Her thesis is that the great evils in history generally, and the Holocaust in particular, were not executed by fanatics or sociopaths, but by ordinary people who accepted the premises of their state and therefore participated with the view that their actions were normal.
Explaining this phenomenon, Edward S. Herman has emphasized the importance of 'normalizing the unthinkable.' According to him, 'doing terrible things in an organized and systematic way rests on 'normalization.' This is the process whereby ugly, degrading, murderous, and unspeakable acts become routine and are accepted as 'the way things are done.'
Over Hannah Arendt's Banality of Evil.
Negentien jaar geleden geleden, juli 1996, verscheen in The New York Review of Books het opzienbarende essay Europe: The Grand Illusion van Tony Judt, waarin de prominente Britse historicus voorspelde dat na het uiteenvallen van de Sovjet- Unie 'The likelihood that the European Union can fulfill its own promises of ever-closer union, while remaining open to new new members on the same terms, is slim indeed. In the first place, the unique historical circumstances of the years between 1945 and 1989 cannot be reproduced.' Judt zette plausibel uiteen dat
Europe's basic economic circumstances have also changed. For a generation following the announcement of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, Western Europe experienced an unprecedented combination of high growth and near-full employment. From this was born the belief, reflected in a series of optimistic economic forecasts from the OECD, that the cycle of crises that had marked the European economy for the previous half century had been broken for good. The great oil crisis of 1974 should have put an end to such illusions. In 1950 Western Europe depended upon oil for only 8.5 percent of its energy needs; most of the rest was still provided by coal, Europe's indigenous and cheap fossil fuel. By 1970 oil accounted for 60 percent of European energy consumption. The quadruple increase in oils prices thus put an end to a quarter of a century of cheap energy, sharply and definitively raising the cost of manufacture, transport, and daily living… Neither the German nor any other Western European economy has ever been the same again.
The effect of this on the European Community (later Union) itself was severe… After 1974 the stalled economy of Europe threatened them all with increasing unemployment, slow growth, and sharply rising prices. There has thus been an unanticipated return to earlier woes. Far from being able to offer advantages of its economic miracle to an ever-expanding community of beneficiaries, 'Europe' van no longer even be sure of being able to provide them to itself. The events of 1989 brought this problem into the open, but the source of the Union's inaudibility to address it can be found fifteen years earlier.
De Nederlandse mainstream-opiniemakers daarentegen beseffen zelfs nu nog niet welke impact de olieprijsstijging heeft gehad op de ingrijpende verandering van het Keynesianisme in het Neoliberalisme, waarbij de productie grotendeels werd overgeheveld naar de lage lonen landen om zodoende de kapitalistische noodzaak van eeuwig stijgende winsten en groei, ongestoord door te laten gaan. Probleem is dat daardoor de naoorlogse westerse economie niet meer in staat was om, zoals in de jaren '50 en '60, de 'close to full employment' te handhaven. Tony Judt:
In the 1960s the annual average employment through much of the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1960s the annual average unemployment rate in Western Europe was just 1.6 percent. In the following decade it rose to an annual average of 4.2 percent. By the late 1980s it had doubled again, with annual average rates of unemployment in the EC at 9.2 percent; by 1993 the figure stood at 11 percent.
Within these depressing figures one could see patterns that were more truly disturbing. In 1993 registered unemployment among men and women under twenty0five exceeded 20 percent in six European countries (Spain, Eire (Ierland. svh), France, Italy, Belgium, and Greece). The long-term unemployed accounted for more than one-third the total of those without work inn those six nations as well as the UK, the Netherlands, and the former West Germany. The redistributive impact of the inflation of the 1980s worsens the effect of these figures, widening the gap between people in work and the unemployed. What is more, upturns in the economy no longer have the effect, as they did during the boom years after 1950, of absorbing surplus labor and pulling up the worse-off. Who now remembers the fantasies of the 1960s, when it was blithely believed that production problems had been solved, and all that remained was to redistribute the benefits?
