dinsdag 13 oktober 2009

De Israelische Terreur 969

UN: US Block on Goldstone Report Must Not Defer Justice

Posted: 12 Oct 2009 12:20 PM PDT

CriminalPush Israel and Hamas to Investigate War Crimes
October 2, 2009

Human Rights Watch

(Geneva) – The decision at the UN Human Rights Council to defer a vote on the Goldstone Gaza report until March 2010 obliges the United States and other governments blocking action at the council to press Israel and Hamas to commence credible investigations, Human Rights Watch said today. The fact-finding mission found evidence of violations of the laws of war during the Gaza conflict that should trigger credible investigations of the conduct of both sides.

Given its responsibility for forcing a deferral of the vote and its criticism of the mission led by Justice Richard Goldstone, the United States bears a special responsibility to ensure that Israel commences investigations that are credible, impartial and meet international standards (see the Human Rights Watch fact sheet, “Why no justice for Gaza?”).

“The United States won Israel a reprieve on the Goldstone report, so now it must ensure that Israel genuinely investigates allegations of abuse,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “If this doesn’t happen by March, then the US should endorse the Goldstone report’s call for international mechanisms of accountability.”

The US government called the Goldstone report “deeply flawed,” although it said it took the allegations seriously. Speaking to the Human Rights Council on September 29, 2009, US Assistant Secretary of State Michael Posner said the United States was “confident that Israel, as a democracy with a well-established commitment to the rule of law, has the institutions and ability to carry out robust investigations into these allegations.”

To date, however, Israel’s record of conducting investigations into the conduct of its military forces has been extremely poor. The Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem documented 773 cases where Israeli forces killed civilians not involved in hostilities during the December-January conflict in Gaza, but found that Israel has to date convicted only one soldier of a crime – for stealing a credit card. Human Rights Watch has also repeatedly criticized Hamas for failing to undertake serious investigations into alleged laws-of-war violations by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups.

European Union member states, which failed to express support for a resolution that would have endorsed the Goldstone report in full, should also demand that Israel undertake serious investigations, Human Rights Watch said.

“The failure of the US and European states to endorse the Goldstone report sent a terrible message that serious laws-of-war violations by allied states would be tolerated,” Whitson said.

The 575-page report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict concluded that both Israel and Hamas were responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including war crimes and possible crimes against humanity. The report recommended that the Israeli government and Hamas authorities conduct independent, impartial investigations within six months. Should the UN Security Council find that they failed to do so, the report urged that it to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that endorsing the Goldstone report would deal a “fatal blow to the peace process.”

“Prime Minister Netanyahu’s rejection of the Goldstone report because it would derail the peace process sadly impugns the importance of justice in reaching peace,” said Whitson. “Persistent impunity, not justice, is the greater threat to peace.”

Jeff Gates – At What Cost the Israel Lobby?

Posted: 12 Oct 2009 09:40 AM PDT

aipac handsMore than 46 years ago, President John F. Kennedy sought to preclude a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. In June 1963, he wrote the last in a series of insistent letters to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Those letters sought what Israel now demands of Iran: international inspections of its nuclear facilities. The key difference: Kennedy knew for certain that Israel, while portraying itself a friend and ally, repeatedly lied to Kennedy about its nuclear weapons development at the Dimona reactor in the Negev Desert.

Best estimates point to sometime between 1962 and 1964 when Israel produced its first weapon in what is now a vast nuclear arsenal estimated at 200-400 warheads. Kennedy’s letter to Ben-Gurion was anything but friendly. The words he chose were drawn not from diplomacy but from the instructions that a judge gives a jury on criminal culpability. In that brusque letter, the U.S. commander-in-chief insisted that this purported ally prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the Zionist enclave was not developing nuclear weapons.

One day after that June 15th letter was cabled to Tel Aviv for delivery by the U.S. ambassador, Ben-Gurion abruptly resigned citing undisclosed personal reasons. As his resignation was announced before the letter could be physically delivered, Jewish authors routinely claim that Kennedy’s message failed to reach Ben-Gurion. Nonsense. That interpretative gloss ignores what we now know about Israeli operations inside serial U.S. presidencies—and about Tel Aviv’s routine intercept of White House communications.

