De Zionistische Meute 17

The statesmen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, and every man will be glad of those conscience-soothing falsities, and will diligently study them, and refuse to examine any refutations of them; and thus he will by and by convince himself that the war is just, and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self-deception.

― Mark Twain, The Mysterious Stranger

The Israeli leaders now state freely, though usually unofficially, their demand for an ever-increasing empire. Their present boundaries are regarded by them as only a beachhead.

—CIA report, eleven months after Israel declared statehood, the term ‘present boundaries’ referring not to the borders Israel agreed to with Resolution 181, but to the Armistice Line, which included more than half the land designated for a Palestinian state and which was supposed to be temporary.

Om de lezer een helder inzicht te geven in het Joods-Israelisch fascisme citeer ik ditmaal wat uitgebreider uit de onthullende studie State of Terror. How terrorism created modern Israel (2016), geschreven door de Amerikaanse auteur en violist Thomas Suárez. Zich baserend op officiële documenten uit ondermeer eind jaren veertig en begin jaren vijftig van de vorige eeuw draagt de schrijver pagina’s lang bewijzen aan van de grootschalige terreur van de zionistische staat. Hoofdstuk 8 getiteld ‘Israel sans frontières’:

In the meantime, the systematic expulsion of non-Jews continued: 5,548 people were known to have been pushed over the Line in the half year ending January, 1951, or one every forty-seven minutes. Atrocities were white-washed by the government to the extent of forging victims’ statements, and ‘the brutality,’ Glubb (Sir John Bagot Glubb, Britse militair, geleerde en auteur. svh) noted, ‘is too general to be due only to the sadism of ordinary soldiers.’ For example, when on the night of 20 October (1950) IDF soldiers seized and tortured seven Palestinians in the (predominantly Christian) town of Jish in upper Galilee, some suffering severe injuries, they did so under the leadership of the local military governor. 

On the 2nd of November, an Israeli patrol of twelve soldiers penetrated about 400 metres into the West Bank and discovered three children from Yalo village collecting wood. One, an eight-year old girl, ran away at the sight of the patrol, escaping with a bullet in her thigh. The soldiers dragged away the other two children, a brother and sister aged twelve and ten, just as their father and uncle rushed to the scene. As described by Glubb, the children were forced into a ditch ‘and there butchered by one soldier with a sten-gun, while the rest of the patrol looked on. All this was plainly visible to their parents, standing helpless on the border only a few hundred yards away’

The boy was dead, with two bullets in his head and one in his shoulder. The girl — ten-year old Fakhriyeh Muhammad Ali Alayyan — had been shot seven times, but was still breathing. Once the soldiers moved on, her father carried her away, while the uncle carried the boy’s body. Fakhriyeh lived several hours, long enough to make a statement to the authorities. Like Wadi Araba, this atrocity was unusual in that it was witnessed, documented, and hit the British press, saddling Israel with another public relations problem. Questions were raised in the House of Commons, and the British Zionist establishment’s denials convinced few. Both the MAC and UN observers confirmed the incident as do, we know these decades later, internal Israeli records. As for the children’s village, in 1967 Israel ethnically cleansed and levelled Yalo, and today Israel’s Canada Park is built on its ruins and those of neighbouring Deir Ayyub and Beit Nuba.609 Yalo was targeted again less than three months later, on 29 January (1951). About sixteen Israeli soldiers descended on the village, approaching simultaneously from two directions while attacking with gunfire and grenades. The Tulkarm area was invaded by Israeli soldiers on the night on 2 February, and the following day the IDF killed three Palestinians in an attack on Saffa. The attacks grew bolder. On the night of 7 February, the soldiers invaded Sharafat, near Jerusalem, and blew up two houses, killing thirteen and wounding five. Twelve of those killed were women and children, and more than half were under fifteen. Beit Nuba and Emmaus — like Yalo, depopulated, razed, and confiscated by Israel sixteen years later—were next. ‘In the small hours of the morning of February 9,’ an Israeli patrol slipped about two kilometres inside Jordanian territory and attacked with Bren and Sten gun fire. They lobbed a grenade into a house, killing a man, his son, and his daughter. The targets were apparently random, and no explanation was offered.

At the MAC meeting later that day, the Israeli representative insisted that the Sharafat massacre be put at the bottom of the list of outstanding matters and walked out when this was not agreed to. The UN Information Officer confirmed that the attack was carried out by the Israeli army with Israeli army equipment, but that ‘in view of the Israeli delegation’s attitude there was no likelihood of M.A.C. being able to do anything in the matter.’

