28 November 2019 4:04 PM
Bellingcat or Guard Dog for the Establishment?
***My response to the ‘Bellingcat’ attempt to spin away the devastating implications of the OPCW Douma Leak.***
I have interleaved my comments (in black or red)with the ‘Bellingcat’ arguments (in green)
‘Emails And Reading Comprehension: OPCW Douma Coverage Misses Crucial Facts’
PH: Is this about ‘comprehension’? Or is it about self-serving prejudice? What ‘crucial facts’ does the leaked e-mail miss? Let us see.
We begin with
November 25, 2019
The date and the byline seem OK to me, except that the names of actual individuals are always helpful, as are any declarations of interest that might be made. Such as: Bellingcat (according to its own website) currently receives grants from the following organisations:
- The National Endowment for Democracy (see below)
- https://www.ned.org/
- https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/who-we-are
- https://www.porticus.com/en/home
- https://www.adessium.org/
- Pax for Peace
- https://www.paxforpeace.nl/
Note that the National Endowment for Democracy is a largely state-sponsored arm of the United States government. It says (on its own website) that its continued funding ‘is dependent on the continued support of the White House and Congress’.
Whatever one might think of the organisations listed above, it is hard under these circumstances to view Bellingcat as being wholly independent of parties interested in the outcome of the investigation into Douma. I would not bother much with this were it not that those who seek to draw attention from the OPCW leak are much given to making baseless accusations that I am an Assad apologist ( a claim I have shown in detail here
to be garbage) or in some way working to further the policy aims of Russia, whose leader I frequently describe as a sinister tyrant. I defy them to produce one tenth of an ounce of evidence for these smears. By contrast, Bellingcat quite openly acknowledges the receipt of funds from an organisation which is itself openly supported by the United States government. I cannot see how it is wrong for me to mention this .
Bellingcat began:
Over the weekend, WikiLeaks released an email from an employee within the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) indicating that the OPCW “misrepresents the facts he and his colleagues discovered on the ground”. This email has since been used to call into question the impartiality and effectiveness of the OPCW’s conclusion about the alleged chemical weapon attack in Douma, Syria.
****This is partly accurate. The story was also covered by The Mail on Sunday of London and La Repubblica of Rome. I cannot speak for La Repubblica, though I think it is known in its country as a reputable organisation. But the Mail on Sunday based its story on its own investigations and checks, and its own interviews and examination of documents etc. It seems to me that the coverage by two major national newspapers (of such disparate politics) is worth mentioning. By mentioning only Wikileaks at this point, and so ignoring the fact that experienced editors and journalists, working under the constraints of professional journalism, examined the material and judged it to be worthy of prominent coverage. The Bellingcat document here begins a general practice of leaving out things and misunderstanding things that it does not like or want to understand.
Bellingcat:
However, a comparison of the points raised in the letter against the final Douma report makes it amply clear that the OPCW not only addressed these points, but even changed the conclusion of an earlier report to reflect the concerns of said employee.
However, a comparison of the points raised in the letter against the final Douma report makes it amply clear that the OPCW not only addressed these points, but even changed the conclusion of an earlier report to reflect the concerns of said employee.
** PH: Apart from the words ‘a’, and ‘the’, everything in the above paragraph is, to put it politely, mistaken. Bellingcat have been so anxious to trash the leak from the OPCW that they have (as many did when the attack was first released) rushed to judgment without waiting for the facts. More is known by the whistleblowers of the OPCW than has yet been released, but verification procedures have slowed down its release. More documents will, I expect, shortly come to light.
One, which I have seen, is very interesting. It is a memorandum of protest, written many months after the e-mail of protest published at the weekend. This was sent to the OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias (there is some doubt about whether it ever reached him) by an OPCW investigator (one of those who actually visited Douma), on 14th March 2019. It has reached me through hitherto reliable sources. This is nearly two weeks *after* the release of the ‘final’ report (on Friday 1st March 2019) which is supposed to have resolved the doubts of the dissenters. Here is a link to that report
Anyone interested may also read my analysis of it,
made at the time, in which I pointed out how very weak and equivocal it in fact was. But not as weak as it should have been, as we shall see.