Deprived of an Israeli government with which to negotiate, Kennedy was denied a national security victory that may well have spared the world a problem he foresaw almost a half-century ago. In retrospect, that Israeli conduct raises topical questions about the ability of the U.S.—or any nation—to hold Zionist extremists accountable.

The Khazars vs. the Kennedys

During this same 1962-63 period, Senator William J. Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, convened hearings on the legal status of the American Zionist Council. The AZC received funds from the Jewish Agency, a predecessor to the state of Israel. As a recipient of U.S. taxpayer funds, the Jewish Agency used those funds to lobby for more funds. Under U.S. law, that conduct required the AZC to register as a foreign agent.

Attorney General Robert Kennedy joined Fulbright in that quest. That effort was thwarted by the Israel lobby and then by the death of President Kennedy. Thereafter, concerns about the impact of Zionist influence on U.S. policy making continued to grow. By 1973, Fulbright could announce with confidence: “Israel controls the U.S. Senate.” In 1974, he lost his Senate seat. [See: “How the Israel Lobby Took Control of U.S. Foreign Policy.”]

Fast-forward to today and imagine the Middle East without an enclave of nuclear-armed Zionist extremists. The threat that Kennedy posed to Tel Aviv’s arsenal was eliminated five months after Ben-Gurion’s strategically well-timed resignation. When Vice President Lyndon Johnson was sworn in as his successor, LBJ quickly increased the arms budget for Israel. Imagine today’s Zionist influence on U.S. policy had Fulbright and the Kennedys succeeded in requiring that the lobby register as what it is: a foreign agent.

Following the Kennedy assassination in November 1963, Nicholas Katzenbach replaced RFK as Attorney General. Soon thereafter, the AZC evaded registration as it morphed into the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. AIPAC now oversees a transnational network of pro-Israeli political operatives commonly known as “the Israel lobby.”

The Kennedy/Fulbright risk to Zionist influence reemerged five years later when Robert Kennedy announced his candidacy for the presidency during the height of an unpopular war that was vastly expanded under the leadership of the Texan who replaced his brother as president. Another Kennedy presidency posed for Tel Aviv a two-fold threat.

First, Robert Kennedy’s peace candidacy revived the possibility that he would pursue his brother’s agenda and target Israel’s nuclear arsenal in order to preclude a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Second, with Fulbright still wielding influence on U.S. foreign policy, a Kennedy administration revived concerns about restrictions on the Israel lobby.

When this charismatic contender surged in the political polls, that threat was eliminated June 5, 1968 at a campaign event in Los Angeles. His death at the hand of Sirhan Sirhan, a Palestinian émigré, coincided with the first anniversary of the Six-Day War. The assassin later cited as his motive Kennedy’s campaign pledge to provide more fighter jets to Israel.

With that murder, the road to the presidency was cleared for Richard Nixon. When lobbied by Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, Nixon readily agreed to endorse an “ambiguous” status for Israel’s nuclear arsenal, akin to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”

Special Standard for a Special Friend

Due to its “special relationship” with the U.S., Tel Aviv remains a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Its Dimona facility has never been subjected to the inspections it now seeks for Iran. But for photographs taken inside the Dimona facility in 1986 by nuclear technician Mordecai Vanunu, that “ambiguity” might well remain intact.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly certified that Iran is not enriching uranium beyond the 3.5% required for nuclear energy. Tehran has agreed to send its uranium abroad for the further enrichment required for medicine (19.5%), a level still well below the 90% required for nuclear weapons.

In mid-September, the U.S. intelligence agencies reported to the White House that their assessment since the National Intelligence Estimate of November 2007 remains unchanged. They still do not believe that Iran has resumed nuclear weapons development work.

What about Israel? What has their lobby been doing? Answer: lobbying. As during the Kennedy era, Tel Aviv remains focused on a single goal: ensuring that its ally and patron continues a six-decade policy ensuring that Israel is not held accountable—for anything.

At what cost has the U.S. acted as if the Israel lobby is not a foreign agent? The strategic issue faced by Fulbright and the Kennedys remains unresolved: how best can the U.S. eliminate Israeli influence as a threat to national security? Since that fateful letter of June 1963, what has been the cost of this lobby to U.S. interests? What costs have been imposed on others by this special relationship? At what point will Americans say: Enough!

Jeff Gates is author of Guilt By Association, Democracy at Risk and The Ownership Solution. See www.criminalstate.com


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