The bombing followed ‘a period of mounting attacks against Arab villages,’ as the Manchester Guardian reported. The paper, which had for years been staunchly pro-Zionist, now suggested that Israel was engaged in a ‘deliberate terroristic policy’ against the Palestinians, whereas Haaretz defended the attacks even as it acknowledged that the victims were innocent. Most tellingly, the ‘liberal’ Israeli paper claimed that events perhaps justified ‘the ultimate acquisition by Israel of Arab Palestine’ — that is, that Israel should annex the West Bank (which included East Jerusalem) and Gaza. 

A week after Sharafat, Jordanian officials, hoping to establish frontier cooperation, met in Jerusalem with Israel’s General Mordechai Maklef, a veteran of notorious Operation Hiram and soon to become Israeli Chief of Staff. When Maklef blamed the troubles on ‘infiltrators,’ the Jordanian representatives asked for more information. In response, the General ‘waved his arm in a noble gesture and said he was prepared to forgive us.’ Similarly, when at a MAC meeting the Israeli representative was asked why they made their allegations difficult for the MAC to investigate, he answered that since the Arabs knew what they did, why should Israel have to give any details?

The investigative journalist Colin Reid published an analysis of Israel’s interaction with the MAC in January (1951). His conclusions mirrored those of British government documents which he could not have seen. ‘As a matter of policy,’ he found, ‘details were not published or reported to the authorities. Only the charge was reported, and often too late to follow up.’ Israel constantly varied its claims, no two statements coinciding, with even the place names changing, so that a single claim appeared to be many claims. The allegations were filed as much as five months after the alleged incidents, and accompanied by artificial complaints of Palestinian aggression so as to ‘considerably obscure the issue’ to the press. Allegations never bore any date of origin or filing, rarely indicated the date of the act complained of, and were submitted in batches. In concert with these methods, Israel subjected Palestinian charges to ‘skillfully constructed procedural obstruction.’ 

On 2 April (1951), an Israeli patrol attacked four unarmed Palestinians collecting brushwood near Hebron; two escaped, but the bodies of the other two, aged eighteen and sixty-two, were later recovered by the MAC and IRC investigators. The IDF had cut off their sexual organs, skinned their buttocks, stabbed their sides with bayonets, and fired Sten gun rounds into their skulls.

Ben-Gurion, in New York in May (1951), reiterated Israel’s refusal to address the Palestinian land it had stolen beyond the Partition, and stated that it would take all the demilitarized zones as well. It was illegally draining Lake Hula in the north and continued to do so in defiance of the UN and threat of US sanctions, both of which had proven impotent. For a moment, it appeared that Israel had finally gone too far when it pirated aircraft parts from a US vessel, prompting the State Department to withhold arms exports. But this was quickly reversed: the US Congress instead prepared an unconditional grant of $150m to Israel, leading US Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin, then in Israel, to propose that the grant at least be contingent on Israel abiding by UN Resolutions. This, too, failed.

Idna, the target of several earlier attacks, was invaded again on 23 May. On the 11th of July, six to eight Israeli soldiers threw grenades into a house in Khirbet Najjar, located two kilometres inside the West Bank, killing an eight-year-old girl and wounding her brother and mother. An Israeli patrol penetrated to the south-eastern end of the Dead Sea on 25 September and blew up a house in Ghor Safi village, killing a twelve-year-old girl and her mother as they slept inside, and wounding a boy and two women.

A tragedy unfolded at the end of 1951 which, like the Wadi Araba incident (zie aflevering 16. svh), offers a glimpse inside the Israeli state’s need for a perceived external threat, terror in the service of expansionism, and manipulation of news and information. It began with the rape and murder of a young Israeli woman from the town of Malha. On the 4th of December, eighteen-year-old Lea Festinger disappeared. Twenty-two days later, her body was discovered in a cave. There were no tracks, as rains had flooded the area, no evidence, and no suspects. ‘Arab infiltrators’ were, however, automatically blamed. Similarly, when on the night of 30 December a woman in Jerusalem was murdered, the ‘notoriously overworked and understaffed’ Israeli police blamed ‘Arab infiltrators’ because someone claimed to have seen ‘men in torn khaki clothes’ in the area. Yet Israel’s domestic violent crime was so rampant that when Lea Festinger’s body was discovered, even the Jerusalem Post warned against using ‘infiltrators’ as scapegoats. Murder, rape and robbery in Israel have taken on alarming proportions. By no means all the incidents can be blamed on infiltrators or remnants of war psychosis among either immigrants or old timers: to a large extent this is merely a final consequence of the general and contemptuous disregard for law that has grown up around us... we are faced with a political situation in which no crime is too crude or pathological to be exploited.