Het neoliberale proces heeft zich na 1996 met volle kracht voort gezet. De westerse economische elite werd daarbij geholpen door het beleid van deregulering en privatisering van zowel 'linkse' als 'rechtse' politici, van 'sociaal-democraten' en 'liberalen,' (what's in a name?). Na de val van het 'communisme' dacht de westerse 'politiek-literaire elite' zelfs dat aangezien het kapitalisme had overwonnen de mens 'het einde van de geschiedenis' meemaakte. Zo verkondigde in 1992 de Amerikaanse neoconservatieve profeet Francis Fukuyama:
De gebeurtenissen waarvan we getuigen zijn, betreffen niet enkel het einde van de Koude Oorlog, of het voorbijgaan van een specifiek tijdperk uit de naoorlogse geschiedenis, maar het einde van de geschiedenis als dusdanig: namelijk, het eindpunt van de ideologische evolutie van de mensheid en de universalisering van de Westerse liberale democratie als de uiteindelijke vorm van menselijk bestuur.
Maar net als de nazi-mythe van het duizendjarig rijk, was ook de neoliberale mythe twaalf jaar later alweer door de werkelijkheid ingehaald. Moderne mythes zijn door de dynamiek van de technologie geen lang leven beschoren. Desondanks verscheen in dat jaar 2004 de 1223 pagina's tellende bestseller In Europa. Reizen door de twintigste eeuw van de journalist Geert Mak als slotconclusie dat 'Europa als vredesproces een eclatant succes [was],' en opmerkelijker nog dat 'Europa als economische eenheid ook een eind op weg [is],' zonder ook maar één woord te wijden aan de revolutionaire neoliberale en neoconservatieve omwenteling die voor zijn ogen plaats vond. Uit zijn literatuurlijst blijkt dat hij geen één boek van de gezaghebbende Tony Judt had gelezen, wel vermeldt de bestseller-auteur in het register drie keer kort de naam van de gezaghebbende Britse historicus. Dat Mak tot een volstrekt tegengestelde conclusie komt is niet vreemd. Tony Judt was een historicus die zich breed oriënteerde, Mak is een journalist die, net als alle Nederlandse mainstream-journalisten, meent dat de geschiedenis bepaald wordt door politiek gebabbel. Daarentegen weet Judt, in de woorden van de Duitse intellectueel Enzensberger, dat
het lot niet, zoals Napoleon nog dacht, door de politiek, maar door de economie [wordt] bepaald. Die presenteert zichzelf als een hogere macht die door niets wordt tegengehouden, en zeker niet door de eeuwenoude tradities, mentaliteiten en constituties van de Europese landen.
Omdat Mak's 'weke sentiment,' (Michaël Zeeman) naadloos aansluit bij de tot niets verplichtende houding van de massa, gaan zijn vrijblijvende beweringen er bij het grote publiek even moeiteloos in als Gods woord in een ouderling. De postmoderne mens is op zoek naar 'hoop' en als zoon van een evangelisatie-dominee is Mak bereid tegen betaling die vertroosting te geven. In het poldermodel houdt men niet van intellectuelen die de werkelijkheid genadeloos beschrijven; zij worden gezien als controversieel, en niets wordt in de polder zo gehaat als onrust, de controverse verstoort de gezapigheid en de hiërarchie, omdat zij dreigt de corruptie van de status quo aan de kaak te stellen. En als 'het Westen zich' dan toch '[zal] moeten aanpassen,' omdat 'the facts change,' dan toch 'nog altijd bij voorkeur onder Amerikaanse leiding, als het een Democraat is,' aldus de in de polder zo geprezen Henk Hofland, die in de corrupte 'Hillary' de 'ideale kandidaat' ziet voor het Amerikaanse presidentschap. 'We' hebben in Nederland te maken met een ideologisch belaste intelligentsia die zich volledig heeft losgezongen van de werkelijkheid. Daardoor beseft ook de polderpers niet dat de neoliberale fase van het hoog-kapitalisme een structurele werkloosheid produceert, en dat dus steeds meer westerlingen overtollig worden, niet noodzakelijk meer zijn om het winstprincipe in stand te houden. Ondertussen voeren 'onze' gecorrumpeerde intellectuelen het hoogste woord, menen in al hun pedanterie dat zij voorbestemd zijn de rest van de mensheid te vertellen wat de waarheid is. De Hoflanden en de Makkianen zijn met hun neoconservatieve/neoliberale propaganda een gevaar voor de samenleving geworden. Daarom, nogmaals een citaat uit Tony Judt's essay Europe: The Grand Illusion, dat is herdrukt in een postuum verschenen essaybundel When the Facts Change. Essays 1995-2010:
Maar als gevolg van de neoliberale afbraakpolitiek van sociaal-democraten in samenwerking met liberalen nadert het moment waarop massaal sociaal verzet kan losbreken en Geert Mak en Henk Hofland hun aangeboren weerzin tegen losers de volle ruimte kunnen geven. Hofland heeft daarvoor al een aanzet gegeven toen hij verklaarde:
Burgerlijke ongehoorzaamheid betekent dat men iets weigert te doen en van die weigering de schuld geeft aan de overheid.
