MONDAY, JUNE 10, 2019
The FFM's Mysterious "Mandate" to Blame "Assad"
<< Douma Chemical Massacre
The OPCW FFM's Mysterious "Mandate" ... to Blame "Assad"
June 10-11, 2019
incomplete
Not allowed: specify blame
When it comes to blaming specific parties for alleged uses of chemicals, as weapons, in the Syrian Arab Republic, via the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) ... there have been some mechanisms over the years. One (called JIM) was tacked-on with a 2015 vote, then allowed to expire with another vote in 2017. Another avenue (called IIT) was voted in 2018 and is trying to operate now, with key state signatories refusing to recognize it as legitimate (covered briefly at the end of this piece). The running issue is a growing concern based on growing evidence that the agency has been corrupted by one bloc's geopolitical interests, and effectively weaponized to serve them.
Otherwise, the "watchdogs" at OPCW have done most of their detective work on CW use through the FFM (Fact-Finding Mission), which has run by a more limited "mandate" - which applied at the time of the incident in Douma on April 7, 2018 - "to determine whether chemical weapons or toxic chemicals as weapons have been used in Syria," and not tasked with "identifying who is responsible for alleged attacks," as the OPCW reiterated with the release of the FFM's final report, nearly a year after the event.
This has been the norm since the FFM's creation and first work in May 2014.* Many lament the limitation as a political constraint on the quest for accountability. They might be right, or right but backwards; the same critics can also point to the FFM findings that point obviously to Syrian government guilt in every case, despite the usual contrary clues that get glossed over. They can't state the blame, but could make it totally clear what would be stated, so people with a grudge against Damascus can push for that power to state the obvious, as that might help punitive measures to go forward.
*24 days in Syria under a mandate that included site inspections, then when opposition (false-flag) chemical and rocket facilities were included, on the first chance to test things, opposition forces shot at and arrested the FFM team on May 27, spurring a new approach that's held for 5+ years, with the exception of this case in Douma, 2018 - they don't inspect in rebel-held areas, initially at least for fear of shooting and detention. (see here).
There are actually multiple mandates; the FFM's final report on the Douma incident (S/1731 March 1, 2019 - PDF) states more specifically: "The aim of the FFM, as specified in Mandate FFM/050/18, was to gather facts regarding the incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon, in Douma ... and to report to the Director-General upon conclusion of the FFM activities." Also noted are "three further mandates (FFM/049/18, FFM/051/18, and FFM/057/18) were issued by the Director-General instructing the FFM team to conduct further activities" relating to the Douma probe. That's a total of four mandates issued, with the (most operative one?) 050 being the second in sequence.
The relative content of these and such details are worth more study, but here I'm interested in how "the mandate" in general is used. It's cited - by the FFM and by OPCW leadership - as shaping the investigation by allowing some lines of inquiry and commentary, and disallowing others. The reasoning seems inconsistent and perhaps improvised, but the results blame Syria in all but name... which may be the reason for any such improvisation.
Allowed: pursue clues for aerial delivery
As Guardian Middle East editor Brian Whitaker put it in a curious May 24 article we'll return to (Medium, Al-Bab):
In fact this hypothesis was developed into a major theme of the FFM's investigation, as shown in their various reports. When it's convenient to explain the scene, a cylinder can be left "without sufficient energy to fall through" the hole it just punched, but usually the things are described as "falling" with a "velocity" and on a "trajectory," maybe an "altered trajectory" but with enough "kinetic energy to cause the observed damage" - on adventures like "passing through the roof" - a simulated "low speed impact" suggests higher speeds were tried and didn't work. - "independent experts in mechanical engineering, ballistics and metallurgy" were called on to assess "the range of force, velocities, and trajectories possible for the cylinder to have caused the damage observed." You get the picture, and it's a petty kinetic one.
Obviousness review: Considering precedent, only the opposition side has the motive for such an event to be reported, falsely if needed. Manual staging is the simplest way to do that, but motive alone ups the slim chances they might figure out how to hurl the things in by air. Surface firing of such a large object with no onboard propulsion remains unknown, difficult enough many consider it impossible, especially with the giant but snug aerial harness included. A crude catapult could put nearly anything in the air, if not with much ability to fly and hit a distant target. We might wonder if the opposition had any aircraft - some of them once seized some helicopters, years ago and across the country, never very useful considering Syria's strong air defenses. They can field aerial drones with no problem, but it's had to imagine one this burly being rigged up to carry and release such a weapon amidst the government assault. So no - they could probably not do this.
Motive alone argues for higher, but the physics of the Douma incident lobby for around 0% so - a sort of illogical compromise number, I offer a generous 3% likelihood for opposition air delivery, to give the other side a little play in the comparison below. So let's say aerial delivery points with the converse 97% certainty, in this case, to Syrian military aircraft.
So they weren't allowed to spell it out, but this clear finding wound up pointing to one side in the conflict - and it was read by many as more like 99-100% sure. The well-endowed pseudo-skeptics at Bellingcat are among OPCW-favored experts who help amplify the inherent signal, muting that limit on their mandate. Commenting on the FFM's final report:
The scientific findings seemed strong enough to overcome obvious and widely-noted inverse motive for the Syrian government. At the verge of defeating the occupying "Army of Islam" with regular military tactics, they had to cap it with a pointless gassing of civilians, and NOT because that's the only thing that gets the U.S. to attack them - it just seemed worth the risk. Now it's hard to prove if the Islamists surrendered due to the horrifying CW attack, or if it was just their last false-flag event before they surrendered, based on the pre-existing state of total defeat. That could be debated forever.
But motive aside, we could assume Assad did it, marring his own victory and inviting missile strikes. We could presume that because the FFM's presumably careful work made aerial delivery so clear and obvious. And again, the effort spent on that seems to be allowed by their mandate.
Not allowed: pursue clues for manual delivery
But for all the effort put into developing one hypothesis, there is no sign the FFM gave serious thought to how the cylinders might NOT line up with the building damage. The reader might presume that's for lack of any other explanation, and so accept it as less of an idea than a fact that makes the linkage - and the suggest blame - "clear" or "obvious." But that would make such a reader misled, because there is another and very plausible hypothesis, which the FFM was aware of, and deliberately left out of their reports.