The 14th March memorandum suggests that the contention made above is incorrect.
Crucially, its author states that ‘there are about 20 inspectors who have expressed their concern over the current situation’. If this is so on 14thMarch, how can it be true to say that their concerns had been allayed by the final (1stMarch 2019) report?
He also points out that the FFM constituted to create the final report was quite different from the one which went to Douma in April 2018 to create the original report (which, as we now know, was first severely redacted and then censored again to exclude key information on the spectacularly low levels of Chlorine found at the site).
This new ‘core team’ wrote the 1st March report. But only one of them, a paramedic, was in Douma for the original investigation. The others, the writer says, had ‘only operated in Country X’ . (Note, the term ‘Country X’ almost certainly refers to Turkey, where those seeking refuge from the Syrian regime tend to be found).
I put this document to the OPCW. The OPCW media office yesterday (27th November 2019) declined to comment on the memo, and said it would not do so.
The author of the memo says bluntly that the FFM report ‘does not reflect the views of all the team members that deployed to Douma’. He details his struggles to get his own evidence even considered for publication. The author points out that he is expert in metallurgy, chemical engineering (including pressure vessel design) artillery and defence R&D.
He describes how after working on analysis of the ballistics of the two gas cylinders found at the site, ‘I found that I was excluded from the work, for reasons not made clear’. Yet he continued with his work, seeking access to ‘sophisticated engineering computational tools’ and involving ‘two highly esteemed institutions’ which were ‘selected for their impartiality and credibility’.
He had been denied requests to review the draft report
There was then ‘continued reluctance from the [Fact Finding Mission] to receive my report’. Soon after he deposited his work for collection, he found that the report had been published anyway but without his input.
He notes that ‘I must stress that I hold no opinion, interest or strong views on the technical part of the matter, nor any interest in the political outcomes. My interest is in sound technical rigour; the science, engineering and facts will speak for themselves. Obviously my current assessment is that the FFM report is incomplete, for reasons that will become clear once my report is properly assessed by experts’.
It seems reasonable to me (though my copy of the memorandum does not carry the name of the author and I do not know who the author is) to speculate that this memorandum may be connected with the famous Henderson report on how the gas cylinders, found at Douma, came to be where they were. Here is that report:
The OPCW, by mounting and announcing a leak inquiry into the publication of this document, quickly confirmed to me that it was authentic, see
On this we know, from the OPCW , that the dispute took place. And it took place *after* the issue of the supposedly consensual 1st March report. Director-General Arias released the text https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/06/Remarks%20of%20the%20Director-General%20Briefing%20for%20States%20Parties%20on%20Syrian%20Arab%20Republic%20Update%20on%20IIT-FFM-SSRC-DAT.pdf
of a briefing he had given about this to the States Parties (the countries which support the OPCW) to the OPCW two weeks earlier. Sr Arias did not name Ian Henderson, an OPCW expert (whose name was on the leaked copy of the report). But Sr Arias did confirm that the report was written by an OPCW staff member who was ‘a liaison officer at our Command Post Office in Damascus.’
Ludicrously, it was then claimed that, because Henderson’s results could be interpreted to reach conclusions on who was to blame for the attack (not part of the FFM’s mandate) that his work belonged in another report being compiled by another body.
It was suggested that the Henderson assessment went outside the FFM mandate. So it was announced that it would now be submitted to the Investigations and Identification Team (IIT) a new part of the OPCW created to attribute responsibility (which the OPCW itself has previously not been allowed to do).