Op die manier proberen 'onze' collaborateurs de angel te verwijderen uit elk politiek protest en zullen zij de slachtoffers van het systeem, dat Geert Mak en Henk Hofland aanzien en geld opleveren, afschilderen als daders die een bedreiging vormen voor wat 'orde' heet, maar in werkelijkheid de wanorde van het hedendaags fascisme is. De geprivilegieerden van de gevestigde orde hoeven nooit burgerlijk ongehoorzaam te zijn. Dat spreekt voor zich. Dit feit weten de door de autoriteiten zo geprezen miljonair Mak en Hofland beter dan wie ook. De dag dat ik dit schrijf, las ik in het boek WORLD WAR II. The Unseen Visual History (2011):
The Nazi industrialization of death and fears of a nuclear apocalypse leave the hope of continual progress through science badly tarnished. The war years have taught people how to live surrounded daily by indiscriminate violence, torture, racial hatred, inhumanity, and lawlessness of all kinds. The very worst no longer comes as a surprise. Among the tragic heritage of World War II is the discovery of the banality of evil.
Niets hebben ze geleerd van de geschiedenis. 'Europa' moet nog 'meer aan defensie uitgeven' (Mak) 'om grenzen aan de Russische expansie te stellen' (Hofland). In diplomatie geloven ze niet. Voor de mainstream-opiniemakers geldt het adagium van Von Clausewitz dat '[o]orlog de voortzetting [is] van de politiek met andere middelen.' De hegemonie van het Westen moet gehandhaafd blijven, al zal het zijn eigen ondergang door middel van kernwapens betekenen. Hofland en Mak zijn de erfgenamen van de 'banality of evil,' het begrip dat Hannah Arendt in haar boek Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) introduceerde, en als volgt toelichtte:
De Zweedse journalist en auteur Sven Lindqvist plaatste de holocaust in een historisch context door er in zijn boek Exterminate all the Brutes (1997) erop te wijzen dat
Auschwitz de moderne industriële toepassing [was] van een uitroeiingspolitiek waarop de Europese overheersing van de wereld […] lang heeft gesteund.
De titel van zijn boek verwijst naar de zin uit Joseph Conrads meesterwerk Hart der Duisternis ‘verdelg al het gespuis.’ Lindqvist vraagt zich af waarom de westerse protagonist
'Kurtz zijn rapport over de beschavingstaak van de blanke man in Afrika met deze woorden eindigt?'
Hij merkt dan op:
Ik las Conrad als een profetische auteur die alle gruwelijkheden die in het verschiet lagen, voorzien had. Hannah Arendt wist beter. Zij zag dat Conrad over de genocides van zijn eigen tijd schreef. In haar eigen boek The Origens of Totalitarianism (1951), toonde ze hoe imperialisme racisme noodzakelijk maakte als het enig mogelijke excuus voor zijn daden […] Haar these dat nazisme en communisme van dezelfde stam komen is algemeen bekend. Maar velen vergeten dat zij ook de 'verschrikkelijke slachtpartijen' en het 'barbaarse moorden' van Europese imperialisten verantwoordelijk hield voor 'de zegevierende introductie van dergelijke pacificatiemiddelen in de alledaagse, respectabele buitenlandse politiek,' daarmee totalitarisme en zijn genocides producerend.