Outside observers like myself could always see this other option and, as we learned just recently, there was a body within the OPCW's investigation called the FFM engineering sub-team (hereafter EST), that reached the same basic conclusion. The EST visited the sites in Douma and carried out later analysis, consulting relevant experts and computer modeling, producing a report called "engineering assessment of two cylinders observed at the Douma incident" signed by likely sub-team leader, Ian Henderson, who is an OPCW trained inspector.
A later version of this report, and presumably the original,* states: "observations at the scene of the two locations, together with subsequent analysis, suggest that there is a higher probability that both cylinders were manually placed at those two locations rather than being dropped.” They felt, with provided reasoning, that the evidence did not match up to show an impact-based relation. Rather, the building damage was caused by explosive weapons at an earlier time - a point that's well-supported by the physical evidence - and the cylinders were just set there, as we're left to presume, as part of an organized deception.
* note: what was leaked is a later "expanded rev 1" of that report, issued by hand to team members only on Feb. 27, 2019 - just prior to the final report's publication. The exact contents and date of the original assessment are uncertain; presumably same or similar, but less expanded. When: apparently in time to be considered, most likely prior to the July 6, 2018 interim report that promised a (first-ever?) engineering assessment would be carried out soon.
Of course the OPCW never allowed us a glimpse of this line of inquiry in the FFM's work, even in its long-delayed final report on March 1. That was left to whistleblowers within the organization to bring it public, via a leak to the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media, prior to May 11. Its startling revelations sparked the weeks of drama and debate since. But previously, this alternative hypothesis had been ruled out to the point of exclusion from the final report. Why?
There will perhaps never be an official explanation, but "informed sources" have put out the word that the EST findings might have violated the FFM's narrow remit. Brian Whitaker's May 24 article explains:
Obviousness review: maybe, for extremely unclear reasons, some Assadist sleeper cell in Douma could sneak into these flats with cylinders, maybe dozens of bodies ... and set it all up with no interference ... then trick the opposition into filming and promoting the site ... No, no. The foreign-backed opposition - here meaning Jaish al-Islam - "Army of Islam," Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists who freely massacre and kidnap civilians on sectarian lines - would have the motive to have the scene happen. They could massacre captives they didn't want to see freed, as would happen otherwise upon their inevitable surrender any day. Only they had the exclusive means in their control of the area (albeit crumbling at the time) as to be the obvious culprits in such a scenario.
I'd say manual placement is 100% certainty (rounded up a bit) in pointing to one side in the conflict. Compaing to 97% (conservatively) for aerial delivery would mean this hypothesis comes a bit closer to explicit blame. So is it just that difference behind the decision? You can get ~97% specific in all the detail you want, but you can go nowhere at all down a road that goes to ~100%? Or put another way: the clearer case has to be left off? That could explain the decision, but quite poorly.
The ban on specified blame shouldn't be the problem here; it's left obvious what kind of hands would be involved, but it's never spelled out in the EST report we see. By the standards used for the aerial clues, this hypothesis should fit the mandate and be included - especially as that would have left it more balanced. But the same standards don't seem to apply.
Asked about this "too close" claim, Whitaker expanded with a more limited but direct quote from his source: "The exact words were that the engineering assessment looked at "hypotheses that the FFM determined to go beyond the scope of the FFM’s mandate"." This is more vague, suggesting the prior claim ("words were") had been misread by Whitaker. But perhaps it was read correctly, but now they're backing off from the blame aspect, maybe due to its overly-evident hypocrisy.
But there's not much else known about this mandate to suggest another reason to cut of those "hypotheses" (and note that's the plural form). I asked Whitaker if anything made aerial delivery less specific than manual placement, or if it was simply a matter of the "closeness" to its option, or was it just a double standard? (here and under the above tweet). He didn't respond. But I estimate aerial as ~3% less specific than manual, at most. There can hardly be a valid reason for such a total sorting of the two options, so one of just two was excised as the other got to ride shotgun the whole way, posed as the only option. It must be an unstated double standard permitting that false clarity about the Assad-helicopter connection.
Not allowed: consider (consistently) how they got there
In late May, OPCW released a Russian criticism of the "FFM final report" (note verbale 759, April 26 - PDF) and the response from the OPCW's Technical Secretariat (S/1755, May 21 - PDF). That response was a questionable exercise, and Peter Hitchens submitted some thoughtful questions to the OPCW (doesn't seem they answered...), and especially about response 14.1, which closes the document S/1755. The language here is not clear enough to be sure, but it seems (straight reading) that they claim the manner of the cylinders' arrival is outside the mandate altogether.
This response was issued May 21, after the EST leak (all about the latter option's absence) on May 12, with widespread news only by the 16th or later, and just before Whitaker's source was claiming (May 24) that option might've come "too close" to pinning blame. Considering that, it might be a hasty, last minute effort to distance the whole issue.
But on reflection I suppose that might be too puzzling, and the wording leaves open a more vague dodge of the issue, a twist on the usual semantics: they don't make the exact case they cite the Russians with, because both quotes include "aircraft" - and perhaps also because they don't consider manual placement or related clues at all, because of ... well, in line with their mandate.
Either way, the mentioned question of "how the cylinders arrived" (from the FFM's interim report) could just mean how fast, how angled, etc. But it kind of suggests different methods (like air vs. manual) were on-line and needing consideration, for some valid reason the FFM was aware of at the time (prior to July 6, 2018). A public statement then to suggest a multi-track investigation might be to placate those who insisted on a more balanced approach. But if so, it was vague and non-binding; in the end the "how" was taken for granted, and it was all a matter of how fast they fell from a point way up in the air, well above the reach of the tallest known human beings.
In contrast, the OPCW's "Internal Vision" states "we take nothing for granted, subject our actions to keen examination, acknowledge other points of view and learn from our mistakes" In the same vein, S/1755 states "The analyses of the FFM are based on the facts and data collected and corroborated by the team and not on assumptions." But the way they focused only on aerial delivery with impacts sounds like an assumption, upon which much of their analysis was based.
The main clear point remains; let's back to the above long quote from the FFM's response: the aerial option is not so much "referred to" as it is directly argued every step of the way. The manual option is not argued, nor elaborated on, nor even mentioned in the final report. And so "this type" of information must actually be two types of information, to get such different treatment. As Hitchens put the suspicion, in his questions to the OPCW, referring to "internal vision" (see above) and its disavowal of assumptions:
Altitude deception required by the mandate?
