even more than when this book was first published, commentators and politicians are invoking ‘Enlightenment values’ as an antidote for contemporary ills. If only we return to these pristine verities, they assure us, freedom will be secure and toleration will thrive. Yet Enlightenment values have very often been illiberal, racist or totalitarian. ‘Scientific racism’ — a spin-off from nineteenth-century Positivism — was used in the twentieth century as a rationale for genocide, and there can be no doubt about the Enlightenment pedigree of Leninism. Just as religious fundamentalists present a severely simplified version of the faith to which they want to return, Enlightenment fundamentalists present a sanitized copy of the tradition they seek to revive. In so doing, they block understanding of the Enlightenment’s role in our present difficulties.
Nu gaat het mij niet zozeer om de naïeve Luyendijk zelf, maar om de middenklasse die hij bedient met stellingen die al eerder en beter zijn verwoord door intellectuelen. Neem bijvoorbeeld zijn onlangs vergaarde kennis dat ook de westerling in een onrechtvaardig neoliberaal kapitalistisch systeem gevangen zit, waar persoonlijke merites doorgaans niet de doorslag geven, maar juist iemands afkomst. De Britse emeritus hoogleraar Antony Manstead is een sociaal psycholoog, wiens onderzoek zich focust op drie topics, te weten:
emotion, attitudes, and social identity. I am interested in the role emotion plays in interpersonal and intergroup relations. I am also interested in the role played by social identity in intergroup conflict and cooperation.
One of the ironies of modern Western societies, with their emphasis on meritocratic values that promote the notion that people can achieve what they want if they have enough talent and are prepared to work hard, is that the divisions between social classes are becoming wider, not narrower. In the United Kingdom, for example, figures from the Equality Trust (2017) show that the top one-fifth of households have 40% of national income, whereas the bottom one-fifth have just 8%. These figures are based on 2012 data. Between 1938 and 1979, income inequality in the United Kingdom did reduce to some extent, but in subsequent decades, this process has reversed. Between 1979 and 2009/2010, the top 10% of the population increased its share of national income from 21% to 31%, whereas the share received by the bottom 10% fell from 4% to 1%. Wealth inequality is even starker than income inequality. Figures from the UK's Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2014) show that in the period 2012–2014, the wealthiest 10% of households in Great Britain owned 45% of household wealth, whereas the least wealthy 50% of households owned less than 9%. How can these very large divisions in material income and wealth be reconciled with the view that the class structure that used to prevail in the United Kingdom until at least the mid-20th century is no longer relevant, because the traditional working class has ‘disappeared’, as asserted by John Prescott in one of the opening quotes, and reflected in the thesis of embourgeoisement analyzed by Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1963)? More pertinently for the present article, what implications do these changing patterns of wealth and income distribution have for class identity, social cognition, and social behavior?
The first point to address concerns the supposed disappearance of the class system. As recent sociological research has conclusively shown, the class system in the United Kingdom is very much still in existence, albeit in a way that differs from the more traditional forms that were based primarily on occupation. In one of the more comprehensive recent studies, Savage et al. (2013) analyzed the results of a large survey of social class in the United Kingdom, the BBC's 2011 Great British Class Survey, which involved 161,400 web respondents, along with the results of a nationally representative sample survey. Using latent class analysis, the authors identified seven classes, ranging from an ‘elite,’ with an average annual household income of £89,000, to a ‘precariat’ with an average annual household income of £8,000. Among the many interesting results is the fact that the ‘traditional working-class’ category formed only 14% of the population. This undoubtedly reflects the impact of de-industrialization and is almost certainly the basis of the widely held view that the ‘old’ class system in the United Kingdom no longer applies. As Savage et al.'s research clearly shows, the old class system has been reconfigured as a result of economic and political developments, but it is patently true that the members of the different classes identified by these researchers inhabit worlds that rarely intersect, let alone overlap. The research by Savage et al. revealed that the differences between the social classes they identified extended beyond differences in financial circumstances. There were also marked differences in social and cultural capital, as indexed by size of social network and extent of engagement with different cultural activities, respectively. From a social psychological perspective, it seems likely that growing up and living under such different social and economic contexts would have a considerable impact on people's thoughts, feelings and behaviors. The central aim of this article was to examine the nature of this impact.
Let wel, dit onderzoek werd voor een aanzienlijk deel verricht in de tijd dat Joris Luyendijk in Engeland verbleef. Hoe is het te verklaren dat een afgestudeerde antropoloog en journalist niet in staat was deze ontwikkeling in het straatbeeld te herkennen, of op de televisie, dan wel in het theater of in supermarkten? Waar berust die blindheid op van iemand die getraind is in de menskunde, en als journalist open moet staan voor de wereld rondom hem? Waarom werd hij pas wakker toen hij zelf vernederd werd? Het is mede door het gecorrumpeerde bewustzijn van de academische middenklasse dat de journalistiek van zelfbenoemde kwaliteitskranten zo erbarmelijk laag is. Nogmaals professor Manstead:
The cycle of disadvantage that starts with poor material conditions and ends with lower chances of entering and succeeding in the very contexts (universities and high-status workplaces) that could increase social mobility is not going to be changed in the absence of substantial pressure for social change. It is therefore interesting that when people are asked about social inequality, they generally say that they are in favor of greater equality.
Norton and Ariely (2011) asked a nationally representative sample of more than 5,500 Americans to estimate the (then) current wealth distribution in the United States and also to express their preferences for how wealth should be distributed. The key findings from this research were (1) that respondents greatly underestimated the degree of wealth inequality in the United States, believing that the wealthiest 20% of the population owned 59% of the wealth, where the actual figure is 84% and (2) that their preferred distribution of wealth among citizens was closer to equality than even their own incorrect estimations of the distribution (e.g., they expressed a preference that the top 20% should own 32% of the nation's wealth). This also held for wealthy respondents and Republican voters — albeit to a lesser extent than their poorer and Democrat counterparts. Similar results for Australian respondents were reported by Norton, Neal, Govan, Ariely, and Holland (2014).
https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/bjso.12251
Luyendijk’s al dan niet gespeelde blindheid komt de elite natuurlijk goed uit. Mede dankzij zijn langdurig onvermogen de werkelijkheid te registreren kreeg hij voorrang, en kon het werk van werkelijk kritische journalisten worden genegeerd, zoals ook nu weer het geval is met zijn nieuwe boek. Meer daarover de volgende keer.
50 jaar lang de 'waarheid' niet zien, maar wel tijdens een Studium Generale over de 'zoektocht naar waarheid' spreken. Welke 'waarheid'? Nederland ten voeten uit.
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