This Alice-in-Wonderland formulation only worked one way. Henderson himself made no attribution of blame. It was not his job to do so. He merely produced an analysis which others could use, if they so chose, to do so. That is surely in the nature of much that the OPCW has always done, long before the IIT was set up. Differing material, which equally implied an attribution of blame in the opposite direction, *was* included in the March 2019 FFM report.
I believe the US Supreme Court has a method of examining claims before it, known as ‘the Laugh Test’ . This means that where an intelligent person bursts out laughing when presented with a daft argument, that argument can safely be dismissed. Here, I think, is an example of an argument that fails the laugh test.
‘Bellingcat argues:
Which Report?
Unusually, in the case of the Douma attack, the OPCW issued two reports. The first was an interim report of 26 pages published on 6 July 2018. The second was a final report of 106 pages, published on 1 March 2019.
The letter released by Wikileaks, dated 22 June 2018, raises concerns about a “redacted report”. The points raised in the letter are clearly not present in the interim report; however, they are present, or else are in modified form, in the final report. Therefore, it appears that the so-called “redacted report” provided a basis or early draft for the final report.
PH: I modify. You distort. He censors
PH notes: Whatever does this stuff mean? This use of the word ‘modify’ to mean ‘change so as to alter its meaning and significance’ is language one expects from power, when it has been caught out in dishonesty (like saying ‘economical with the truth’ to mean suppression of the truth). It is certainly not a word which can be used by an independent investigator.
Since ‘Bellingcat’ have not seen the original unredacted report of June 2018 (about which the memo complains) how can they possibly assert either that ‘The points raised in the letter … are present, or else are in modified form, in the final report.’ Or that ‘the so-called “redacted report” provided a basis or early draft for the final report’. Also, what is this about ‘in modified form’.
If I alter an article which says ‘nothing important happened’ to read ‘something important happened’, I have not just ‘modified’ it. I have falsified it. If I ‘modify’ a calculation which shows a tiny, insignificant quantity, so that instead it shows a large and significant quantity, I am likewise falsifying it.
I am not going to do this line by line (that, I think, will come later in this process). I shall concentrate only upon one key complaint in the June 22 e-mail, reproduced here with my emphases:
‘The statement in paragraph 8.3 of the final conclusions "The team has sufficient evidence at this time to determine that chlorine, or another reactive chlorine-containing chemical, was likely released from cylinders", is highly misleading and not supported by the facts. The only evidence available at this moment is that some samples collected at Locations 2 and 4 were in contact with one or more chemicals that contain a reactive chlorine atom. Such chemicals could include molecular chlorine, phosgene, cyanogen chloride, hydrochloric acid, hydrogen chloride or sodium hypochlorite (the major ingredient of household chlorine-based bleach). Purposely singling out chlorine gas as one of the possibilities is disingenuous. It is also worth noting that the term "reactive chlorine-containing chemical" used in the redacted report is, in fact, inaccurate. It actually describes a reactive chemical that contains chlorine which itself (the chlorine) is not necessarily reactive e.g. chlorophenol. The original report uses the more accurate term "a chemical containing reactive chlorine.’
After the original unpublished report (the first report) was slashed and censored, so creating the second (redacted but unpublished) report, the scientists begged that at least this part should be retained, or something resembling it. They were promised that this would happen. But when the third report was published, on July 6 and the promise was broken.
Examine the original (interim) report of July 6 2018, here https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2018/en/s-1645-2018_e_.pdf
and search for mentions of chlorine. What do you find? ‘Various chlorinated organic chemicals were found in samples from Locations 2 and 4, along with residues of explosive. These results are reported in Annex 3. Work by the team to establish the significance of these results is ongoing.’ That is it. In the annex listing samples, nothing is said about trace or ppb quantities, nor is the point about the generic nature of the samples found (discoverable in household bleach and not in any way specifically related to chlorine gas) mentioned.