‘Intolerance,’ as a British report noted, ‘explodes into violence with appalling ease in Israel,’ whose domestic domestic murder rate in 1951 was fourteen times England’s. Nonetheless, Jordan, aware that West Bankers were the presumed suspects, immediately asked Israel ‘for any evidence they might have about the murderer so that steps could be taken.’ Israel replied that there ‘was no need for Arabs to bother with evidence,’ since ‘we have our own methods of dealing with this sort of thing.’ 

1952. Those ‘methods’ came to pass on the night of Eastern Christmas Eve, 6 January: three attacks surrounding Bethlehem, timed to coincide with the start of the great midnight procession to the Church of the Nativity in this predominantly Christian area. One Israeli patrol blew up a house near Beit Jala, about two kilometres west of Bethlehem. Another patrol bombed two houses one kilometre north of Bethlehem, near the Greek Orthodox monastery of Mar Elias. A third IDF patrol crossed three kilometres of no man’s land in the Latrun Salient and opened fire on the village of Imwas. (Fifteen years later, Imwas would be levelled on the orders of Yitzhak Rabin.) It happened that some British MPs had come for the Christmas Eve procession, and so there were early outside witnesses to the carnage. The MAC’s US Commander E. H. Hutchison was there as well: ‘No person could live long enough,’ he wrote, ‘to become calloused to such a sight’ of massacred men, women, and children.

Israeli leaflets, printed on pink paper by cyclostyle, were in Beit Jala and Mar Elias, announcing that the attacks were in retaliation for the rape and murder of the Jewish girl on 4 December. The leaflets were identical except for the name of the accused village.

Israel, to be sure, had never named any suspects for Lea Festinger’s murderer, and had still never named any suspects when at the next MAC meeting the Jordanian representative put on record the names of the victims of the Christmas Eve massacre. Upon presenting the Committee with the names of the dead, an extraordinary fraud took place right in front of the MAC: 

‘Some minutes after the occupants of the demolished houses were named in the MAC by the Jordan representative, one of the Israeli representatives left the room and returned with a slip of paper on which were written three names, allegedly those of the Jewish girl’s murderers: they were those of the householders just previously named by Jordan as the victims of the assault. The Senior Israeli delegate then said: ‘We have the names of the people who carried out [the rape and murder], but I did not want to pass them on before.’

And so Israel posthumously framed three of its Christmas eve victims for Lea Festinger’s rape and murder. Spreading the lie to the media, Israel announced that the houses blown up on Christmas Eve ‘appeared to be inhabited by the three infiltrators whose names were given [by Israel to] the Jordanian delegation as responsible.’ When Ramati, the Israeli representative, was pushed to find those responsible for the massacre, he replied that the MAC only provides for prevention. Nor could Israel make any attempt to discover the young woman’s actual murderer, as the attempt itself would contradict its official lie. The MAC chairman suspected that the Christmas eve atrocities were ‘intended to provoke Arab hostilities which would be capitalized abroad by the Israelis. 

A week after the Bethlehem massacre, on 13 January, a father and son working on the lands of Cremisan, the area near Bethlehem known for its wine, were seized by nine IDF soldiers, ‘taken into the Israel area, and butchered.’ Five days later, three villagers working a vegetable plot (on the Israeli side, but under agreement) were murdered in similar fashion, ‘marched a few hundred metres further into Israel [that is, to make them ‘infiltrators’] and gunned down at point-blank range.’ The same formula was used in the murder of two more villagers the next day. Between February and May, thirty-nine Israeli attacks on the West Bank were recorded, involving the murder of civilians, including farmers asleep in their field, the targeting of UN observers, theft of livestock, and kidnappings.

On the 7th of May, about a kilometer inside Jordanian territory between Qaffin and Nazlot Issa, an Israeli patrol of about 32 soldiers opened fire on harvesters at a range of about 200 yards, among them a sixty-year-old woman too feeble to run. On the night of 20 May, an Israel patrol laid a delayed-action mine against a house on the outskirts of Qaffin village (northwest Palestine). When it exploded at about 1:30 in the morning, a sixteen-year-old boy and two children aged five and six were killed outright, and a baby of one and a half years died while being extracted from the rubble. The father was asleep in his field, having left the teenage son to take care of the family in his absence. As in distant Bethlehem, leaflets were left behind announcing that the bombing was retribution for the murder of a Jewish girl (presumably Lea Festinger). A senior Belgian UN observer joined those warning that Israel was attacking in order to create a war: Jews are deliberately working up the tension and the shooting with a view to provoking the Arab Legion to retaliate and then blaming us and starting up the war again.