It's true the FFM's reports completely omits the A-word, and avoids some details like the type (almost surely helicopter) and - for reasons that must be strange - the possible altitude from which the weapons fell is off-limits. S/1755: "The analyses of the FFM are based on the facts and data collected and corroborated by the team and not on assumptions. In this context, the FFM report on the Douma incident does not contain assumptions or statements about the use of a helicopter (or any other craft) and the height of flight."
It's a detail of the aircraft they can't mention, but also a detail of the falling cylinders at the center of their single hypothesis. The duration of fall leads to the velocity needed to maybe explain the impacts. That seems worth mentioning, even if it's not necessary. They could call it an unexplained "descent initiation," and even avoid the leading word "drop." But rather, they opted to leave it out entirely.
Is it a coincidence they also arrive at a drop altitude that's implausibly (and thus embarrassingly) low? From the provided images of some modeling work, not the report text, we can summarize their best-fit velocities, chosen to perhaps explain the damage and/or sudden stops suggested:
Location 4: ~60 m/s impact pierces the roof straight-down, cylinder bounces off the floor at an angle into a bed.
Location 2: 30 m/s final impact, after a prior corner impact slowed it from about 50 m/s, it tips over on the balcony, next to the hole it made.
The FFM is emphatic about not "assuming" an altitude, and instead using these estimated velocities as a starting point. Then, they conducted "reverse scientific calculations" which would - among other things - point back to a range of altitudes (depending on variable like exact weight, wind, etc.). Everyone who calculates what that range should be, and shares the results, comes to similar conclusions. But no one supporting the FFM seems interested in trying - just the critics.
The Russian analysis (see NV 759) estimates the FFM's chosen velocities equate to an altitude range from 45 meters for the lower speeds (Location 2) and up to 180 meters (Location 4), depending on whatever variables they considered variably.
Fellow WGSPM member, engineering-minded Michael Kobs tried for the faster Loc. 4 cylinder in graphs I couldn't read easily enough (see here for one). He had to explain to me how - for a 260km full cylinder - it could be dropped anywhere from 120-200 meters up, depending on any tumbling (mix of vertical vs. horizontal alignment). With the design considered, mostly vertical is expected, so closer to the lower level; maybe around 150 meters.
Eminent but quite fallible professor Theodore Postol's recent analysis (Washington's Blog) - 30 m/s impact at Location 2 would require - quite broadly - "an altitude of between 50 and 250 m, with the most likely altitudes being between 50 and 130 m" or as he also says a 30 m/s impact "would only occur if a helicopter dropped the cylinder from an altitude of roughly 50 m." But it seems he didn't figure in the supposedly crucial corner impact in comparing (my concerns - The difference is not serious, but could be exploited.)
Renowned climate scientist Stephen McIntyre reviewd this "insolent OPCW response,"considering the Russian numbers as similar to his own for Location 2 ("balcony"): "a drop altitudes of 50 to 150 meters" depending on variables, starting from a "slightly narrower range of impact velocities of 30 to 50 m/s." The FFM claimed the higher speed prior to corner impact, so the higher altitude would apply: ~150m.
None of that is gospel, but all come out pretty similar, and nothing much different comes out at all.
How this compares to aerial reality: all kinds of sources agree normal practice for Syrian aviation is to stay above 2,000 meters (and even higher by some sources) while passing over opposition territory, to be well above their anti-aircraft fire. This isn't proof any aircraft had to be that high over Douma, as the Russian NV579 paints it, nor at any particular height; dips to lower but fairly safe levels shouldn't be ruled out, nor even risky dips to lower levels yet, if there's some reason. But no one wants to hover at 150m or 50m and get shot down by an AK-47 or RPG, just so the FFM's later calculations can be valid.
So 2,000 meters remains a good reference point, if not a lowest possible level. The Henderson-EST report, for example, assumed some altitudes to test the evidence (an inherently proper idea, but supposedly outside the FFM mandate - see above). They or their experts felt anything from 2000 down to 500 meters should be considered (even at 500 the damage was much more severe than noted - to the buildings and to the cylinders). A graphic showing the expected impact damage at Location 2 indicates (barely readable in the scan) "initial velocity 100 m/s."
Stephen McIntyre explains the significance:
In review, the following "not allowed" and "allowed" lines of inquiry and commentary were supposedly crucial in shaping the FFM's findings, in line with their "mandate and methodology":
* Allowed: consider if chemicals were used as a weapon without specifying blame (indicating is ok).
* Not allowed: consider manual placement, which would say no, indicate oppo. for staging of an attack, suggest related crimes like murder of the deceased victims.
* Allowed: pursue aerial clues, which say yes, and indicates "Assad regime"
* Not allowed: in this context with two options and one is deleted, no competing hypotheses are allowed. Therefore:
* Not allowed: a No answer to the weapon/attack question
* Not allowed: the option of indicating (and thus possibly blaming) anyone but Assad
* Allowed, exclusively in this case: a finding that Assad regime clearly/obviously used chemicals as a weapon, chlorine dropped from helicopters - which the opposition doesn't have so case closed.
* Also not allowed: discussion of certain embarrassing details like the low drop height needed to partially explain the damage. Or conversely:
* Allowed: selective use of the mandate to obscure any embarrassing steps in developing their preferred hypothesis.
So in essence, the FFM's mandate requires them to make the case for yet another obvious Assad regime CW attack. They don't get to state the case, but they make it well enough that nothing else fits in the provided blank line. They get to screen out any alternative hypothesis that might compete for belief, and present the preferred option as the only one. And as they give it, it's their mandate and its established limits that force all this and prevent them from getting any other result, even if it were true. This was already pretty evident, but here we can trace it in their own references.
Postscript on the IIT's mysterious mandate
...not so crucial, but related and interesting, so forthcoming.
...
Prof. Scott Lucas' altered trajectory (June 11)
2018: OPCW is still investigating ... 3. @ClarkeMicah ignores findings re helicopters & munitions, both pointing to #Assad responsibility
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1040919083997380609
2018: UN Commission on chlorine attack on #Douma in April 2018: (linked)
Para. 92: "At approximately 7.30 p.m., a gas cylinder containing a chlorine payload delivered by helicopter struck a multi-storey residential apartment building" (based on OPCW)
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1041638274190721024
March 1, 2019: [FFM final] Report points to helicopters dropping canisters...