Why not? Well, we cannot say because we cannot read the minds of those responsible, or ask them. . What we do know is that somehow the vague wording ‘ ‘Various chlorinated organic chemicals were found in samples from Locations 2 and 4, along with residues of explosive. These results are reported in Annex 3. Work by the team to establish the significance of these results is ongoing.’ resulted in some quite remarkable media reports. These are explored here https://www.moonofalabama.org/2018/07/syria-many-media-lie-about-watchdog-report-on-the-chemical-attack-in-douma.html
Bellingcat and its supporters may not like the source, and I do not much like it myself, but it is a unique record, as far as I know, of the initial media response to the issue of the July 6 report. I have in fact checked its claims with Reuters and the BBC and they do not dispute what it says, though they say they later corrected the output. As a journalist of more than 40 years’ experience, I could speculate on how such errors might have come to be made. But I do not know, and intelligent readers will have to draw their own conclusions.
Now, in what way does the March 2019 report make up for this, and meet the complaints made in the June 2018 e-mail? It doesn’t. Search the March 2019 report … (here it is again https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/03/s-1731-2019%28e%29.pdf )
… for mentions of chlorine, and what do you find?
Well, here is what somebody found. But was it there? In this case, the BBC are *still* speculating about the use of chlorine gas, see
They say ‘The global chemical weapons watchdog has concluded chlorine is likely to have been used in an attack on the Syrian town of Douma last April.’
And on this occasion they apparently have *more* justification for this conclusion (though less than it first appears, as we shall see) than they did for what they said in July 2018. .
For the report says: ‘Based on the levels of chlorinated organic derivatives, detected in several environmental samples gathered at the sites of alleged use of toxic chemicals (Locations 2 and 4), which are not naturally present in the environment, the FFM concludes that the objects from which the samples were taken at both locations had been in contact with one or more substances containing reactive chlorine’.
(I have mnever understood how it gets from that to the claim that there are ‘reasonable grounds that the use of a toxic chemical as a weapon took place. This toxic chemical contained reactive chlorine. The toxic chemical was likely molecular chlorine’, I have never understood, as no reasoning process is provided. When claiming 'reasonable grounds', surely you should show your reasoning).
Now, can anyone explain to me how this wording is a step towards accepting this complaint: ‘Paragraph 8.2 states that "based on the high levels of various chlorinated organic derivatives, [...] detected in environmental samples". Describing the levels as "high" likely overstates the extent of levels of chlorinated organic derivatives detected. They were, in most cases, present only in parts per billion range, as low as 1-2 ppb, which is essentially trace quantities’?
Where in the March 2019 report is the evidence of levels of chlorine presence in quantities or character greater and more significant than those found by the original team?
The March 2019 (final) report refers to the ‘levels’ of chlorinated organic samples as a basis for its conclusion that chlorine had been used as a weapon. This must imply that levels were either high or – at a minimum - higher than background levels at the scene. Yet no evidence is produced to show that this was so. The March report suppresses the fact, stated in the 2018 e-mail, that the levels were low. It also does not provide any control sample data to show that the already low levels were not simply the same as the normal background levels for the area. The claim that chlorine may have been used as a weapon simply is not based on any specific finding in the report. It is an assertion.
Bellingcat:
Points Raised By The Letter
Point 1
This wording used in the letter is not present in the final report. The paragraph that matches this most closely in the final report is paragraph 2.16, which states, “it is possible that the cylinders were the source of the substances containing reactive chlorine.”
The decision to use the word “possible” in the final report is a significant change from the word “likely”, as it represents the level of confidence of the OPCW. By changing this particular phrase, the OPCW have in fact downgraded their confidence in possible conclusions about this event, which is in line with the employee’s concerns.
***PH asks : Is Bellingcat serious? This attempt to see concessions where none exist is a sign of the problems faced by those who have decided to believe something because it suits them - and therefore twist and bend every piece of evidence against that belief, to fit that belief. It is perfectly obvious that to say something is ‘possible’, in the face of experts who say that it is ‘highly misleading' and 'not supported by the facts’ is not to concede anything to them. It is to ignore them. The authors of the original uncensored report thought it ‘misleading’ and ‘unsupported by facts’ to suggest that it was *likely* that chlorine was released from the cylinders.