Relations between Israel and the United Nations reached a crisis in June of 1952 over Mt. Scopus, an area in northeast Jerusalem that lay on the Palestinian side of the Armistice Line but which Israel occupied. The UN tolerated Israel’s occupation of Mt. Scopus with the stipulation that it not be militarized. Israel, however, was digging trenches along the hill, defying UN demands that it stop, and smuggling in weapons. It was caught on 4 June, when one of its convoys heading for Mt. Scopus was stopped at the UN border about 200 yards, among them a sixty-year-old woman too feeble to run. On the night of 20 May, an Israel patrol laid a delayed-action mine against a house on the outskirts of Qaffin village (northwest Palestine). When it exploded at about 1:30 in the morning, a sixteen-year-old boy and two children aged five and six were killed outright, and a baby of one and a half years died while being extracted from the rubble. The father was asleep in his field, having left the teenage son to take care of the family in his absence. As in distant Bethlehem, leaflets were left behind announcing that the bombing was retribution for the murder of a Jewish girl (presumably Lea Festinger). 

A senior Belgian UN observer joined those warning that Israel was attacking in order to create a war: Jews are deliberately working up the tension and the shooting with a view to provoking the Arab Legion to retaliate and then blaming us and starting up the war again.625 Relations between Israel and the United Nations reached a crisis in June of 1952 over Mt. Scopus, an area in northeast Jerusalem that lay on the Palestinian side of the Armistice Line but which Israel occupied. The UN tolerated Israel’s occupation of Mt. Scopus with the stipulation that it not be militarised. Israel, however, was digging trenches along the hill, defying UN demands that it stop, and smuggling in weapons. It was caught on 4 June, when one of its convoys heading for Mt. Scopus was stopped at the UN border crossing at the Mandelbaum Gate, and a UN guard dipped a test rod into one of the oil drums it was transporting. The rod struck a ‘heavy object concealed beneath.’ As the drum was removed from the truck to be checked, the Israeli driver pretended to have engine trouble, pushed the truck to make it roll toward the Israeli check post, jumped in, and escaped with the rest of the evidence. After much deliberation, the decision was made to open the impounded barrel in front of international observers and representatives from Israel and Jordan, on 20 June at half past noon. For safekeeping until then, it was rolled into the bathroom of the MAC headquarters and locked. That meeting, however, never took place. As described by US Commander Hutchison, at noon on the appointed day, the door of the MAC office burst open and three Israeli officers, with pistols drawn and escorted by two enlisted men who were holding Thompson sub-machine guns at the ready, marched into the room.

The Israelis commandeered the UN office, prevented the examination of the barrel, replaced the MAC’s key to the bathroom with their own, kept guard over UN personnel and answered the UN’s phones. The MAC itself now hijacked by Israel, MAC personnel kept vigil by the door, taking turns throughout the night to prevent any action going unwitnessed. Israel’s next move was its smokescreen: it issued an Aide Memoire requesting ‘the immediate replacement of the United Nations Personnel involved in this disreputable incident.’ 

A new date was set — 10 July — to open the barrel, now with the presence of the US’ General William Riley, Commander of the UN Truce Supervision Organization. With Riley in charge, Israel had no objections to proceeding. Riley had the dip rod inserted again, confirmed that it concealed contraband, but then to everyone’s astonishment, he declared that it would be returned to Israel unopened — ‘against violent opposition by [MAC chairman Colonel] de Ridder and Sloan and against the views of almost his whole staff.’ As Hutchison explained, Riley’s action made the entire peace-keeping endeavor meaningless, since Israel’s violations carried no risk. Foreseeing the barrel incident ‘win’ as another watershed in Israeli intransigence, the British in Jerusalem warned the Foreign Office that ‘the Israeli use of force has thus paid handsome dividend and I fear the consequences may be far-reaching.’

Describing Israel’s occupation of Mt. Scopus as ‘a dangerous anomaly,’ officials wrote in despair of their inability inability ‘to bring the Israelis to heel (hen dwingen zich aan de regels te houden. svh).’  Some advocated the suspension of UN convoys to Mt. Scopus until Israel cooperated, but this, too, was not pursued because of the surety that Israel would respond with force. In the words of Commander Hutchison — who by his own account had gone to the Middle East pro-Israel — ‘had the Jordanians been guilty of these deeds, Israel would have spelled them out in banner headlines from Baghdad to Fresno.’

