of privileges.
The historic events in Tunis had a familiar, French Revolutionary feel. A spontaneous movement spreads, widely diverse social strata are brought together, absolutism is vanquished. At which point, there are two alternatives left: take your winnings and leave, or double your stakes. Generally, one section of society (the liberal bourgeoisie) tries to stem the flood; another (peasants, employees in dead-end jobs, unemployed workers, poor students) backs the tide of protest, in the hope that the ageing autocracy and the monopolists will be swept away. Some of the protestors, especially the young, do not want to have risked their lives so that others, less daring but better placed, can use the protests to their own advantage. The social system survives, minus the police and the mafia.
Extending opposition to dictatorship in the person of the Ben Ali family to opposition to economic domination by an oligarchy would not suit the tourists, the money markets or the International Monetary Fund. The only freedom they want is for tourists, trade and movement of capital. Moody’s rating agency naturally downgraded Tunisia’s bond ratings on 19 January, citing “political instability and uncertainties caused by the collapse of the previous political regime”.
France’s outstretched hand
Cairo, Algiers, Tripoli, Beijing and western chanceries were equally unenthusiastic. As mainly Muslim crowds called for liberty and equality, France had its own interpretation of the compatibility of democracy with Islam, offering Ben Ali’s failing regime “the expert assistance of our security forces”. Ruling oligarchies, Muslim, secular and Christian, always close ranks at any public unrest. The former Tunisian president claimed to support secularism and women’s rights against fundamentalism, his party was a member of the Socialist International, yet he fled. To Saudi Arabia of all places.Imagine the outcry if police had opened fire on demonstrators in Tehran or Caracas, leaving a hundred dead. Such comparisons were rejected in principle over 30 years ago in an article by the US academic, Jeane Kirkpatrick (3), in which she claimed that pro-western “authoritarian” regimes were always preferable and more susceptible to reform than the “totalitarian” regimes that might succeed them.
President Ronald Reagan was so impressed that he appointed her ambassador to the UN. Her article, published in November 1979, examines major blows the US had suffered that year, the revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua. She maintained that the Carter administration, in its efforts to promote democracy, had in both cases “actively collaborated in the replacement of moderate autocrats friendly to American interests [the shah of Iran and Augusto Somoza] with less friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion.” These friendly regimes had their faults. Both were “led by men who had not been selected by free elections, … who sometimes invoked martial law to arrest, imprison, exile, and occasionally, it was alleged [sic], torture their opponents.” But “they were positively friendly to the US, sending their sons and others to be educated in our universities, voting with us in the United Nations, and regularly supporting American interests and positions even when these entailed personal and political cost. The embassies of both governments were… frequented by powerful Americans. And the shah and Somoza themselves were both welcome in Washington, and had many American friends.”
Then, “viewing international developments in terms of… a contemporary version of the same idea of progress that has traumatised western imaginations since the Enlightenment”, the Carter administration made a fatal mistake: it encouraged regime change. “Washington overestimated the political diversity of the opposition (especially the strength of ‘moderates’ and ‘democrats’), … underestimated the strength and intransigence of radicals in the movement, and misestimated the nature and extent of American influence on both the government and the opposition”, preparing the way for the ayatollahs and the Sandinistas.
There is nothing new about the idea of a “dictatorship of the lesser evil”, which is pro-western and may mend its ways given endless time, or the fear of finding fundamentalists (or communists) masquerading as democratic demonstrators. But the spirit of Jeane Kirkpatrick seems to have influenced Paris more than Washington. The US was reassured by the relatively minor role of Islamists in the Tunisian uprising, enabling a broad social and political front against Ben Ali. WikiLeaks had revealed the State Department’s feelings about the “mafia-esque elite” and the “sclerotic regime” of the ruling family. The White House left them to their fate, trusting that the liberal bourgeoisie would provide a replacement friendly to western interests.
But the Tunisian uprising has had wider repercussions, notably in Egypt. For the conditions that caused it are to be found elsewhere: unequal growth, high unemployment, protest crushed by grossly overblown police forces, well-educated young people with no prospects, bourgeois parasites living like tourists in their own country. Tunisians will not solve all these problems at a stroke but they have made a start. Like the rest of us, they were told there was no alternative. Yet they have shown us that “the impossible happens” (4).
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