De vanzelfsprekendheid van deze kop is opmerkelijk, zo wordt terreur acceptabel gemaakt bij het grote publiek. Zou er ooit in een westerse krant geschreven worden: 'Live with a nuclear Israel or Strike?' Nee, natuurlijk niet. En dat bepaalt ook meteen de kleur van dit artikel in Le Monde:
'Live With a Nuclear Iran or Strike?
By Laurent Zecchini
Le Monde
The United States is keeping two irons in the fire with Iran. It is exploring the diplomatic route and economic sanctions, while sending strong signals of its determination to choose the military option: The two American aircraft carriers in the Arabian-Persian Gulf are a modern illustration of "gunboat diplomacy." If Tehran's nuclear headlong rush must be stopped, which - the United States or Israel - should take care of it? Knowing that a bombing campaign will not succeed in razing all of Iran's ballistic missile sites, still less in eradicating the knowledge of its nuclear experts, and knowing that such an offensive will trigger Iranian reprisals against Israel and American interests in the region, what can the purpose of such an operation be?
If the risks of a military intervention exceed its advantages, can Israel live with a nuclear Iran? Those uncertainties characterize the Israeli population and its officialdom for which the Iranian question is becoming a national obsession. The approach of Ephraim Kam, a recognized expert on Iranian questions at Tel-Aviv's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), is all the more original in this context: Examining all the scenarios, he demonstrates a moderation that contrasts strongly with the bellicose accents of certain American and Israeli officials.
By presenting Tehran as one of the troublemakers fomenting problems in Iraq, the American administration does its utmost to designate a scapegoat for its own fiasco, while simultaneously bolstering its indictment against Iran. It's a situation that recalls the foreplay for the launch of the American "Iraqi Freedom" operation in March 2003. Yet Washington refrains from going all the way. First of all, because the development of the political situation in Tehran could open new negotiation prospects, and then, because the effectiveness of military strikes is unpredictable.
If that scenario should occur, the destruction of Iran's nuclear installations would have to be envisaged first, before Tehran reaches the threshold of atomic weapons production. After that, Iran would have a potent means of blackmail at its disposal, and it is probable that the international community would concede the Iranian nuclear fait accompli as it has done for India and Pakistan, briefly sanctioned after their 1998 nuclear tests.
How much time does that leave? The Israelis deem that Iran is three to four years away from the bomb (but they add that that estimate does not take into account a probable secret nuclear program), while American experts talk about five to eight years.
The goal of such a military intervention would have to be modest: At best, the international community would gain a respite, betting that the Iranian population would hold the Mullahs' regime responsible for the suffering and destruction it would have been subjected to. On the other hand, it is more likely that such a strike would favor a reflexive national unity against the "aggressor." The Israelis would much prefer that the Americans take on a complex and risky military operation. They deem that the United States is better equipped operationally and no doubt also to confront the diplomatic consequences of such an intervention. For the Hebrew state, the question is a veritable strategic challenge: Iranian nuclear sites are dispersed, often buried and situated 1,200 to 1,500 kilometers from Israel's territory, a distance that will be significantly increased should IDF planes have to go around Jordanian, or even Iraqi, air space.'
If the risks of a military intervention exceed its advantages, can Israel live with a nuclear Iran? Those uncertainties characterize the Israeli population and its officialdom for which the Iranian question is becoming a national obsession. The approach of Ephraim Kam, a recognized expert on Iranian questions at Tel-Aviv's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), is all the more original in this context: Examining all the scenarios, he demonstrates a moderation that contrasts strongly with the bellicose accents of certain American and Israeli officials.
By presenting Tehran as one of the troublemakers fomenting problems in Iraq, the American administration does its utmost to designate a scapegoat for its own fiasco, while simultaneously bolstering its indictment against Iran. It's a situation that recalls the foreplay for the launch of the American "Iraqi Freedom" operation in March 2003. Yet Washington refrains from going all the way. First of all, because the development of the political situation in Tehran could open new negotiation prospects, and then, because the effectiveness of military strikes is unpredictable.
If that scenario should occur, the destruction of Iran's nuclear installations would have to be envisaged first, before Tehran reaches the threshold of atomic weapons production. After that, Iran would have a potent means of blackmail at its disposal, and it is probable that the international community would concede the Iranian nuclear fait accompli as it has done for India and Pakistan, briefly sanctioned after their 1998 nuclear tests.
How much time does that leave? The Israelis deem that Iran is three to four years away from the bomb (but they add that that estimate does not take into account a probable secret nuclear program), while American experts talk about five to eight years.
The goal of such a military intervention would have to be modest: At best, the international community would gain a respite, betting that the Iranian population would hold the Mullahs' regime responsible for the suffering and destruction it would have been subjected to. On the other hand, it is more likely that such a strike would favor a reflexive national unity against the "aggressor." The Israelis would much prefer that the Americans take on a complex and risky military operation. They deem that the United States is better equipped operationally and no doubt also to confront the diplomatic consequences of such an intervention. For the Hebrew state, the question is a veritable strategic challenge: Iranian nuclear sites are dispersed, often buried and situated 1,200 to 1,500 kilometers from Israel's territory, a distance that will be significantly increased should IDF planes have to go around Jordanian, or even Iraqi, air space.'
Lees verder: http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3232,36-879478,0.html Of in het Engels: http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/030707G.shtml
Geen opmerkingen:
Een reactie posten