https://eurasianet.org/how-an-embattled-ukrainian-oligarch-has-kept-his-grip-on-an-economic-empire
De Engelse editie van de Indiase Economic Times berichtte op 25 september 2019, vier maanden nadat Zelensky tot Oekraïense president was gekozen:
Igor Kolomoisky, an industrial and media magnate worth an estimated $1.1 billion, used his broadcasting empire to drive Zelenskiy’s former career as a TV comic. Tongues have been wagging for some time over how close the two men remain.
For starters, there was Kolomoisky’s abrupt return from self-imposed exile in Tel Aviv three days before Zelenskiy’s inauguration in May. The tycoon had fallen out with the president’s predecessor over the nationalization of his bank, among other things. His TV channel embraced Zelenskiy in the run-up to the election.
There’s since been plenty more grist for the rumor mill, though concrete evidence that Kolomoisky is influencing policy is hard to come by.
At stake is Ukraine’s nascent economic revival, which could be derailed if the billionaire succeeds in regaining control of Privatbank, the country’s No. 1 lender. Such a step would suggest the oligarch class, a drag on previous reform efforts, can retain its vast power in the new Ukraine.
It would also threaten financial stability, according to the central bank, and could torpedo a new loan program with the International Monetary Fund.
‘There’s a consensus among investors that the government is doing a lot of good things,’ said Ihor Mazepa, who owns Ukrainian investment firm Concorde Capital. ‘But any wrong decisions on Privatbank would erase that positive effect very quickly.’
Zelenskiy and Kolomoisky have repeatedly said there’s nothing untoward in their relationship. But government appointments and developments around Privatbank are causing concern.
Zelenskiy’s chief of staff used to be Kolomoisky’s personal lawyer. Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, publicly praised by the tycoon, was among only two officials to retain their places in the new government.
The head of Kolomoisky’s TV station and three of its journalists are lawmakers for Zelenskiy’s party. Another, Oleksandr Dubinsky, represents parliament on a committee that picks independent board members for state-controlled banks, including Privatbank.
Then there’s the central bank, a driving force in the government’s takeover of Privatbank. Dubinsky wants parliament to probe the its actions in recent years. The bank has complained about threats to current and former officials.
The past few days have seen speculation build. Zelenskiy met Kolomoisky in his office for the first time on Sept. 10. The next day, Privatbank’s headquarters were raided by police.
Kolomoisky said later that he didn’t discuss the bank at his meeting with Zelenskiy and doesn’t want to get it back ‘at any cost.’ Even so, he sees a ‘good window of opportunity’ now the officials that handled the nationalization aren’t around.
A Ukrainian court ruled in April that the takeover was unlawful in a case that’s pending appeal.
De vraag blijft wat een extreem corrupte joodse miljardair zag in een joodse komiek om hem te steunen als presidentskandidaat van een land met een sterke antisemitische traditie? Immers, oligarchen staan niet bekend als altruïstische individuen. Zeker in hun bewustzijn geldt als vuistregel: voor wat, hoort wat. Die vraag is van belang vanwege het volgende:
Zelenskyy's presidential campaign against Poroshenko was almost entirely virtual. He did not release a detailed policy platform and his engagement with mainstream media was minimal… In place of traditional campaign rallies, he conducted stand-up comedy routines across Ukraine with his production company Kvartal 95. He styled himself as an anti-establishment, anti-corruption figure,
kortom, de bekende populistische leuzen die in het Westen door het establishment en zijn mainstream-media zo intens worden gehaat.
Zelensky beweerde:
he wished to restore trust in politicians, ‘to bring professional, decent people to power’ and to ‘change the mood and timbre of the political establishment.’ On 16 April 2019, a few days before the election, 20 Ukrainian news outlets called on Zelenskyy to ‘stop avoiding journalists.’
Prior to the elections, Zelenskyy presented a team that included former finance minister Oleksandr Danylyuk… During the campaign, concerns were raised over his (Zelensky's. svh) links to the oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volodymyr_Zelenskyy
Tweede van links Danylyuk en helemaal rechts John Bolton in Warschau.
Het is veelzeggende dat Danylyuk ‘studied at the Kyiv Institute of Investment Management (1995) and obtained MBA from the Indiana University Kelley School of Business in 2001.’ Hij kan worden gezien als een neoliberale westers georiënteerde technocraat, met alle positieve en vooral negatieve consequenties van dien. Hij is aanhanger van de ideologie van deregulering en privatisering die in het Westen een toenemende macht van speculerende banken en hedgefunds veroorzaakt, en een almaar dieper wordende kloof tussen arm en rijk, zoals de westerse neoliberale ontwikkeling de afgelopen vier decennia heeft aangetoond. Toch is het volgende interessant aan hem:
In 2016, Oleksandr Danylyuk was appointed a Minister of Finance. He declared his key objectives at the position — better investment climate in Ukraine, transparent rules of doing business for Ukrainian entrepreneurs and foreign investors and public finance reform.