Lindqvist ontdekt gaandeweg dat de
Europese vernietiging van de 'inferieure rassen' van vier continenten de grond voorbereidde voor Hitlers vernietiging van zes miljoen joden in Europa […] Het Europese expansionisme, vergezeld als het was door een schaamteloze verdediging van het uitroeien, schiep manieren van denken en politieke precedenten die de weg baanden voor nieuwe wandaden, die uiteindelijk culmineerden in de gruwelijkste van alle: de Holocaust […] En toen hetgeen was gebeurd in het hart der duisternis werd herhaald in het hart van Europa, herkende niemand het. Niemand wilde toegeven wat iedereen wist. Overal in de wereld waar kennis wordt onderdrukt, kennis die als ze bekend zou worden gemaakt ons beeld van de wereld aan gruzelementen zou slaan en ons zou dwingen om onszelf ter discussie te stellen – daar wordt overal het Hart der Duisternis opgevoerd. U weet dat al. Net als ik. Het is geen kennis die ons ontbreekt. Wat gemist wordt is de moed om te begrijpen wat we weten en daaruit conclusies te trekken.
Bij gebrek aan 'moed' blijven Hofland en Mak de politieke 'stock phrases en self-invented cliché's' (Arendt) over de voortreffelijkheid van het Westen herhalen. Met halve waarheden en hele leugens, met schijnbare rechtvaardigingen en eufemismen slagen ze erin massale moord en uitbuiting voor het grote publiek 'somehow palatable' maken. Zoals Hannah Arendt overtuigend aantoonde kon '[d]espite all the efforts of the prosecution, everybody see that this man (Eichmann. svh) was not a ''monster.''' Integendeel zelfs, 'The sad truth is that most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be good or evil,' aldus Arendt over de 'droevige waarheid,' waarop ook Harry Mulisch stuitte tijdens het schrijven van zijn boek De Zaak 40/61:
Op zijn beurt kenmerkte de joodse jurist Abel Herzberg, die Bergen-Belsen overleefde, de moderne massamens als volgt:
Is hij slecht, die doodgewone man? Welnee. Is hij goed? Ook niet. Hij is geen van beide en beide tegelijk. Hij is een beetje wreed tegen een vlieg en sentimenteel tegen een muis… Scharführer X is niets. Hij is leeg. Men heeft hem idealisme toegedacht. Hij bezit dat niet. Men heeft hem opvattingen toegeschreven. Hij mist ze. Men heeft in hem tenminste vaderlandsliefde of nationaal enthousiasme willen ontdekken. Hij heeft er geen zweem van. Hij heeft een maag, een hart, longen, darmen, nieren en hij stelt er bijzondere prijs op, deze behoorlijk te doen functioneren. Dientengevolge zijn natje en zijn droogje hem heilig. Voor het overige is hij een ding. Leeg.
In een interview met mij zei Herzberg in 1984 over de moderne massamens:
Hij denkt niet meer uit zichzelf. Het is hem te moeilijk, het bezwaart hem, hij begrijpt het niet. Hij heeft een vijand nodig die hij kan haten, en daar leeft hij zich helemaal op uit. Dat is zijn leven, dat is de reden van zijn bestaan, dat is zijn ideaal. Zo was het en zo is het. Het is toch een schandaal, nietwaar, het is toch eenvoudig een menselijk schandaal dat na alles wat er is gebeurd wij nu bang moeten zijn voor een Derde Wereldoorlog, en wat voor een oorlog!
Het zijn deze stemmen die 'ons' keer op keer eraan helpen herinneren dat
Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality. (Arendt)
Het zijn mainstream-opiniemakers als Henk Hofland, Geert Mak en al die andere leden van de zelfbenoemde 'politiek-literaire elite' in de polder die de sfeer rijp maken voor het alles vernietigend geweld tegen Het Grote Kwaad in de wereld, of dit nu Russen of Iraniërs of Chinezen zijn, of welk volk dan ook dat niet onmiddellijk de westerse alleenheerschappij accepteert. En dit alles wordt gerechtvaardigd door leugens over democratie en mensenrechten:
Study: US is an oligarchy, not a democracy
17 April 2014
The US is dominated by a rich and powerful elite.