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1101731023459622912
March 1: Desperate stuff from InfoWars Guy —- pretty sure he hadn’t read OPCW report pointing to chlorine attack by helicopter on #Douma on April 7, 2018
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1101594004322508800
April 30: With respect, OPCW report is clear that 1) there was deadly chlorine attack on #Douma on April 7, 2018; 2) chlorine was in canisters dropped by helicopters.
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1123224345772462084
May 26: #OPCW final report --- based on 3 sets of experts in 3 countries --- working from calculations & data, differing from Kobs' extrapolation, pointing to drop from regime helicopter.
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1132631938156695558
After the OPCW statements of May 21-24 sunk in:
May 30: How dim are you, Fake Chemical Engineer?
1. OPCW FFM, limited in mandate, does not issue conclusion re means of chlorine delivery
2. Evidence & analysis point to #Assad regime copters. Follow-up OPCW inquiry, w mandate to attribute responsibility, will determine
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1134336253053349889
May 29: 6. This is also why, even if technically sound, Henderson dissent is not in #OPCW final report but is referred to IIT: it attributes blame with its assertion that canisters were likely to have been placed rather than air-dropped.
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1133846552735342592
May 31: So Peter Hitchens still doesn't understand.
1. OPCW FFM, limited in mandate, does not issue conclusion re means of chlorine delivery
2. But evidence & analysis point to #Assad regime copters. Follow-up OPCW inquiry, w mandate to attribute responsibility, will determine
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1134362892340486144
And we can see why Prof. Lucas, as opposed to Mr. Hitchens or most of us, will always "understand" the OPCW and, so long as he doesn't get too confused by its twists and turns, will remain on its good side.
Some helicopter quotes collected by Per Firdous al-Buyun @lissnup, May 31 with commentary:
Leaked @OPCW report exposes an internet phenomenon, #Douma Loop Syndrome: repeatedly crashing into opposing viewpoints and continuing altered trajectory.
Scott rigidly defends the FFM now but it was a different song not so long ago, in replies to @21WIRE, Hitchens and myself.
https://twitter.com/lissnup/status/1134525033756463104
OPCW DG Arias on blame vs. facts (June 12)
https://twitter.com/HRIMark/status/1138527955926310913
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9r5MrA5r0Dc&feature=youtu.be&t=5942
Diector-General Fernando Arias, speaking recently at a conference in Bratislava, Slovakia:
At 1:41:20 he explains how the Henderson-EST assessment was "produced by a staff member of the organization" - not by some interloper as suggested by initial OPCW statements, and to the present by some of their supporters. The assessment "is going to be given - it has already been given to the Investigation and Identification Team in chagge of attributing responsibilities [sic]..." (app. a recent decision that's barely sunk in) "... Because this information you referred to is more focusing, is more targeted to establish responsibilities than focused to the facts." Not mentioned: it suggests blame with information just as factual as any, and more likely to be true than the analysis used to attribute blame in the other direction, unchallenged, in the FFM's self-undermined final report. Arias also mentions how this is a spot where some information is "not fit to the conclusion" - for example if they conclude for air delivery, as seems to be the case, manual placement would not "fit" with that. BBC's Frank
Gardner posed the questions about the EST assessment, specifically Robert Fisk's article in The Independent. Gardner started (1:40:55) with "I know this is uncomfortable for you..." and asks if this classes as 'fake news' or that "misinformation" Arias spoke of. "Not exactly," he replied, then a long explanation including the points above.
Prior to that (1:39:02) Arias poses the OPCW as victim of a malicious conspiracy to undermine its credibility, and pleads for more of the antidote; ongoing faith in the OPCW's process and findings: "...we are attacked with misinformation, with proxies that produced reports to undermine an official report of the fact-finding mission about investigations in Syria. And I ask you, civil society, to believe in what we do. We work for the protection of the international community. ... anything you can do to help the organization to reinforce its legitimacy will be to the benefit of peace and security in the world." Journalists present got the message, and perhaps to do their part to preserve that faith, they asked no questions (1:42:45).
"Misinformation" = information that clashes with the OPCW's biased findings taken as fact, and much or most of it is true info, not "mis." "Reports" likely = briefing notes, because Proxies likely = a WGSPM in particular, of which I'm a member, apparently taken as proxies of the Russians. He'll have no real evidence for this untrue suggestion, and for our part at least, our "attacks" on the OPCW and its credibility are only to expose how they already lack credibility. People should know and adjust their faith allocation accordingly. It could be that our works are sticking with the public mind, despite all the authority the OPCW enjoys, because the problems with the organization are quite real and need only to be pointed out. https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-ffms-mysterious-mandate-to-blame.html?fbclid=IwAR05JbcrHl9fAJlFYJseLOGTcaVUB1WlOKjceUSJT4bbj4gV9509M9o4jrI
The OPCW FFM's Mysterious "Mandate" ... to Blame "Assad"
June 10-11, 2019
incomplete
Not allowed: specify blame
When it comes to blaming specific parties for alleged uses of chemicals, as weapons, in the Syrian Arab Republic, via the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) ... there have been some mechanisms over the years. One (called JIM) was tacked-on with a 2015 vote, then allowed to expire with another vote in 2017. Another avenue (called IIT) was voted in 2018 and is trying to operate now, with key state signatories refusing to recognize it as legitimate (covered briefly at the end of this piece). The running issue is a growing concern based on growing evidence that the agency has been corrupted by one bloc's geopolitical interests, and effectively weaponized to serve them.
Otherwise, the "watchdogs" at OPCW have done most of their detective work on CW use through the FFM (Fact-Finding Mission), which has run by a more limited "mandate" - which applied at the time of the incident in Douma on April 7, 2018 - "to determine whether chemical weapons or toxic chemicals as weapons have been used in Syria," and not tasked with "identifying who is responsible for alleged attacks," as the OPCW reiterated with the release of the FFM's final report, nearly a year after the event.