How then is it a concession to say instead that something described as misleading and unsupported by facts was *possible*? ‘Misleading’ and ‘unsupported by facts’ are absolute statements, politely suggesting actual untruth. The distance between them and either ‘possible’ *or* ‘likely’ is as wide as the Atlantic.
By contrast he distance between ‘likely’ and ‘possible’ is small, and both entail a belief in the truth of the statement that is being challenged. Whereas ‘misleading’ and ‘not supported by the facts’ entail a belief in the untruth of the statement. The two positions are contradictory, and not reconcilable, whether ‘likely’ or ‘possible’ is used.
In fact, if anything, ‘possible’ is a worse contradiction of the original report than ‘likely’. How can something unsupported by facts be said to be ‘possible’?
Point 2.1
Aside from the absurdity of claiming that “singling out chlorine gas” after an alleged chlorine gas attack in a country where multiple chlorine attacks have taken place is “disingenuous”, these points appear to have been addressed by the final report.
PH:
This is wilful misunderstanding of a high order.When the scientists say it is disingenuous, they are making a scientific, not a general or political point, about what can (and cannot) be deduced from hard evidence. Bellingcat needs to read the words ‘Such chemicals could include molecular chlorine, phosgene, cyanogen chloride, hydrochloric acid, hydrogen chloride or sodium hypochlorite (the major ingredient of household chlorine-based bleach). Purposely singling out chlorine gas as one of the possibilities is disingenuous’. What is being said is that it is disingenuous to argue that that the presence of chlorine in these common generic forms suggests in any meaningful way the *specific* presence of chlorine gas. The traces are so non-specific that chlorine gas *might* have created such traces. But so *might* a bottle of household bleach. From this, no conclusions about the use of gas can honestly be reached. No specific trace was found which pointed in that specific direction. It has nothing to do with any general point about whether such gas has been used by Assad. Once again, the prejudices of Bellingcat’s writers have closed their minds to the point of what they are reading. I will skip from here to the end, as the general point has been made about the Bellingcat report’s principal weakness, an unfettered prejudice, gravely lacking self-awareness.
Bellingcat
Paragraphs 8.6 – 8.19 in the final report include a “Discussion of analysis results”, which addresses the points raised in this paragraph of the letter, including explaining why many of the chemicals listed in this part of the letter could be excluded. It should be noted that this section is chemistry-heavy.
Point 2.2
The final report does not use the phrase “reactive chlorine containing chemical.” Instead, the phrase “chemical containing reactive chlorine” is used, as suggested in the letter.
Point 3
The final report does not include this mention of the gas being released from cylinders. As highlighted in Point 1, the final report concludes that it is “possible” the cylinders were the source of substances containing reactive chlorine.
Point 4
At no point does the final report describe the levels of various chlorinated organic derivatives as “high”. However, it does note in paragraph 7 of Annex 4 that these derivatives exist in the natural background, and that control samples were collected at locations not expected to have been exposed to chlorine gas for comparison.
Point 5
The final report includes a discussion of symptoms, along with an Epidemiological Analysis addressing these issues, on page 25.
It is also notable that the final report consulted “four toxicologists and one toxicologist and medical doctor” (paragraph 8.87) rather than the three toxicologists mentioned in the letter. It also notes in Annex 3 that further consultations with toxicologists took place in September and October 2018, months after this letter was written.
It is also notable that the final report consulted “four toxicologists and one toxicologist and medical doctor” (paragraph 8.87) rather than the three toxicologists mentioned in the letter. It also notes in Annex 3 that further consultations with toxicologists took place in September and October 2018, months after this letter was written.
It should also be noted that the final report also states that the FFM redeployed to conduct further interviews between 14-22 October.