So concludes a recent study by Princeton University Prof Martin Gilens and Northwestern University Prof Benjamin I. Page.
This is not news, you say.
Perhaps, but the two professors have conducted exhaustive research to try to present data-driven support for this conclusion. Here's how they explain it:
Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on US government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence.
In English: the wealthy few move policy, while the average American has little power.
The two professors came to this conclusion after reviewing answers to 1,779 survey questions asked between 1981 and 2002 on public policy issues…
When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites and/or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover, because of the strong status quo bias built into the US political system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get it.
They conclude:
Americans do enjoy many features central to democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and association and a widespread (if still contested) franchise. But we believe that if policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans, then America's claims to being a democratic society are seriously threatened.
Eric Zuess, writing in Counterpunch, isn't surprised by the survey's results.
'American democracy is a sham, no matter how much it's pumped by the oligarchs who run the country (and who control the nation's "news" media),' he writes. 'The US, in other words, is basically similar to Russia or most other dubious 'electoral' 'democratic' countries. We weren't formerly, but we clearly are now.'
Meer over de westerse Grand Illusion en de Banality of Evil later.
Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%
THE FAT AND THE FURIOUS The top 1 percent may have the best houses, educations, and lifestyles, says the author, but “their fate is bound up with how the other 99 percent live.”
Americans have been watching protests against oppressive regimes that concentrate massive wealth in the hands of an elite few. Yet in our own democracy, 1 percent of the people take nearly a quarter of the nation’s income—an inequality even the wealthy will come to regret.
It’s no use pretending that what has obviously happened has not in fact happened. The upper 1 percent of Americans are now taking in nearly a quarter of the nation’s income every year. In terms of wealth rather than income, the top 1 percent control 40 percent. Their lot in life has improved considerably. Twenty-five years ago, the corresponding figures were 12 percent and 33 percent. One response might be to celebrate the ingenuity and drive that brought good fortune to these people, and to contend that a rising tide lifts all boats. That response would be misguided. While the top 1 percent have seen their incomes rise 18 percent over the past decade, those in the middle have actually seen their incomes fall. For men with only high-school degrees, the decline has been precipitous—12 percent in the last quarter-century alone. All the growth in recent decades—and more—has gone to those at the top. In terms of income equality, America lags behind any country in the old, ossified Europe that President George W. Bush used to deride. Among our closest counterparts are Russia with its oligarchs and Iran. While many of the old centers of inequality in Latin America, such as Brazil, have been striving in recent years, rather successfully, to improve the plight of the poor and reduce gaps in income, America has allowed inequality to grow.
Economists long ago tried to justify the vast inequalities that seemed so troubling in the mid-19th century—inequalities that are but a pale shadow of what we are seeing in America today. The justification they came up with was called “marginal-productivity theory.” In a nutshell, this theory associated higher incomes with higher productivity and a greater contribution to society. It is a theory that has always been cherished by the rich. Evidence for its validity, however, remains thin. The corporate executives who helped bring on the recession of the past three years—whose contribution to our society, and to their own companies, has been massively negative—went on to receive large bonuses. In some cases, companies were so embarrassed about calling such rewards “performance bonuses” that they felt compelled to change the name to “retention bonuses” (even if the only thing being retained was bad performance). Those who have contributed great positive innovations to our society, from the pioneers of genetic understanding to the pioneers of the Information Age, have received a pittance compared with those responsible for the financial innovations that brought our global economy to the brink of ruin.
Some people look at income inequality and shrug their shoulders. So what if this person gains and that person loses? What matters, they argue, is not how the pie is divided but the size of the pie. That argument is fundamentally wrong. An economy in which most citizens are doing worse year after year—an economy like America’s—is not likely to do well over the long haul. There are several reasons for this.