This has been the norm since the FFM's creation and first work in May 2014.* Many lament the limitation as a political constraint on the quest for accountability. They might be right, or right but backwards; the same critics can also point to the FFM findings that point obviously to Syrian government guilt in every case, despite the usual contrary clues that get glossed over. They can't state the blame, but could make it totally clear what would be stated, so people with a grudge against Damascus can push for that power to state the obvious, as that might help punitive measures to go forward.
*24 days in Syria under a mandate that included site inspections, then when opposition (false-flag) chemical and rocket facilities were included, on the first chance to test things, opposition forces shot at and arrested the FFM team on May 27, spurring a new approach that's held for 5+ years, with the exception of this case in Douma, 2018 - they don't inspect in rebel-held areas, initially at least for fear of shooting and detention. (see here).
There are actually multiple mandates; the FFM's final report on the Douma incident (S/1731 March 1, 2019 - PDF) states more specifically: "The aim of the FFM, as specified in Mandate FFM/050/18, was to gather facts regarding the incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon, in Douma ... and to report to the Director-General upon conclusion of the FFM activities." Also noted are "three further mandates (FFM/049/18, FFM/051/18, and FFM/057/18) were issued by the Director-General instructing the FFM team to conduct further activities" relating to the Douma probe. That's a total of four mandates issued, with the (most operative one?) 050 being the second in sequence.
The relative content of these and such details are worth more study, but here I'm interested in how "the mandate" in general is used. It's cited - by the FFM and by OPCW leadership - as shaping the investigation by allowing some lines of inquiry and commentary, and disallowing others. The reasoning seems inconsistent and perhaps improvised, but the results blame Syria in all but name... which may be the reason for any such improvisation.
Allowed: pursue clues for aerial delivery
As Guardian Middle East editor Brian Whitaker put it in a curious May 24 article we'll return to (Medium, Al-Bab):
"Although the FFM determined that the cylinders were probably dropped from the air, the published report (in line with its mandate) omitted any mention of the obvious implication that they had been dropped by regime aircraft."So the mandate allowed them to consider and publish evidence with "obvious implications" pointing to one party. Keep this in mind.
In fact this hypothesis was developed into a major theme of the FFM's investigation, as shown in their various reports. When it's convenient to explain the scene, a cylinder can be left "without sufficient energy to fall through" the hole it just punched, but usually the things are described as "falling" with a "velocity" and on a "trajectory," maybe an "altered trajectory" but with enough "kinetic energy to cause the observed damage" - on adventures like "passing through the roof" - a simulated "low speed impact" suggests higher speeds were tried and didn't work. - "independent experts in mechanical engineering, ballistics and metallurgy" were called on to assess "the range of force, velocities, and trajectories possible for the cylinder to have caused the damage observed." You get the picture, and it's a petty kinetic one.
Obviousness review: Considering precedent, only the opposition side has the motive for such an event to be reported, falsely if needed. Manual staging is the simplest way to do that, but motive alone ups the slim chances they might figure out how to hurl the things in by air. Surface firing of such a large object with no onboard propulsion remains unknown, difficult enough many consider it impossible, especially with the giant but snug aerial harness included. A crude catapult could put nearly anything in the air, if not with much ability to fly and hit a distant target. We might wonder if the opposition had any aircraft - some of them once seized some helicopters, years ago and across the country, never very useful considering Syria's strong air defenses. They can field aerial drones with no problem, but it's had to imagine one this burly being rigged up to carry and release such a weapon amidst the government assault. So no - they could probably not do this.
Motive alone argues for higher, but the physics of the Douma incident lobby for around 0% so - a sort of illogical compromise number, I offer a generous 3% likelihood for opposition air delivery, to give the other side a little play in the comparison below. So let's say aerial delivery points with the converse 97% certainty, in this case, to Syrian military aircraft.
So they weren't allowed to spell it out, but this clear finding wound up pointing to one side in the conflict - and it was read by many as more like 99-100% sure. The well-endowed pseudo-skeptics at Bellingcat are among OPCW-favored experts who help amplify the inherent signal, muting that limit on their mandate. Commenting on the FFM's final report:
"While some may find comfort in increasingly elaborate conspiracy theories about what happened in Douma, the OPCW FFM report continues to make it clear that the Douma attack was yet another chlorine attack delivered by helicopter ..."See also extended example from Prof. Scott Lucas below the main article, taking this sort of line until he realizes he shouldn't...
The scientific findings seemed strong enough to overcome obvious and widely-noted inverse motive for the Syrian government. At the verge of defeating the occupying "Army of Islam" with regular military tactics, they had to cap it with a pointless gassing of civilians, and NOT because that's the only thing that gets the U.S. to attack them - it just seemed worth the risk. Now it's hard to prove if the Islamists surrendered due to the horrifying CW attack, or if it was just their last false-flag event before they surrendered, based on the pre-existing state of total defeat. That could be debated forever.
But motive aside, we could assume Assad did it, marring his own victory and inviting missile strikes. We could presume that because the FFM's presumably careful work made aerial delivery so clear and obvious. And again, the effort spent on that seems to be allowed by their mandate.
Not allowed: pursue clues for manual delivery
But for all the effort put into developing one hypothesis, there is no sign the FFM gave serious thought to how the cylinders might NOT line up with the building damage. The reader might presume that's for lack of any other explanation, and so accept it as less of an idea than a fact that makes the linkage - and the suggest blame - "clear" or "obvious." But that would make such a reader misled, because there is another and very plausible hypothesis, which the FFM was aware of, and deliberately left out of their reports.
Outside observers like myself could always see this other option and, as we learned just recently, there was a body within the OPCW's investigation called the FFM engineering sub-team (hereafter EST), that reached the same basic conclusion. The EST visited the sites in Douma and carried out later analysis, consulting relevant experts and computer modeling, producing a report called "engineering assessment of two cylinders observed at the Douma incident" signed by likely sub-team leader, Ian Henderson, who is an OPCW trained inspector.
A later version of this report, and presumably the original,* states: "observations at the scene of the two locations, together with subsequent analysis, suggest that there is a higher probability that both cylinders were manually placed at those two locations rather than being dropped.” They felt, with provided reasoning, that the evidence did not match up to show an impact-based relation. Rather, the building damage was caused by explosive weapons at an earlier time - a point that's well-supported by the physical evidence - and the cylinders were just set there, as we're left to presume, as part of an organized deception.
