The boy and the tank: The picture shows an Israeli tank which marched towards a Palestinian street to crush a demonstration by the Palestinians. It sprayed the demonstrators with bullets resulting in 14 serious injuries. Then Faris Odeh (13) charged against it. Faris started throwing stones at it. Faris later on died in unrelated incident. Haaretz bericht:
'It could explode at some stage'
By Tom Segev
The Qassam rockets being fired into Sderot and the surrounding area from the Gaza Strip have prompted calls to punish Gaza's population and even to expel a few thousand of them from the area of the Israeli border. There is, of course, another - reverse - possibility, which no one is considering today: in their distress, a few hundred thousand Palestinians march to the border, tear down the fences, breach the walls and invade Israel in a gigantic demonstration of unarmed civilians. Exactly two years before the Six-Day War, prime minister and defense minister Levi Eshkol was apprehensive about just such a development. A discussion was held in the weekly meeting with the senior figures of the defense establishment on June 4, 1965. Eshkol opened by asking how many refugees there were, what they ate and what the state of emigration was. The head of Military Intelligence, Aharon Yariv, replied that they ate what UNRWA, the United Nations relief agency, gave them. The situation was not good, the refugees were embittered and therefore were being drafted into the Egyptian army, Yariv reported. Eshkol noted that Egypt was not allowing the refugees to enter its territory and asked, "Could there not be a thought that we should raise an international gevalt [outcry, in Yiddish] why people are not allowed to go where they want?" He requested that his proposal be referred to the Foreign Ministry. Yariv offered some tactical advice: "We shouldn't be the ones to shout. We should see to it that someone else does the shouting."
Eshkol: "I always think that this is our Achilles' heel regarding the refugees. What will we do if one fine day they send their women and children forward?" The chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin, reassured him: "If they have not done it yet, they will not do it. After the first 100 are killed, they will go back." Eshkol was not convinced: "They multiply fast," he remarked. Rabin corrected him: "The number of refugees has not grown over the years. In 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, when the Negev was empty, when there were abandoned villages, this could have been a concern. At that time there was talk of marches by refugees. These days I haven't heard anyone talking about it." Eshkol: "The moment there will be 500,000 to 600,000 people - well, people have to live from something, and they are multiplying all the time and it could explode at some stage. And the fact that UNRWA is providing for them - we do not think that is right, either." The director general of the Defense Ministry, Moshe Kashti, asked whether there was no "constructive thinking" on solving the problem, by which he meant encouraging emigration. Rabin replied, "We acted in this matter in Germany and are acting in South America, but the Egyptians are not letting them out. They say so openly. They have created a frame of mind among the Arabs that to leave is to betray Palestine." Two years later, Israel captured the Gaza Strip. Eshkol received various proposals to alleviate the refugees' plight. One possibility was to resettle several thousand Gaza families in the West Bank permanently. Nothing was done, in part because ministers Menachem Begin, Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon wanted the West Bank to be reserved for Jewish settlement. Without Begin, Dayan and Allon, Eshkol did not have a coalition. That was the great missed opportunity of 1967.'
Zie: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/903678.html
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