First, growing inequality is the flip side of something else: shrinking opportunity. Whenever we diminish equality of opportunity, it means that we are not using some of our most valuable assets—our people—in the most productive way possible. Second, many of the distortions that lead to inequality—such as those associated with monopoly power and preferential tax treatment for special interests—undermine the efficiency of the economy. This new inequality goes on to create new distortions, undermining efficiency even further. To give just one example, far too many of our most talented young people, seeing the astronomical rewards, have gone into finance rather than into fields that would lead to a more productive and healthy economy.
Third, and perhaps most important, a modern economy requires “collective action”—it needs government to invest in infrastructure, education, and technology. The United States and the world have benefited greatly from government-sponsored research that led to the Internet, to advances in public health, and so on. But America has long suffered from an under-investment in infrastructure (look at the condition of our highways and bridges, our railroads and airports), in basic research, and in education at all levels. Further cutbacks in these areas lie ahead.
None of this should come as a surprise—it is simply what happens when a society’s wealth distribution becomes lopsided. The more divided a society becomes in terms of wealth, the more reluctant the wealthy become to spend money on common needs. The rich don’t need to rely on government for parks or education or medical care or personal security—they can buy all these things for themselves. In the process, they become more distant from ordinary people, losing whatever empathy they may once have had. They also worry about strong government—one that could use its powers to adjust the balance, take some of their wealth, and invest it for the common good. The top 1 percent may complain about the kind of government we have in America, but in truth they like it just fine: too gridlocked to re-distribute, too divided to do anything but lower taxes.
Economists are not sure how to fully explain the growing inequality in America. The ordinary dynamics of supply and demand have certainly played a role: laborsaving technologies have reduced the demand for many “good” middle-class, blue-collar jobs. Globalization has created a worldwide marketplace, pitting expensive unskilled workers in America against cheap unskilled workers overseas. Social changes have also played a role—for instance, the decline of unions, which once represented a third of American workers and now represent about 12 percent.
But one big part of the reason we have so much inequality is that the top 1 percent want it that way. The most obvious example involves tax policy. Lowering tax rates on capital gains, which is how the rich receive a large portion of their income, has given the wealthiest Americans close to a free ride. Monopolies and near monopolies have always been a source of economic power—from John D. Rockefeller at the beginning of the last century to Bill Gates at the end. Lax enforcement of anti-trust laws, especially during Republican administrations, has been a godsend to the top 1 percent. Much of today’s inequality is due to manipulation of the financial system, enabled by changes in the rules that have been bought and paid for by the financial industry itself—one of its best investments ever. The government lent money to financial institutions at close to 0 percent interest and provided generous bailouts on favorable terms when all else failed. Regulators turned a blind eye to a lack of transparency and to conflicts of interest.
When you look at the sheer volume of wealth controlled by the top 1 percent in this country, it’s tempting to see our growing inequality as a quintessentially American achievement—we started way behind the pack, but now we’re doing inequality on a world-class level. And it looks as if we’ll be building on this achievement for years to come, because what made it possible is self-reinforcing. Wealth begets power, which begets more wealth. During the savings-and-loan scandal of the 1980s—a scandal whose dimensions, by today’s standards, seem almost quaint—the banker Charles Keating was asked by a congressional committee whether the $1.5 million he had spread among a few key elected officials could actually buy influence. “I certainly hope so,” he replied. The Supreme Court, in its recent Citizens United case, has enshrined the right of corporations to buy government, by removing limitations on campaign spending. The personal and the political are today in perfect alignment. Virtually all U.S. senators, and most of the representatives in the House, are members of the top 1 percent when they arrive, are kept in office by money from the top 1 percent, and know that if they serve the top 1 percent well they will be rewarded by the top 1 percent when they leave office. By and large, the key executive-branch policymakers on trade and economic policy also come from the top 1 percent. When pharmaceutical companies receive a trillion-dollar gift—through legislation prohibiting the government, the largest buyer of drugs, from bargaining over price—it should not come as cause for wonder. It should not make jaws drop that a tax bill cannot emerge from Congress unless big tax cuts are put in place for the wealthy. Given the power of the top 1 percent, this is the way you would expect the system to work.