* note: what was leaked is a later "expanded rev 1" of that report, issued by hand to team members only on Feb. 27, 2019 - just prior to the final report's publication. The exact contents and date of the original assessment are uncertain; presumably same or similar, but less expanded. When: apparently in time to be considered, most likely prior to the July 6, 2018 interim report that promised a (first-ever?) engineering assessment would be carried out soon.
Of course the OPCW never allowed us a glimpse of this line of inquiry in the FFM's work, even in its long-delayed final report on March 1. That was left to whistleblowers within the organization to bring it public, via a leak to the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media, prior to May 11. Its startling revelations sparked the weeks of drama and debate since. But previously, this alternative hypothesis had been ruled out to the point of exclusion from the final report. Why?
There will perhaps never be an official explanation, but "informed sources" have put out the word that the EST findings might have violated the FFM's narrow remit. Brian Whitaker's May 24 article explains:
"According to the informed source, when Henderson’s assessment was reviewed there were concerns that it came too close to attributing responsibility, and thusfell outside the scope of the FFM’s mandate."This is simply amazing. When you're pointing to the air, "too close" doesn't seem to exist; you can be right on top of and wrapped all around that unstated blame. But if you're pointing the other way, it seems no distance is far enough - nary a whisper of that possibility is allowed by this rather convenient and malleable "mandate."
Obviousness review: maybe, for extremely unclear reasons, some Assadist sleeper cell in Douma could sneak into these flats with cylinders, maybe dozens of bodies ... and set it all up with no interference ... then trick the opposition into filming and promoting the site ... No, no. The foreign-backed opposition - here meaning Jaish al-Islam - "Army of Islam," Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists who freely massacre and kidnap civilians on sectarian lines - would have the motive to have the scene happen. They could massacre captives they didn't want to see freed, as would happen otherwise upon their inevitable surrender any day. Only they had the exclusive means in their control of the area (albeit crumbling at the time) as to be the obvious culprits in such a scenario.
I'd say manual placement is 100% certainty (rounded up a bit) in pointing to one side in the conflict. Compaing to 97% (conservatively) for aerial delivery would mean this hypothesis comes a bit closer to explicit blame. So is it just that difference behind the decision? You can get ~97% specific in all the detail you want, but you can go nowhere at all down a road that goes to ~100%? Or put another way: the clearer case has to be left off? That could explain the decision, but quite poorly.
The ban on specified blame shouldn't be the problem here; it's left obvious what kind of hands would be involved, but it's never spelled out in the EST report we see. By the standards used for the aerial clues, this hypothesis should fit the mandate and be included - especially as that would have left it more balanced. But the same standards don't seem to apply.
Asked about this "too close" claim, Whitaker expanded with a more limited but direct quote from his source: "The exact words were that the engineering assessment looked at "hypotheses that the FFM determined to go beyond the scope of the FFM’s mandate"." This is more vague, suggesting the prior claim ("words were") had been misread by Whitaker. But perhaps it was read correctly, but now they're backing off from the blame aspect, maybe due to its overly-evident hypocrisy.
But there's not much else known about this mandate to suggest another reason to cut of those "hypotheses" (and note that's the plural form). I asked Whitaker if anything made aerial delivery less specific than manual placement, or if it was simply a matter of the "closeness" to its option, or was it just a double standard? (here and under the above tweet). He didn't respond. But I estimate aerial as ~3% less specific than manual, at most. There can hardly be a valid reason for such a total sorting of the two options, so one of just two was excised as the other got to ride shotgun the whole way, posed as the only option. It must be an unstated double standard permitting that false clarity about the Assad-helicopter connection.
Not allowed: consider (consistently) how they got there
In late May, OPCW released a Russian criticism of the "FFM final report" (note verbale 759, April 26 - PDF) and the response from the OPCW's Technical Secretariat (S/1755, May 21 - PDF). That response was a questionable exercise, and Peter Hitchens submitted some thoughtful questions to the OPCW (doesn't seem they answered...), and especially about response 14.1, which closes the document S/1755. The language here is not clear enough to be sure, but it seems (straight reading) that they claim the manner of the cylinders' arrival is outside the mandate altogether.
"The FFM report does not refer in any part to “the argument that they were dropped from an aircraft.” Also, the FFM report does not elaborate in any part on the “high probability that both cylinders were placed at Locations 2 and 4 manually rather than dropped from an aircraft”. In fact, this type of information is deemed outside of the mandate and methodology of the FFM."Information of "this type" seems to mean how it got there (from an aircraft vs. manually or by foot). But that clashes with all the kinetic analysis about how the things arrived on a "trajectory" with "velocity" to "cause the observed damage" in what's described as an "impact." Hitchens found that puzzling, given their stated work, ongoing in July 2018, regarding "the relative damage to the cylinders and the roofs, and how the cylinders arrived at their respective locations."
This response was issued May 21, after the EST leak (all about the latter option's absence) on May 12, with widespread news only by the 16th or later, and just before Whitaker's source was claiming (May 24) that option might've come "too close" to pinning blame. Considering that, it might be a hasty, last minute effort to distance the whole issue.
But on reflection I suppose that might be too puzzling, and the wording leaves open a more vague dodge of the issue, a twist on the usual semantics: they don't make the exact case they cite the Russians with, because both quotes include "aircraft" - and perhaps also because they don't consider manual placement or related clues at all, because of ... well, in line with their mandate.
Either way, the mentioned question of "how the cylinders arrived" (from the FFM's interim report) could just mean how fast, how angled, etc. But it kind of suggests different methods (like air vs. manual) were on-line and needing consideration, for some valid reason the FFM was aware of at the time (prior to July 6, 2018). A public statement then to suggest a multi-track investigation might be to placate those who insisted on a more balanced approach. But if so, it was vague and non-binding; in the end the "how" was taken for granted, and it was all a matter of how fast they fell from a point way up in the air, well above the reach of the tallest known human beings.
In contrast, the OPCW's "Internal Vision" states "we take nothing for granted, subject our actions to keen examination, acknowledge other points of view and learn from our mistakes" In the same vein, S/1755 states "The analyses of the FFM are based on the facts and data collected and corroborated by the team and not on assumptions." But the way they focused only on aerial delivery with impacts sounds like an assumption, upon which much of their analysis was based.