Veelbetekenend voor de interne Oekraïense spanningen is dat:
On 7 June 2018, Ukraine's parliament voted in support of Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman's motion to dismiss Finance Minister Danylyuk.
Groysman had asked for Danylyuk's dismissal in response to Danylyuk's May 2018 letter to the ambassadors of the G-7 top industrial nations saying that Groysman was stalling vital reforms of the State Fiscal Service that are needed to combat corruption. Groysman said Danylyuk's actions may have hurt Ukraine's negotiations with the European Union about economic aid. Danylyuk stated that he had been asked to use government money to fund particular politicians favored projects, effectively to back political corruption. Danylyuk stated that Groysman seek his dismissal to prevent reform of State Fiscal Service notoriously known for its corruption and headed by the Groysman old ally Prodan.
Danylyuk initiated dismissal of Roman Nasirov, Head of State Fiscal Service, whom he accused of corruption and sabotaging reforms in tax administration. He filed the respective cases with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). Nasirov, who enjoyed support of many influential people in power, was later investigated and formally accused by NABU of corruption. Danylyuk used this as formal pretext to remove him from his position in Feb 2017, and later 2018 despite significant push back from the prime-minister succeeded in firing him permanently.
Cooperation with IMF and return to markets
Shortly after appointment Danylyuk renewed cooperation with IMF after long pause which allowed to unlock funding. Danylyuk leveraged trusted relationship with IMF.
Kenmerkend voor de binnenlandse krachtmeting in het totaal corrupte Oekraïne is dat:
In December 2016 the largest bank in the country PrivatBank was nationalized. Ministry of Finance became the sole shareholder. The preparatory work lasted for more than a year with National Bank and Ministry of Finance taking leading role. The bank was owned by two influential businessmen Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Gennadiy Bogolyubov.
Tekenend voor de corruptie is dat de joodse Kolomoyskyi de joodse president Zelensky financieel en anderszins steunde tot hij doorkreeg dat hij op het verkeerde paard had gewed en vervolgens de kant van Rusland koos. Op zijn beurt richtte de joodse miljardair Bogolyubov de Bogolyubov Stichting op, ‘a charitable organization rooted in authentic Torah values.’ Bovendien financierde Bogolyubov’s stichting in 2014:
an educational centre for Jewish history in a hall excavated under Jerusalem's Muslim Quarter, among mainly Mamluk remains connected by underground spaces to the Western Wall tunnel. Bogolyubov financed the excavation and refurbishing of the underground area with ca. $20 million out of his own wealth. Bogolyubov funded the Menorah Centre, a 56,000 square meter Jewish community centre with an attached synagogue in Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine.
Karakteristiek voor joodse miljardairs uit het voormalige Oostblok is dat ook Bogolyubov:
resides on Belgrave Square in Belgravia, London, England. He led a secular life until his mid-40s when he rediscovered Judaism and is a practising Jew today.
It was reported in The Guardian that Bogolyubov had acquired Cypriot citizenship in 2016 through a 'Golden visa’ scheme, ‘as a result of him having made substantial investments in the country (via certain companies) and being fully compliant with the legal requirements at the time.’
In November 2017 Bogolyubov officially declared that he was a citizen of Ukraine, Great Britain, Israel and Cyprus. He also noted that he lives in Geneva, Switzerland.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gennadiy_Bogolyubov
Voor een deel van de joodse Oekraïeners geldt de opmerking van Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, hoogleraar psychologie aan de Universiteit van Haifa, die mij begin maart 2008 in een interview erop wees dat ‘in ruil voor de onbeperkte politieke steun aan Israël’ diaspora joden datgene hebben ‘gekregen waaraan het ze het meest ontbreekt: een ideologische inhoud om de leegte van hun identiteit te vullen.’ Net als Zelensky geldt ook voor Bogolyubov en anderen dat na de val van de Sovjet Unie hun ‘joodse’ achtergrond hen ineens een nieuwe identiteit gaf, en dat zij zich daardoor schatplichtig voelen aan westerse joden en/of de Joodse inwoners van Israel, die 80 procent van de bevolking in de 'Joodse staat' uitmaakt. Vandaar dat Bogolyubov in 2017 verklaarde ‘een staatsburger te zijn van Oekraïne, Groot Britannië, Israel en Cyprus.’ In de Oekraïne werd hij geboren en wist hij te profiteren van de chaos na de ineenstorting van het Sovjet-rijk, in Groot Britannië kan hij als miljardair poseren, in een poging onderdeel te worden van het westers establishment, in Israel is hij een Jood, en in Cyprus kan hij de belasting in zijn geboorteland ontwijken, net zoals Zelensky de belasting in Oekraïne wist te ontwijken door zijn 1.2 miljard in belastingparadijzen elders ‘onzichtbaar’ te maken. Tegelijkertijd kon deze poseur toch als ‘dienaar van het volk’ de presidentsverkiezing winnen, door te beloven allereerst de corruptie van de parasitaire rijken te zullen bestrijden. En in het Westen tenslotte speelt hij de held van het Oekraïense vaderland, zonder dat de 'vrije pers' een woord wijdt aan de doortrapte machtspolitiek waarin Zelensky als pion van het Westen wordt gebruikt.