Israel’s ‘passive’ ethnic cleansing of non-Jews continued. ‘Israel intends to make it so uncomfortable for its remaining Arabs,’ the CIA reported in late 1952, ‘that eventually they will all try to emigrate.’ Among those ‘passive’ methods, Bedouin were forced to sign ‘requests’ to move to Jordan under the threat of expulsion to unproductive desert if they refused. In another method, witnessed by Hutchison, the IDF broke and ignited benzene-filled beer bottles over the humps of their camels, burning the animals alive in order to make even the hides unsalvageable. Moshe Dayan stuck to the script of an existential threat: According to future Jerusalem mayor Kollek, Dayan had his soldiers chase Bedouin in jeeps, firing at them and killing several in order to provoke them to attack army patrols — which ‘was what Dayan was looking for,’ giving him the ‘reason’ to wage a ‘mopping up campaign.’ The commandeering of Palestinian homes by Jewish Israelis continued with impunity, Israel maintaining that it ‘cannot evict a Jew from a house’ once he has gone inside it. 

The stranger-than-fiction intrigue of Mt. Scopus continued on the night of 13 December (1952), when Israeli soldiers were caught running an arms cache past the border. They fled, leaving behind six US Army manpacks filled with 1,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 2,000 rounds of stengun ammunition, six 81 mm mortar shells, six 2” mortar shells, three 90-volt dry batteries, 24 hand grenades, and a tin of detonators — all destined for Mt. Scopus. Twice during the night, the Israelis attempted to retrieve the arms, but were driven back. Throughout the next day (14th), the MAC tried to contact Israeli authorities, but were continually told that no one ‘was available’ to speak to them, the very UN-administered peace-keeping mission that had just foiled their nocturnal arms-running to occupied territory. The ritual obfuscation came the following day, when Israel filed what Hutchison described as ‘perhaps the most ridiculous allegation received during the history of the [MAC] mission’: the culprits were not Israeli, but ‘Jordanian marauders’ who had stolen ammunition from an Israeli army dump and wounded an Israeli soldier. To the MAC’s credit, it nonetheless took the allegation seriously, and had the Israelis submit evidence and walk the investigators through the alleged events. After the Israeli claim proved farcical and the MAC condemned Israel for the breach of the Armistice, Israel responded by launching an international campaign against Chairman de Ridder. Soon, de Ridder needed a bodyguard. The harassment continued, and although de Ridder stood firm, the UN did not. Under what Hutchison referred to as Israel’s constant pressure on the UN, he was eventually removed from his position. The Israeli ‘smokescreen of words’ was described by John Wilson upon leaving the British delegation in Tel Aviv in mid-1953. Israeli officials have built up ‘a sickening jargon... the air is thick with propaganda… Misleading stories and press campaigns are worked up [and] censorship stifles the dissemination of honest news.’ Several observers noted how the Israeli state, following in the footsteps of the Jewish Agency, conjured such hysteria with its manipulation of the news that it found itself having to take action against the threats it had invented.

Precies dezelfde tactieken om de slachtoffers buiten spel te zetten, gebruikt het criminele zionisme, nu 70 jaar later, nog steeds. En nog steeds wordt de zelfbenoemde ‘Joodse staat,’ daarin gesteund door de even misdadige joodse lobby in de VS en Europa en door de westerse elite. Inderdaad, al in 1952 wist de CIA dat:

Israel intends to make it so uncomfortable for its remaining Arabs, that eventually they will all try to emigrate,

en inderdaad, ook toen al hadden ‘Israelische functionarissen’ een ‘sickening jargon’ gecreëerd, en was ‘the air thick with propaganda… Misleading stories and press campaigns are worked up [and] censorship stifles the dissemination of honest news.’  

Deze genocidale politiek is één van de grootste misdaden van na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. En het meest wrange is dat de nazaten van Joodse slachtoffers van de nazi’s vandaag de dag even misdadig handelen als de SS en de Gestapo. Een ieder die, net als de voormalig overtuigde communist Constant Vecht, op de een of andere manier de aandacht probeert af te leiden van dit Joods-Israelisch fascisme, deugt niet. Illustrerend voor de houding van Vecht is dat Jaap Hamburger, als joodse voorzitter van Een Ander Joods Geluid, de zelfbenoemde ‘half-jood’ Constant Vecht op donderdag 8 augustus 2019 moest uitleggen dat: 

zo goed als het concept van het communisme helaas voorgoed gecompromitteerd is door de praktijk ervan, zo is het concept van het zionisme gecompromitteerd door de praktijk. Met één verschil: communistische staten bestaan niet meer, maar de zionistische staat woekert maar door.

https://www.facebook.com/jaap.hamburger/posts/10157309553969318?comment_id=10157316536139318&notif_id=1565444694378445&notif_t=comment_mention  

Meer over het Joods fascisme in Israel de volgende keer.