The main clear point remains; let's back to the above long quote from the FFM's response: the aerial option is not so much "referred to" as it is directly argued every step of the way. The manual option is not argued, nor elaborated on, nor even mentioned in the final report. And so "this type" of information must actually be two types of information, to get such different treatment. As Hitchens put the suspicion, in his questions to the OPCW, referring to "internal vision" (see above) and its disavowal of assumptions:
"... you could not possibly have ‘taken for granted’ that the cylinders were dropped from the air. Could you? Your minds must have been open to alternative possibilities. ... Surely it is not the case that such information is only within the OPCW mandate if it suggests that the cylinders were dropped from above?"Surely not? Perhaps not. But alas... it seems their mandate is that narrow as to only let one option pass, at the risk of choking out the truth.
Altitude deception required by the mandate?
It's true the FFM's reports completely omits the A-word, and avoids some details like the type (almost surely helicopter) and - for reasons that must be strange - the possible altitude from which the weapons fell is off-limits. S/1755: "The analyses of the FFM are based on the facts and data collected and corroborated by the team and not on assumptions. In this context, the FFM report on the Douma incident does not contain assumptions or statements about the use of a helicopter (or any other craft) and the height of flight."
It's a detail of the aircraft they can't mention, but also a detail of the falling cylinders at the center of their single hypothesis. The duration of fall leads to the velocity needed to maybe explain the impacts. That seems worth mentioning, even if it's not necessary. They could call it an unexplained "descent initiation," and even avoid the leading word "drop." But rather, they opted to leave it out entirely.
Is it a coincidence they also arrive at a drop altitude that's implausibly (and thus embarrassingly) low? From the provided images of some modeling work, not the report text, we can summarize their best-fit velocities, chosen to perhaps explain the damage and/or sudden stops suggested:
Location 4: ~60 m/s impact pierces the roof straight-down, cylinder bounces off the floor at an angle into a bed.
Location 2: 30 m/s final impact, after a prior corner impact slowed it from about 50 m/s, it tips over on the balcony, next to the hole it made.
The FFM is emphatic about not "assuming" an altitude, and instead using these estimated velocities as a starting point. Then, they conducted "reverse scientific calculations" which would - among other things - point back to a range of altitudes (depending on variable like exact weight, wind, etc.). Everyone who calculates what that range should be, and shares the results, comes to similar conclusions. But no one supporting the FFM seems interested in trying - just the critics.
The Russian analysis (see NV 759) estimates the FFM's chosen velocities equate to an altitude range from 45 meters for the lower speeds (Location 2) and up to 180 meters (Location 4), depending on whatever variables they considered variably.
Fellow WGSPM member, engineering-minded Michael Kobs tried for the faster Loc. 4 cylinder in graphs I couldn't read easily enough (see here for one). He had to explain to me how - for a 260km full cylinder - it could be dropped anywhere from 120-200 meters up, depending on any tumbling (mix of vertical vs. horizontal alignment). With the design considered, mostly vertical is expected, so closer to the lower level; maybe around 150 meters.
Eminent but quite fallible professor Theodore Postol's recent analysis (Washington's Blog) - 30 m/s impact at Location 2 would require - quite broadly - "an altitude of between 50 and 250 m, with the most likely altitudes being between 50 and 130 m" or as he also says a 30 m/s impact "would only occur if a helicopter dropped the cylinder from an altitude of roughly 50 m." But it seems he didn't figure in the supposedly crucial corner impact in comparing (my concerns - The difference is not serious, but could be exploited.)
Renowned climate scientist Stephen McIntyre reviewd this "insolent OPCW response,"considering the Russian numbers as similar to his own for Location 2 ("balcony"): "a drop altitudes of 50 to 150 meters" depending on variables, starting from a "slightly narrower range of impact velocities of 30 to 50 m/s." The FFM claimed the higher speed prior to corner impact, so the higher altitude would apply: ~150m.
None of that is gospel, but all come out pretty similar, and nothing much different comes out at all.
How this compares to aerial reality: all kinds of sources agree normal practice for Syrian aviation is to stay above 2,000 meters (and even higher by some sources) while passing over opposition territory, to be well above their anti-aircraft fire. This isn't proof any aircraft had to be that high over Douma, as the Russian NV579 paints it, nor at any particular height; dips to lower but fairly safe levels shouldn't be ruled out, nor even risky dips to lower levels yet, if there's some reason. But no one wants to hover at 150m or 50m and get shot down by an AK-47 or RPG, just so the FFM's later calculations can be valid.
So 2,000 meters remains a good reference point, if not a lowest possible level. The Henderson-EST report, for example, assumed some altitudes to test the evidence (an inherently proper idea, but supposedly outside the FFM mandate - see above). They or their experts felt anything from 2000 down to 500 meters should be considered (even at 500 the damage was much more severe than noted - to the buildings and to the cylinders). A graphic showing the expected impact damage at Location 2 indicates (barely readable in the scan) "initial velocity 100 m/s."
Stephen McIntyre explains the significance:
"...had the OPCW reported the range of trajectories, readers would have been informed that the observed damage at the balcony corresponded to a drop altitude of only 50-150 meters. The inconsistency of this figure with known operating altitudes of Syrian helicopters would undoubtedly have been immediately pointed out, raising major questions about whether the chlorine cylinders could be attributed to a drop from Syrian helicopters as opposed to manual placement (as had been concluded in the leaked OPCW Engineering Sub-Team Report."Summary: the FFM mandate is to blame "Assad"
In review, the following "not allowed" and "allowed" lines of inquiry and commentary were supposedly crucial in shaping the FFM's findings, in line with their "mandate and methodology":
* Allowed: consider if chemicals were used as a weapon without specifying blame (indicating is ok).
* Not allowed: consider manual placement, which would say no, indicate oppo. for staging of an attack, suggest related crimes like murder of the deceased victims.
* Allowed: pursue aerial clues, which say yes, and indicates "Assad regime"
* Not allowed: in this context with two options and one is deleted, no competing hypotheses are allowed. Therefore:
* Not allowed: a No answer to the weapon/attack question
* Not allowed: the option of indicating (and thus possibly blaming) anyone but Assad
* Allowed, exclusively in this case: a finding that Assad regime clearly/obviously used chemicals as a weapon, chlorine dropped from helicopters - which the opposition doesn't have so case closed.