PrivatBank was a systemic bank with more than 22 million customers. As a part of an amicable agreement on nationalization Kolomoyskyi and Bogolyubov agreed to compensate losses of State related to nationalisation within 6 months following the completion of the nationalization. After failing of delivering on this commitment Government initiated criminal proceedings against former shareholders of Privatbank.
In December 2017 London Court imposed a Worldwide freeze of assets of former shareholders of PrivatBank. Danylyuk played an instrumental role in this process overcoming the resistance of the Prosecutor general and other high-level officials who attempted to prevent the decision of assets freezing. To prevent it several criminal proceedings were opened against advisors hired by the National Bank of Ukraine, Ministry of Finance and Privatbank. Court banned any decision related to initiating legal proceedings outside Ukraine, etc. Despite all the opposing efforts, the WWFA was imposed and stays by now.
Oleksandr Danylyuk has repeatedly stressed that reformation of State Fiscal Service is one of the key anti-corruption initiatives, as it will help to improve the business climate in Ukraine. ‘The State Fiscal Service needs to continue the modernization of its approach to work. Working with the State Fiscal Service should be more convenient for every taxpayer.’ Danylyuk integrated State Fiscal Service reform into the program of cooperation with the IMF, additionally creating a project supervisory board, which included G7 ambassadors, an IMF representative and a business ombudsman.
Later, this escalated into a conflict between, back then, the head of the Finance Ministry and Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman (joods. svh), when during negotiations with the IMF, the PM overturned decisions that launched the reform.
Prior to Danylyuk's appointment as the Minister of Finance, he played an active role in implementation of anticorruption reforms in Ukraine.
He was in charge of the development of the Law on National Anticorruption Bureau (NABU) in cooperation with experts and civil society activists and lobbied for its adoption. The law provided a good framework for establishing NABU and protecting its independence.
Introduced a system of electronic declarations and recruitment to the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC).
Supported adoption of the law for launching the High Anti-corruption court. In June 2018, he sent a personal letter to every PM, explaining the importance of adopting the law and urged them to do so.
Danylyuk actively promoted the reform of law enforcement institutions. He took action at the abolition of the Tax Police, a highly corrupt institution that harassed Ukrainian business.
Despite strong resistance of the President, Prime-minister and the Parliament the law that de facto removed any powers from Tax Police was passed. Realizing the mistake, the coalition attempted to fix the problem by adopting the law and returning the powers to the Tax Police.
Danylyuk addressed the Parliament with pledged not to restore tax police. It was the first time in history when Minister publicly opposed the parliamentary coalition and the President in the parliament. In the confusion, parliament took the position of the minister refusing to adopt the changes. Position to restore the Tax police was promoted by President Poroshenko's ally Nina Yuzhanina.
On May 28, 2019, Danylyuk was appointed Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine — the main organizational body for national security and defense under the President of Ukraine. From June 2019 onwards, he became a head of the National Cyber Security Coordination Center. In July, he joined the National Council for Anti-Corruption Policy. On September 27, 2019, Danylyuk wrote a resignation letter from the post of Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. He explained his decision by disagreeing with the policy of ‘carpet games’ (zwendel. svh) in the new government. ‘Many of those who came lack professionalism. This is a systemic problem that carries a risk. I hope that conclusions will be made and the President will make some adjustments,’ he told reporters.
On 25 September 2020, Danylyuk was elected Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the National Depository. On 28 April 2021 the shareholders of the National Depository of Ukraine terminated his powers. Danylyuk claimed this was done ‘to appoint a person convenient for the Presidential Administration.'
Met andere woorden: ook Zelinsky en zijn adviseurs zijn onderdeel van de voortgaande grootschalige corruptie.
In 2021 Danylyuk applied as head for the new Bureau of Economic Security. The (then) new law enforcement body of investigating economic crimes. On 29 July 2021 Danylyuk was rejected to take part in the competition of selection because he could not provide a diploma of higher education in a specialty that did meet the requirements of the competition.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oleksandr_Danylyuk
Het zal de lezer niet verbazen dat de westerse mainstream-media over dit alles zwijgen. En waarom zwijgen mijn collega’s hierover? Door een combinatie van luiheid, zelfcensuur en een corrupte levenshouding, waarin aanzien en geld belangrijker zijn dan het onderzoeken van de werkelijkheid. Meer de volgende keer.
Geen opmerkingen:
Een reactie posten