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'United States President-elect Barack Obama's election victory has revived hopes that stalled Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations could finally lead to a two-state solution. Few new presidents have been greeted with such optimism and associated high expectations.
However, the chances for progress depend on more than a new American president. There are several interrelated factors: US engagement, the availability of a viable peace agreement, Israeli and Palestinian internal politics and the broader international situation.
An examination of these factors indicates that the optimism is unjustified and that President Obama will not be more successful in bringing about a two-state solution to the conflict. This does not however mean that the situation will remain static or that those pursuing a just peace have no recourse for action.
Early US engagement is not enough
Days after Obama's election, speaking on CNN, Brent Scowcroft, national security advisor to President George Herbert Walker Bush, advised the President-elect to start early on reviving peace negotiations as a way to "psychologically change the mood of the [Middle East] region" and "because the Palestinian issue ... gives the members of the region a deep sense of injustice" (Fareed Zakaria GPS, 12 November 2008). Former US President Jimmy Carter echoed these views, urging Obama to avoid the mistakes of other presidents who waited until their final year in office to push for an agreement (see "Obama will waste no time pursuing Middle East peace," Haaretz, 12 November). In a June speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the pro-Israel lobby, Obama himself pledged, "to do all I can to advance the cause of peace from the start of my administration."
These voices reflect a consensus that early and sustained US engagement has been the missing ingredient. The problem, however, has never been a lack of US engagement. Rather, it has been too much of the wrong kind. Earlier administrations, whether or not they actively encouraged negotiations, have been deeply involved. Since 1967, the US has given growing military, economic and diplomatic support to Israel -- in effect intervening heavily on one side of the conflict.
Aaron David Miller, a former top State Department official, succinctly summed up the American role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy over the past quarter century as "Israel's attorney, catering and coordinating with the Israelis at the expense of successful peace negotiations" (Miller, "Israel's Lawyer," The Washington Post, 23 May 2005). The George W. Bush administration, like that of former US President Bill Clinton, adopted Israeli positions as its own: the permanence of large Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, opposition to Palestinian refugee rights and support for Israel's demand to be recognized as a "Jewish state," even though 20 percent of Israeli citizens are Palestinians whose second-class status would be legitimized by such recognition.
The outgoing Bush administration took American engagement to unprecedented levels both overtly and covertly. Contrary to the well-crafted public initiatives, like the Annapolis conference and attempts to revive the "peace process," it was the Bush administration's covert activities that had the greatest impact. Intervening directly in Palestinian internal politics, it pushed for Palestinian elections, and then when Hamas won, attempted to overturn the result. The administration helped arm and train Palestinian militias opposed to Hamas and vetoed a Palestinian "national unity government." It has supported the blockade of the Gaza Strip and used financial aid to bolster client Palestinian leaders (see David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell," Vanity Fair, April 2008). While these realities are often ignored, confronting them is nonetheless essential to understanding how American policy would have to change for the US to play a constructive role in fostering a just, sustainable and agr eed peace.
For an Obama administration to live up to the expectations and break with its predecessors would require that the US: make financial and other aid to Israel conditional on compliance with international law and signed agreements (such as long-ignored United Nations Security Council resolutions requiring Israel to dismantle settlements); stop interfering in Palestinian internal affairs and respect the democratic choices of the Palestinian people; and call for an immediate end to the blockade of the Gaza Strip. It would also require that the US exercise its influence to level the power imbalance in negotiations, rather than weighting the scales even further towards the stronger party. This includes using consistent standards for judging violent acts, negotiating ceasefires and apportioning responsibility for breaches of ceasefires by Israelis and Palestinians.'

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