Point 6
Although it is not precisely clear what the letter is referring to here, the final report devotes extensive and detailed discussion to the modelling of the impact of the two cylinders in pages 53-64. Three independent analyses by experts in three different countries were carried out, and all reached complimentary conclusions: the damage at the impact sites is consistent with the cylinders having fallen from height (Annex 12).
It should also be noted that the engineering studies were only received by the FFM in December 2018, well after the date of this letter. As such, any discussion about the point of impact on the date of this letter would have been superseded by the studies which came later.
It should also be noted that the engineering studies were only received by the FFM in December 2018, well after the date of this letter. As such, any discussion about the point of impact on the date of this letter would have been superseded by the studies which came later.
Point 7
The final report contains an extensive bibliography, including peer-reviewed scientific literature.
Conclusion
Although this letter appears to be at least superficially damaging to the OPCW, after reading the actual reports published by the OPCW it is clear that this letter is outdated and inapplicable to the final Douma report.
The letter refers to a “redacted report” that was either not published or was heavily updated before it became the final version of the report. The issues raised in the letter appear to have either been addressed with further work and research, or changed to reflect the concerns of the employee who wrote the letter.
The fact that the redacted report stated it was “likely” the cylinders were the source of the chlorine or reactive chlorine-containing chemical, while the final report said it was “possible that the cylinders were the source of the substances containing reactive chlorine” is significant. It demonstrates that the OPCW in fact downgraded their confidence in their conclusions in order to include the doubts raised by the author of the letter.
Based on this analysis, it is clear that WikiLeaks, the Daily Mail, La Repubblica, and Stundin have failed to understand the context of this letter and the final Douma report.
Based on this analysis, it is clear that WikiLeaks, the Daily Mail, La Repubblica, and Stundin have failed to understand the context of this letter and the final Douma report.
If the people covering this story had actually taken the time to read the letter and the FFM reports, they may well have chosen to publicize it in a very different manner.
PH: Conclusion? I don’t think so. It’s not over yet
The e-mail (why do Bellingcat call it a letter?) is deeply damaging to the OPCW’s upper deck. It is also most reassuring about the character of its actual foot soldiers. Their behaviour, seeking by polite and measured internal protest, to support and re-establish the truth, was courageous and principled, and deserves all our thanks. Their eventual decision to go public must have cost them a great deal of anxiety, and only illustrates how serious the matter is. These are non-political people whose expertise is in carefully searching for the truth, and reporting on it without fear or favour. Yet they have stepped into this storm. Knowing that spite and venom will be directed against them. This is bravery of a high order. I am personally shocked that so many in my trade of journalism have yet to recognise the courage and sacrifice involved, or to do it justice. I hope they will eventually recognise their plain duty to respect the courage and conscience of others, and report this matter properly.
It is not true that the problems raised by the e-mail have been addressed, as I have demonstrated above and as I believe future events and revelations will show beyond doubt. I have dealt fully with the nonsense about ‘likely’ and ‘possible’ and with the problems about the quantities of chlorine found.
AS for this ‘Based on this analysis, it is clear that WikiLeaks, the Daily Mail, La Repubblica, and Stundin have failed to understand the context of this letter and the final Douma report.
If the people covering this story had actually taken the time to read the letter and the FFM reports, they may well have chosen to publicize it in a very different manner.’
I am amused that these supposed experts cannot even tell the difference between The Mail on Sunday and the Daily Mail, and laughed out loud at their suggestion that I, who have been writing about this for years now, did not read or understand the context of the e-mail (which I went to such trouble to obtain, and had for nearly a fortnight of consideration and inquiry between reception and publication) and the March 2019 report (about which I am, as far as I know, the UK journalist to have written a lengthy analysis at the time of its publication) . I have a final question for any reader. Bellingcat has a high opinion of itself. But is it justified? Who thinks that Bellingcat, had they received the e-mail, would have published it? If we relied upon Bellingcat to know how the world works, how well-informed would we be?
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