America’s inequality distorts our society in every conceivable way. There is, for one thing, a well-documented lifestyle effect—people outside the top 1 percent increasingly live beyond their means. Trickle-down economics may be a chimera, but trickle-down behaviorism is very real. Inequality massively distorts our foreign policy. The top 1 percent rarely serve in the military—the reality is that the “all-volunteer” army does not pay enough to attract their sons and daughters, and patriotism goes only so far. Plus, the wealthiest class feels no pinch from higher taxes when the nation goes to war: borrowed money will pay for all that. Foreign policy, by definition, is about the balancing of national interests and national resources. With the top 1 percent in charge, and paying no price, the notion of balance and restraint goes out the window. There is no limit to the adventures we can undertake; corporations and contractors stand only to gain. The rules of economic globalization are likewise designed to benefit the rich: they encourage competition among countries for business, which drives down taxes on corporations, weakens health and environmental protections, and undermines what used to be viewed as the “core” labor rights, which include the right to collective bargaining. Imagine what the world might look like if the rules were designed instead to encourage competition among countries for workers. Governments would compete in providing economic security, low taxes on ordinary wage earners, good education, and a clean environment—things workers care about. But the top 1 percent don’t need to care.
Or, more accurately, they think they don’t. Of all the costs imposed on our society by the top 1 percent, perhaps the greatest is this: the erosion of our sense of identity, in which fair play, equality of opportunity, and a sense of community are so important. America has long prided itself on being a fair society, where everyone has an equal chance of getting ahead, but the statistics suggest otherwise: the chances of a poor citizen, or even a middle-class citizen, making it to the top in America are smaller than in many countries of Europe. The cards are stacked against them. It is this sense of an unjust system without opportunity that has given rise to the conflagrations in the Middle East: rising food prices and growing and persistent youth unemployment simply served as kindling. With youth unemployment in America at around 20 percent (and in some locations, and among some socio-demographic groups, at twice that); with one out of six Americans desiring a full-time job not able to get one; with one out of seven Americans on food stamps (and about the same number suffering from “food insecurity”)—given all this, there is ample evidence that something has blocked the vaunted “trickling down” from the top 1 percent to everyone else. All of this is having the predictable effect of creating alienation—voter turnout among those in their 20s in the last election stood at 21 percent, comparable to the unemployment rate.
In recent weeks we have watched people taking to the streets by the millions to protest political, economic, and social conditions in the oppressive societies they inhabit. Governments have been toppled in Egypt and Tunisia. Protests have erupted in Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain. The ruling families elsewhere in the region look on nervously from their air-conditioned penthouses—will they be next? They are right to worry. These are societies where a minuscule fraction of the population—less than 1 percent—controls the lion’s share of the wealth; where wealth is a main determinant of power; where entrenched corruption of one sort or another is a way of life; and where the wealthiest often stand actively in the way of policies that would improve life for people in general.
As we gaze out at the popular fervor in the streets, one question to ask ourselves is this: When will it come to America? In important ways, our own country has become like one of these distant, troubled places.
Alexis de Tocqueville once described what he saw as a chief part of the peculiar genius of American society—something he called “self-interest properly understood.” The last two words were the key. Everyone possesses self-interest in a narrow sense: I want what’s good for me right now! Self-interest “properly understood” is different. It means appreciating that paying attention to everyone else’s self-interest—in other words, the common welfare—is in fact a precondition for one’s own ultimate well-being. Tocqueville was not suggesting that there was anything noble or idealistic about this outlook—in fact, he was suggesting the opposite. It was a mark of American pragmatism. Those canny Americans understood a basic fact: looking out for the other guy isn’t just good for the soul—it’s good for business.
The top 1 percent have the best houses, the best educations, the best doctors, and the best lifestyles, but there is one thing that money doesn’t seem to have bought: an understanding that their fate is bound up with how the other 99 percent live. Throughout history, this is something that the top 1 percent eventually do learn. Too late.
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