* Also not allowed: discussion of certain embarrassing details like the low drop height needed to partially explain the damage. Or conversely:
* Allowed: selective use of the mandate to obscure any embarrassing steps in developing their preferred hypothesis.
So in essence, the FFM's mandate requires them to make the case for yet another obvious Assad regime CW attack. They don't get to state the case, but they make it well enough that nothing else fits in the provided blank line. They get to screen out any alternative hypothesis that might compete for belief, and present the preferred option as the only one. And as they give it, it's their mandate and its established limits that force all this and prevent them from getting any other result, even if it were true. This was already pretty evident, but here we can trace it in their own references.
Postscript on the IIT's mysterious mandate
...not so crucial, but related and interesting, so forthcoming.
...
Appendices
Prof. Scott Lucas' altered trajectory (June 11)
2018: OPCW is still investigating ... 3. @ClarkeMicah ignores findings re helicopters & munitions, both pointing to #Assad responsibility
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1040919083997380609
2018: UN Commission on chlorine attack on #Douma in April 2018: (linked)
Para. 92: "At approximately 7.30 p.m., a gas cylinder containing a chlorine payload delivered by helicopter struck a multi-storey residential apartment building" (based on OPCW)
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1041638274190721024
March 1, 2019: [FFM final] Report points to helicopters dropping canisters...
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1101731023459622912
March 1: Desperate stuff from InfoWars Guy —- pretty sure he hadn’t read OPCW report pointing to chlorine attack by helicopter on #Douma on April 7, 2018
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1101594004322508800
April 30: With respect, OPCW report is clear that 1) there was deadly chlorine attack on #Douma on April 7, 2018; 2) chlorine was in canisters dropped by helicopters.
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1123224345772462084
May 26: #OPCW final report --- based on 3 sets of experts in 3 countries --- working from calculations & data, differing from Kobs' extrapolation, pointing to drop from regime helicopter.
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1132631938156695558
After the OPCW statements of May 21-24 sunk in:
May 30: How dim are you, Fake Chemical Engineer?
1. OPCW FFM, limited in mandate, does not issue conclusion re means of chlorine delivery
2. Evidence & analysis point to #Assad regime copters. Follow-up OPCW inquiry, w mandate to attribute responsibility, will determine
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1134336253053349889
May 29: 6. This is also why, even if technically sound, Henderson dissent is not in #OPCW final report but is referred to IIT: it attributes blame with its assertion that canisters were likely to have been placed rather than air-dropped.
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1133846552735342592
May 31: So Peter Hitchens still doesn't understand.
1. OPCW FFM, limited in mandate, does not issue conclusion re means of chlorine delivery
2. But evidence & analysis point to #Assad regime copters. Follow-up OPCW inquiry, w mandate to attribute responsibility, will determine
https://twitter.com/ScottLucas_EA/status/1134362892340486144
And we can see why Prof. Lucas, as opposed to Mr. Hitchens or most of us, will always "understand" the OPCW and, so long as he doesn't get too confused by its twists and turns, will remain on its good side.
Some helicopter quotes collected by Per Firdous al-Buyun @lissnup, May 31 with commentary:
Leaked @OPCW report exposes an internet phenomenon, #Douma Loop Syndrome: repeatedly crashing into opposing viewpoints and continuing altered trajectory.
Scott rigidly defends the FFM now but it was a different song not so long ago, in replies to @21WIRE, Hitchens and myself.
https://twitter.com/lissnup/status/1134525033756463104
OPCW DG Arias on blame vs. facts (June 12)
https://twitter.com/HRIMark/status/1138527955926310913
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9r5MrA5r0Dc&feature=youtu.be&t=5942
Diector-General Fernando Arias, speaking recently at a conference in Bratislava, Slovakia:
At 1:41:20 he explains how the Henderson-EST assessment was "produced by a staff member of the organization" - not by some interloper as suggested by initial OPCW statements, and to the present by some of their supporters. The assessment "is going to be given - it has already been given to the Investigation and Identification Team in chagge of attributing responsibilities [sic]..." (app. a recent decision that's barely sunk in) "... Because this information you referred to is more focusing, is more targeted to establish responsibilities than focused to the facts." Not mentioned: it suggests blame with information just as factual as any, and more likely to be true than the analysis used to attribute blame in the other direction, unchallenged, in the FFM's self-undermined final report. Arias also mentions how this is a spot where some information is "not fit to the conclusion" - for example if they conclude for air delivery, as seems to be the case, manual placement would not "fit" with that. BBC's Frank
Gardner posed the questions about the EST assessment, specifically Robert Fisk's article in The Independent. Gardner started (1:40:55) with "I know this is uncomfortable for you..." and asks if this classes as 'fake news' or that "misinformation" Arias spoke of. "Not exactly," he replied, then a long explanation including the points above.
Prior to that (1:39:02) Arias poses the OPCW as victim of a malicious conspiracy to undermine its credibility, and pleads for more of the antidote; ongoing faith in the OPCW's process and findings: "...we are attacked with misinformation, with proxies that produced reports to undermine an official report of the fact-finding mission about investigations in Syria. And I ask you, civil society, to believe in what we do. We work for the protection of the international community. ... anything you can do to help the organization to reinforce its legitimacy will be to the benefit of peace and security in the world." Journalists present got the message, and perhaps to do their part to preserve that faith, they asked no questions (1:42:45).
"Misinformation" = information that clashes with the OPCW's biased findings taken as fact, and much or most of it is true info, not "mis." "Reports" likely = briefing notes, because Proxies likely = a WGSPM in particular, of which I'm a member, apparently taken as proxies of the Russians. He'll have no real evidence for this untrue suggestion, and for our part at least, our "attacks" on the OPCW and its credibility are only to expose how they already lack credibility. People should know and adjust their faith allocation accordingly. It could be that our works are sticking with the public mind, despite all the authority the OPCW enjoys, because the problems with the organization are quite real and need only to be pointed out. https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-ffms-mysterious-mandate-to-blame.html?fbclid=IwAR05JbcrHl9fAJlFYJseLOGTcaVUB1WlOKjceUSJT4bbj4gV9509M9o4jrI
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