Obama 94

Obama and Afghanistan: Repeating Past Mistakes

By A.G. Noorani

April 04, 2009 "Dawn" -- --‘IT is an infallible rule that a prince who is not wise himself cannot be well advised … wise counsels, from whoever they come, must necessarily be due to the prudence of the prince, and not the prudence of the prince to the wise counsel received.’

Niccolo Machiavelli’s sage words aptly sum up the predicament of President Barack Obama on Afghanistan. Unlike his predecessor George W. Bush and his equally rash bunch of advisers, Obama is a sensible man. However, the haste he has shown in crafting a policy on Afghanistan does not reflect wisdom.

He ordered ‘a careful policy review … as soon as I took office’ he said on March 27 in a speech which, like all American pronouncements from on high, did not err on the side of brevity. His own understanding of that country and this region, as his campaign speeches revealed, was not profound. His advisers are none too blessed with the knowledge or understanding either. The highest in the intelligence services confessed to an ‘appalling’ ignorance of the command structure of the Taliban whom his book The Audacity of Hope ignores. It has brief references only to Al Qaeda.

What is it that emboldened Obama to think that he would hit upon a cure for the ills in Kabul in record speed? The recipe prescribed in the speech does not reckon with the one fundamental issues that lies at the root of the problem — the presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil. They went there to be rid of Al Qaeda. The Taliban were affected because they had extended hospitality to its chief Osama bin Laden. Second only to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, her colleague Karl F. Inderfurth was responsible for snubbing the Taliban’s many overtures and for, thus, hardening their attitude. Disdain for diplomacy and indifference to other people’s sentiments are the twin hallmarks of American diplomacy.

They were reflected in an article by Inderfurth and James Dobbins, a Bush official, published on the day Obama spoke. They were reflected in the president’s speech as well. Inderfurth and Dobbins first lay out the sketch of an impressive edifice of an international treaty which ensures peace in Afghanistan and in the region. The US and its allies will ‘withdraw all forces from Afghanistan once these other provisions (of the treaty) had been implemented’.

That is a consummation devoutly to be wished for. But how will it be achieved? By the use of military force. ‘More western troops and economic assistance, more sophisticated military tactics and greater civilian capacity will be needed to turn the tide that is currently running against Nato...’

Obama’s proposals are no different. Deployment of more US troops. ‘That’s how we will prepare Afghans to take responsibility for their security, and how we will ultimately be able to bring our own troops home.’ Is this a realistic exit strategy?

The goal is defined thus: ‘to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.’ To this end ‘we must isolate Al Qaeda from the Pakistani people (sic)’ — a strange formulation. Even The Economist came to realise by March 28 that ‘America’s bombing raids inside Pakistan probably are counterproductive, and should stop’. Economic aid to Pakistan will be coupled with demands for greater commitment to rooting out Al Qaeda and for denial of safe havens to it.'
Lees verder: http://informationclearinghouse.info/article22343.htm